Article Analysis Assignment | Online Assignment

Five-part essay: Intro; Article #1, Article #2; Article #3; Personal Evaluation of Concepts and Sources (Explanation of which of the three articles is preferred based on the research method and the data collected/evaluated)Inside the Black Box of Negative Campaign Effects:
Three Reasons Why Negative Campaigns Mobilize
Paul S. Martin
Department of Political Science, University of Oklahoma
The debate over the effect of negative campaigns on vote turnout has not been settled. At
present, studies demonstrating a mobilization effect seem to have the upper hand. However,
neither side has offered a compelling theory of the causal mechanisms that connect negative
campaigns and voter turnout. This paper identifies three mechanisms of voter motivation—
republican duty, candidate threat, and perceived closeness of the election—and
tests the influence of negative ads on each. The findings suggest that each works to plausibly
translate exposure to negative advertisement into increased participation.
KEY WORDS: voter turnout, negative campaign advertisement, mobilization
Since Ansolabehere and his colleagues’ groundbreaking evidence of the
demobilizing effects of negative campaigns (Ansolabehere, Iyengar, Simon, &
Valentino, 1994), new research has begun to point in the opposite direction
(Goldstein & Freedman, 2002). Negativity in campaigns is increasingly thought
to mobilize rather than demobilize citizens, with a few important exceptions. Even
so, the causal mechanisms of both the demobilization and mobilization hypotheses
are underdeveloped. This paper explores three different explanations for why
negative campaigns encourage rather than discourage turnout—stimulation of
republican duty, anxiety toward the candidates, and perceptions of increased
closeness of the race. Ultimately, all three paths for mobilization bear fruit.
Effects of Negative Campaigning on Turnout
Evidence supporting the idea that negative campaigning discourages voter
turnout comes primarily through experimental research, whereas evidence supporting
the idea that negative campaigning encourages voter turnout comes from

survey research. It appears that citizens believe that they are less likely to vote
because of negative campaigning, but nonetheless act in the opposite manner.
Negative campaigns may be a kind of guilty pleasure for Americans—they claim
to dislike them, but inadvertently are drawn to them in much the same way that
shoppers find themselves drawn to the tabloids in the checkout aisle.
The best evidence of a demobilization effect comes from a set of widely
reported experiments that tested the influence of negativity in campaign commercials
on attitudes toward government and self-reported intention to vote
(Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995; Ansolabehere et al., 1994). The studies found
that when respondents were shown a single negative advertisement, they claimed
that they would be less likely to vote and had worse attitudes toward government
(as measured by standard efficacy items). If people were shown a positive advertisement,
the effect was reversed. The difference between the effects of positive
and negative ads on the likelihood of voting was about 5%. Hence, the authors
claimed that negative advertisements demobilize the electorate. They further supported
their laboratory findings with an analysis of the influence of campaign tone
on aggregate voter turnout and vote roll-off in the 1992 Senate elections.
Although the laboratory evidence is provocative, it is not without problems,
as many have pointed out. First, in the analysis of the effects of exposure to advertising
on turnout, education does not prove to be an important factor predicting
vote intent. Studies consistently find that the more educated are more likely to
vote (e.g., Nie, Junn, & Stehlik-Barry, 1996; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995;
Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980), so the lack of an effect of education on vote
intention may indicate problems with the validity of the study. Negative campaign
commercials may have different influences in the lab than they have outside of
the lab. Second, others have not replicated the results of these early experiments.
More important, vote intent may be a poor measure of actual behavior.
Whereas experiments produce results showing demobilization, survey
research suggests the opposite. Reexamination of the negativity-demobilization
hypothesis has found little support for either aggregate- or individual-level effects.
Using content analysis of all presidential television advertisements since 1960,
Finkel and Geer (1998) concluded that there is no aggregate-level correlation
between the tone of campaigns and turnout. Likewise, using the National Election
Studies (NES) cumulative study, these authors found no influence of advertisement
tone on self-reported vote. If anything, they found slight evidence that
certain groups of people may have been mobilized by negative advertisement.
Additional studies of Senate campaigns demonstrate that most campaign negativity
fosters participation, with the exception of outright mudslinging, which
depresses turnout (Kahn & Kenney, 1999a). Similarly, a second set of Senate campaign
studies supports the idea that campaign negativity has a curvilinear effect
on turnout. Lau and Pomper (2001) found that most levels of negativity stimulate
turnout, but that negativity at extremely high levels seems to do the opposite. Both
sets of authors argued that mudslinging or unusually high levels of negativity have
546 Martin
distinct effects because citizens respond differently to what they perceive to be
legitimate criticisms versus personal attacks.1
An enduring problem with these initial survey-based studies is that none have
been able to adequately measure either the level of campaign advertising or the
level of reception of advertising messages within the mass public. Two important
new studies rectify these problems by more accurately assessing the probability
that a given individual will be exposed to negative political advertisements
(Freedman & Goldstein, 1999; Goldstein & Freedman, 2002). The authors of the
studies acquired market research data indicating the location and timing of campaign
advertisements, and then queried survey respondents about the times of day
that they typically watch television. When measured more precisely, reception of
negative political advertisements appears to increase turnout (Freedman &
Goldstein, 1999; Goldstein & Freedman, 2002). The original study by Freedman
and Goldstein focused on state-level races, but a more recent study focusing on
the 1996 presidential campaign showed that exposure to negative campaigns
mobilizes voters (Goldstein & Freedman, 2002).2
With the exception of the initial experimental work, scholars investigating
the effects of negative campaigning on turnout have consistently found that negative
advertising may in fact stimulate political participation. But even this assessment
is limited. A meta-analysis of 52 studies investigating various aspects of
negative campaigns concludes that “participatory democracy may be on the wane
in the United States, but the evidence reviewed here suggests that negative political
advertising has relatively little to do with it” (Lau, Sigelman, Heldman, &
Babbitt, 1999, p. 858).
Mechanisms
Despite an accumulation of evidence, the reasons why negative campaigns
mobilize or demobilize the public are not well established. On the side of demobilization,
most authors make a case that citizens are repulsed by candidates
attacking one another. According to Ansolabehere et al. (1994), “exposure to campaign
attacks makes voters disenchanted with the business of politics as usual”
(p. 835). For those proposing mobilization, most authors argue that campaign negativity
stimulates attention to and awareness of the campaign. The demobilization
arguments rely on a reading of the cultural tastes of the mass public, whereas the
mobilization arguments rely on a reading of the psychology of negative information
(e.g., Lau, 1985).
Why Negative Campaigns Mobilize 547
1 Although these two studies concur on the basic curvilinear effect of negativity on turnout, they find
conflicting evidence concerning the subpopulations most likely to be influenced and the direction of
the influence.
2 One distinct problem with using advertisement data to test the effect of negative campaigns is that
the volumes of negative and positive ads shown in a given media market are positively correlated.
The zero-order correlation of positive and negative ads for both Clinton and Dole in 1996 is about
.6. This is compounded by the nature of campaigns to be mostly negative.
The problem with the demobilization argument is that it is a version of an
ostrich theory—negativity encourages citizens to stick their heads in the ground
and avoid politics. The evidence supporting the view that citizens would act this
way is surprisingly weak. Robinson (1976), for example, originally made the argument
that media negativity encouraged what he called videomalaise (a sense of
disengagement), but the evidence presented in his study shows that when citizens
were exposed to negative information about politics and government, they did not
shy away from politics. Instead, they sought out opposition and third parties.
Several other studies offer indirect arguments—for example, media negativity
encourages distrust in government (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Miller,
Goldenberg, & Erbring, 1979). But distrust has never been clearly connected to
political participation. Rather, distrust, like videomalaise, seems to encourage
people to seek alternatives such as third parties (Peterson & Wrighton, 1998). In
sum, there is little evidence that citizens lack the stomach for negative campaigns.
On the side of the mobilization hypothesis, the preponderance of psychological
evidence concludes that negative information is arousing and attentiongrabbing.
People pay greater attention to negative information than to positive
information (Fiske, 1980; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Pratto & John, 1991). And
the process encouraging more attention to negative information appears to be
automatic—quick, effortless, subconscious—and induced by a perception of
threat. As Pratto and John (1991) explained,
There are good evolutionary reasons for this widespread and pronounced
asymmetry in people’s evaluative reactions. Events that may negatively
affect the individual are typically of greater time urgency than are events
that lead to desirable consequences. Averting danger to one’s well being,
such as preventing loss of life or limb, often requires an immediate
response. In comparison, positively valenced activities, such as feeding
and procreation, are less pressing; although they are of crucial importance
in the long term, pleasure is simply less urgent than pain. Negative
affect carries an important signal value because it signifies to the
organism the need to change or adjust its current state or activity. (p. 380)
Although this description may conjure up images of primitive people avoiding
predators, the same psychological mechanism that attracts our attention to immediate
dangers also draws our attention to negative social information (Lang,
Newhagen, & Reeves, 1996; Reeves, Lang, Thorson, & Rothchild, 1989).
When people are exposed to negative television images, they experience greater
arousal (Reeves et al., 1989) and demonstrate higher attention levels (Lang et al.,
1996) than when they are exposed to comparable positive images.3 Campaign
548 Martin
3 One recent study argues against this view, pointing out that once arousal is controlled for, positive
images are more memorable (Bolls, Lang, & Potter, 2001). Outside the laboratory, however, arousal
is not controlled for, so we should expect negative messages to be more memorable.
negativity may be apt to stimulate the kind of attention that could translate to
mobilization.
However, the application of these psychological theories to campaign-type
information is not without problems. Theories of attention-stimulating negative
information rely on evolutionary biology arguments over “fight or flight.” The
fundamental question is whether attention leads to engagement or avoidance,
whereas scholars making the negativity-attention argument overlook the real possibility
of flight when they equate attention with engagement. What is missing
is an argument that explains not only why negative campaign information is
attention-grabbing, but also why that attention will be steered toward, rather than
away from, political participation.
Intervening Mechanisms
Those supporting the view of demobilization unfairly characterize citizens’
likely response to negative information—that is, they give citizens too little credit.
Meanwhile, those contending mobilization suffer from a nearly universal problem
of using “interest” as a placeholder for mechanisms that are ill understood.
Progress in the scholarly debate over the influence of negative campaigns on voter
mobilization needs to rest on a better understanding of what motivates citizens to
vote and whether those mechanisms are influenced by campaign negativity.
Instead of the relatively blunt mechanisms of negativity automatically producing
interest or negativity turning off citizens, we should consider more carefully
how the information available in negative campaigns might be interpreted
and digested by citizens. The remainder of this paper explores three paths by
which negative campaigns might motivate citizens to vote. People may be motivated
to participate because negative advertising highlights threats in the social
environment or threats from particular candidates, and because it may indicate the
closeness of a race.
The first possible route—that of republican duty—assumes that American
citizens share some deep concern over the future of their country and that this
concern can be stimulated to encourage participation. Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and
McPhee (1954) argued something similar to this point, suggesting that people did
not vote because they were content with the status quo. Although their general
argument was perhaps too optimistic by ignoring how socioeconomic status limits
the ability of some to participate, the basic sentiment that people are more likely
to participate when they see trouble on the horizon may be worth reconsidering.
This conception of duty implies that obligations to vote and otherwise participate
in government are contingent on perceptions of external, societal circumstances,
specifically threats to the community. Whereas a progressive sense
of civic duty—as thought of by the authors of The American Voter (Campbell,
Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960) and most scholars since—is constant and fixed,
republican duty is flexible; sometimes it is more important to vote than at other
Why Negative Campaigns Mobilize 549
times. The burden of civic duty or obligation should rise and fall with a person’s
perceptions of external circumstances.
Drawing on the idea of republican civic duty, Martin (2000) found that when
people perceive more problems facing the country, they are more likely to participate
in politics. The perception of problems also stimulates interest in the
campaign and beliefs about the importance of voting. As negative campaigns frequently
center on issues, it is likely that citizens pick up information about collective
problems inadvertently through negative ads more than they would from
positive ads because of the way that negative information is advantaged in attention,
memory, and judgment. Exposure to negative advertisement should encourage
participation by heightening perceptions of public problems, making an
election appear of greater importance, and thereby stimulating republican duty.
A second possible route draws on models of candidate threat that argue that
campaigns may arouse anxiety within the public, which in turn stimulates interest
in campaigns (Marcus & MacKuen, 1993; Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen,
2000). The power of emotions such as anxiety to motivate participation should
not be underestimated. The impact on engagement from a person going from calm
to anxious is equivalent to or greater than the impact of going from a grade school
education to a college education (Marcus et al., 2000, p. 85).
One of the primary goals of negative campaigns is to paint opponents in the
worst possible light. These efforts may raise fears about the individual candidates,
especially for partisans. Raised anxiety because of negative advertisement should
foster interest in campaigns, and plausibly participation.
A third possible route comes from rational choice explanations of participation.
Rational actor models offer the suggestion that citizens participate in politics
if the utility of their participation outweighs the cost of their effort. And the
marginal utility of a vote is directly related to the closeness of a race. As a race
becomes close, the marginal utility of each vote increases. If potential voters
believe that the contest will be close, they will also believe that their vote will be
of greater consequence (Aldrich, 1993; Downs, 1957; Riker & Ordeshook, 1968).
Negative campaigns may signal to potential voters the relative closeness of
an upcoming race. Indeed, Kahn and Kenney (1999b) found that negative campaigns
are more likely in close races. If candidates are running frequent and negative
ads, then the race may appear more competitive and citizens may infer that
the race is tight. If citizens are attuned to basic political processes, it takes little
effort to infer that increased advertisement suggests a closer race. The empirical
problem, one this analysis does not avoid, is whether negative ads themselves
indicate the closeness of the race to citizens or whether negative ads are endogenous
to close races. Without a barrage of ads, people might not know a race is
close.
The following section tests the influence of negative campaigns on the
awareness of public problems, anxiety toward the candidates, and perceptions
550 Martin
of the closeness of the presidential election as three proximate causes of
mobilization.
Research Design
This study takes advantage of the WiscAds collection compiled under the
direction of Ken Goldstein at the University of Wisconsin. The ad collection, in
combination with the NES surveys, offers the opportunity to measure in the most
precise way available the effect of campaign advertising on political behavior.
This study uses the 1996 presidential race as a case study.
The WiscAds collection draws data originally collected by the Campaign
Media Analysis Group that tracked campaign advertising in the top 75 media
markets from 1 April 1996 through Election Day in November. From these data
we have measures of maximum potential exposure to campaign advertising in
each media market. The WiscAds project content-analyzed each ad and tracked
the frequency with which each ad was aired. Ads were categorized as being positive,
negative, or contrasting. Spots that focused entirely on the opponent were
considered negative, those focusing on the sponsoring candidate were positive,
and those doing both were contrasting.4 During the period of this study, Bill
Clinton’s campaign aired 91,432 ads to Bob Dole’s 70,728. Only 6% of Clinton’s
and 15% of Dole’s airings were positive. Twenty-eight percent of Clinton’s airings
were of negative ads, whereas 70% of Dole’s were negative. Although Goldstein
and Freedman (2002) pointed out that most contrast ads lean toward the negative
(p. 729), I use only negative ads to maintain conceptual and operational
consistency.
The WiscAds data allow us to estimate the frequency and tone of the advertisement,
whereas the 1996 NES allows us to estimate the probability that a given
respondent is exposed to the advertisement. Questions measuring the frequency
with which respondents watched prime-time television, nightly news, sporting
events, and game shows are used to construct an index that estimates the likelihood
that a respondent is exposed to campaign ads. This measure of likely exposure
is identical to that of Goldstein and Freedman (2002).
The analyses that follow use exposure to negative advertisement—the frequency
of negative ads in a given media market weighted by the likelihood that
a respondent is exposed to the ad—as the primary independent variable of interest.
The models also control for the amount of television viewership, independent
of whether ads were shown in the respondent’s area. I then test the effects of
the intervening variables—problem awareness, candidate anxiety, and perception
of the closeness of the race—on whether the respondent voted in 1996.
Why Negative Campaigns Mobilize 551
4 Goldstein and Freedman (2002) reported extensively on the coding of the ads. Ads were coded by
two graduate students. Of the 148 individual ads coded, there was disagreement on only three.
Testing Mechanisms
Negative Advertising Encourages People to Be More Aware of
Public Problems
Models of republican duty suggest that citizens become more engaged when
they perceive greater problems facing the country (Martin, 2000). Negative campaigns
frequently focus on attacking the issue positions of one another and may
incidentally raise awareness within the citizenry about the range of problems to
be dealt with, and hence the stakes of the race (or alternatively the importance of
the election).
To measure problem awareness, I counted the number of responses to the
open-ended question “What do you think are the most important problems facing
the country?” Respondents who named one problem were prompted for up to two
additional problems; hence, they could name zero, one, two, or three problems.5
The analysis presented in Table 1 is an ordered probit analysis looking at the influence
of exposure to negative advertisement on problem awareness while controlling
for partisanship and socioeconomic status.
552 Martin
Table 1. Effect of Negative Advertisement on Problem Awareness
Exposure to negative advertisement 0.0001† (.00007)
Prime-time TV viewership 0.305 (.315)
Partisanship -0.043† (.026)
Age -0.001 (.003)
Education 0.128* (.040)
Income 0.163* (.055)
White 0.415* (.175)
Female 0.119 (.263)
Cut point 1 -0.887 (.327)
Cut point 2 0.409 (.305)
Cut point 3 1.26 (.308)
n 522
c2 47.09*
Initial log likelihood -517.87
Final log likelihood -494.33
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates are ordered probit coefficients. Sources: NES
1996, WiscAds 1996.
†p < .10, *p < .05 (two-tailed).
5 To alleviate concerns about the intensity of perceived problems, a second study conducted at the
University of Oklahoma tested a follow-up question after the most important problems measure.
Respondents were asked how much of a problem they believed each problem mentioned was. On a
scale from 1 to 100, all problems mentioned were rated nearly the same at 75, which provides some
confidence that respondents did not mention problems they considered trivial.
The evidence from Table 1 shows that exposure to negative advertisement
increases problem awareness. The effect of exposure to ads was statistically significant
at the p < .10 level for a two-tailed test and p < .05 for a one-tailed test.
Negative ads appeared to increase public perceptions of problems and, indirectly,
the apparent stakes of the race.6 People who watched similar amounts of television
in areas without campaign ads showed no increase in problem awareness.
Table 2 presents a logit model demonstrating that problem awareness positively
influences voter turnout while controlling for strength of partisanship,
differences in socioeconomic status, and whether either political party contacted
the respondent (see the Appendix for details). Voter turnout is measured by a
self-report of whether the respondent voted in the 1996 election. As problem
awareness increased, respondents became more likely to have voted in 1996.
Negative Advertising Stimulates Anxiety About Candidates
Anxiety about candidates stimulates interest and engagement in campaigns
(Marcus & MacKuen, 1993; Marcus et al., 2000). The natural question is whether
negative ads encourage such anxiety, as they are probably intended to do.
The tests used to examine this hypothesis separate the survey respondents
into partisan groups because negative advertisement should influence these groups
differently. Those predisposed to a candidate will be more prone to resist negative
information about their preferred candidate, and those opposed to a candidate
Why Negative Campaigns Mobilize 553
Table 2. Problem Awareness and Voter Turnout
Problem awareness 0.257* (.120)
Strength of partisanship 0.609* (.110)
Party contact 1.14* (.277)
Age 0.029* (.006)
Education 0.517* (.087)
Income 0.387* (.105)
Female -0.051 (.209)
White 0.109 (.300)
Constant -5.71 (.696)
n 730
c2 188.23
Initial log likelihood -397.38
Final log likelihood -303.26
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates are logit coefficients. Dependent variable is
coded 1 if the respondent voted, 0 if not. Source: NES 1996.
*p < .05.
6 The influence of negative ad exposure on problem awareness was slightly stronger in respondents
who had at least a college degree.
are likely to accept negative information about that candidate (see Zaller, 1992).
Specifically, negative ads run by Clinton against Dole are not targeted at staunch
Republicans, but rather at voters who are undecided or leaning toward Democrats.
Anxiety about candidates is gauged using questions about whether the candidates
(Bill Clinton or Bob Dole) made survey respondents angry or afraid, and
if they did, whether they were made angry or afraid rarely, occasionally, fairly
often, or very often. The analysis here is also an ordered probit.
Among the possible relationships, only Clinton’s negative ads produced any
anxiety among Democrats and independents, and then the ads influenced only
feelings of fear about Dole.7 Table 3 presents the results. Exposure to Dole’s negative
ads did not influence the anxiety level of independents and Republicans
about Clinton. (Note, however, that those who watched more prime-time television,
shown in the third row, were more likely to be angered by Dole and Clinton,
even when no negative ads were run in their market.) Had this been an open
contest, the effects of Dole’s negative advertisement would likely have been different.
As Clinton was the incumbent, and hence widely known, Dole’s political
ads were in competition with a 4-year stream of information: Clinton’s record and
actions were the subject of front-page news. Conversely, although Dole was the
Senate majority leader (from January 1995 through June 1996, when he resigned
that post to concentrate on his campaign), the campaign was his introduction to
a national audience. The mass public’s relative ignorance of Dole afforded
Clinton a negative advertising advantage—the ability to fill in a relatively blank
canvas.
Table 4 shows a model of how fear of Dole—the only measure of anxiety
shown to be influenced by negative ads—influenced the participation of Democrats
and independents. The model controls for the strength of partisanship,
whether the respondent was contacted by the parties, as well as the respondent’s
age, education, income, whether the respondent was female, and whether the
respondent was white. Democrats and independents who expressed greater fear
of Dole were more likely to vote (p < .05).
Negative Advertising Influences Perceptions of the Closeness of the Race
Rational choice theory suggests that citizens participate in politics if the
utility of their participation outweighs the cost of their effort, which is more likely
if an election is close. Negative campaigns may signal to potential voters the
relative closeness of an upcoming race. Closeness is measured by asking respondents
whether they think the presidential race will be close or whether one
candidate will win by quite a bit.
554 Martin
7 Respondents with a college degree or higher education showed stronger effects from exposure to
Clinton ads on their fear and anger at Dole.
Why Negative Campaigns Mobilize 555
Table 3. Effect of Negative Advertisement on Anxiety Toward Candidates
Independents and Democrats Independents and Republicans
Dole makes you angry Dole makes you afraid Clinton makes you angry Clinton makes you afraid
Exposure to Clinton’s negative ads 0.0002 (.0004) 0.0007† (.0004) — —
Exposure to Dole’s negative ads — — 0.0001 (.0001) 0.0003 (.0001)
Prime-time TV viewership 1.15* (.293) 0.511 (.315) 0.532† (.276) 0.143 (.291)
Age -0.002 (.003) 0.0002 (.003) 0.0002 (.003) 0.0008 (.003)
Education 0.137* (.037) 0.115* (.039) 0.087* (.037) 0.013 (.039)
Income -0.202* (.050) -0.145* (.054) 0.072 (.054) 0.026 (.056)
Female 0.117 (.099) 0.076 (.105) -0.168† (.099) -0.058 (.104)
White 0.285* (.140) -0.033 (.142) 0.749* (.287) 0.440 (.307)
Cut point 1 0.812 (.284) 0.825 (.304) 0.886 (.363) 0.758 (.380)
Cut point 2 0.965 (.285) 0.976 (.304) 1.08 (.364) 0.961 (.381)
Cut point 3 1.53 (.287) 1.41 (.306) 1.80 (.368) 1.53 (.383)
Cut point 4 2.13 (.292) 1.94 (.310) 2.38 (.371) 1.96 (.386)
n 581 579 492 492
c2 49.02* 26.25* 31.82* 7.85
Initial log likelihood -746.52 -636.06 -749.67 -655.10
Final log likelihood -722.01 -622.93 -733.76 -651.18
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates are ordered probit coefficients. Higher values indicate higher anger or fear. Sources: NES 1996, WiscAds
1996.
†p < .10, *p < .05 (two-tailed).
556 Martin
Table 4. Fear of Dole and Turnout for Independents and Democrats
Dole makes you afraid 0.208* (.075)
Strength of partisanship 0.508* (.091)
Party contact 1.00* (.239)
Age 0.028* (.005)
Education 0.397* (.071)
Income 0.500* (.093)
Female -0.036 (.182)
White -0.321 (.242)
Constant -4.57* (.569)
n 825
c2 187.29
Initial log likelihood -486.33
Final log likelihood -392.67
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates are logit coefficients. Dependent variable is
coded 1 if the respondent voted, 0 if not. Source: NES 1996.
*p < .05.
Table 5 presents the results of a logit analysis showing that exposure to
negative advertisement encourages perceptions that the race is closer.8 But it does
so in a curious way. Exposure to both Clinton’s and Dole’s negative ads made
Republicans and Republican leaners perceive the race to be closer. The effects are
not mirrored on the Democratic side. A model that does not differentiate between
Clinton’s and Dole’s negative ads finds the same thing: Republicans were likely
to see the race as closer when negative ads were more frequent. One potential
explanation for this finding is that Democrats were in general less likely to think
the race was close. Only 46% of Democrats believed the presidential contest was
close, versus 60% of Republicans. Exposure to negative advertising may have
encouraged Republicans’ wishful thinking about Dole’s prospects.
One problem that rational choice models can’t overlook is that the connection
between citizen perceptions about the closeness of a race and their participation
in it is frequently tenuous (Ferejohn & Fiorina, 1975). However, Table 6
(also a logit analysis controlling for party contact and demographics) shows that
whereas perceived closeness of the race has no bearing on pure independents (who
are least likely to vote) or self-identifying partisans, closeness matters for leaning
partisans, or what many call “closet partisans” (see Keith et al., 1992). Negative
ads may mobilize those weakly aligned with either party.
8 A fair question is whether it is indeed the negativity that causes people to see races as closer, rather
than simply exposure to many ads because of competitiveness in a given area. Models very similar
to those presented in Table 5, but testing for the effect of total number of ads rather than specific
negativity, were nearly indistinguishable in their results. This is probably because the zero-order correlation
between the number of ads and the number of negative ads in a designated market area
(DMA) is above .9. When and where campaigns run many ads, they run many negative ads, which
makes it difficult to differentiate the effect of negative ads from the effect of ads in general.
Conclusion
To briefly summarize the evidence, negative campaigns stimulate problem
awareness, stimulate anxiety about candidates, and make people perceive races
as closer. All three offer indirect (if partial) routes to mobilization. Although some
may expect analysis that pits these routes against one another, there is little reason
to believe that these mechanisms are in competition rather than representing multiple,
complementary paths to participation.9 Also, it is noteworthy that these findings
are not universal; Clinton’s and Dole’s negative campaigns did not have equal
influence, and the effects were not present in all subgroups.
In the context of the debate over the effect of negative advertisement on
voting, this paper supports the argument that negative campaigns mobilize,
showing multiple mechanisms that could translate exposure to negative advertisement
into motivation to vote. I do not doubt, however, that negative advertisement
could also stimulate other mechanisms, such as personal political
efficacy, that could make some people less likely to vote.
Why Negative Campaigns Mobilize 557
Table 5. Effect of Negative Advertisement on Perceived Closeness of the Race
Democrats and Democratic leaners Republicans and Republican leaners
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Exposure to Clinton’s 0.001 (.001) — 0.002† (.001) —
negative ads
Exposure to Dole’s — -0.001 (.001) — 0.0007* (.0003)
negative ads
Prime-time TV -0.416 (.574) -0.063 (.548) 0.057 (.635) 0.126 (.597)
viewership
Strength of -0.107 (.123) -0.101 (.123) 0.117 (.132) 0.110 (.133)
partisanship
Age 0.001 (.006) 0.001 (.006) -0.003 (.006) -0.003 (.006)
Education 0.018 (.071) 0.014 (.071) -0.036 (.082) -0.037 (.082)
Income -0.083 (.096) -0.090 (.096) -0.033 (.081) -0.026 (.111)
Female 0.817* (.194) 0.819* (.194) 0.506* (.211) 0.505* (.212)
White -0.604* (.261) -0.569 (.260) -0.155 (.929) -0.195 (.927)
Constant 0.350 (.668) 0.348 (.668) 0.048 (.044) 0.065 (1.10)
n 498 498 403 403
c2 27.82* 27.23 13.08 14.42
Initial log likelihood -342.47 -342.47 -275.00 -275.00
Final log likelihood -328.56 -328.85 -268.46 -267.79
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates are logit coefficients. Dependent variable is
perceived closeness of the presidential race, coded 1 if perceived as close, 0 if not. Sources: NES
1996, WiscAds 1996.
†p < .10, *p < .05 (two-tailed).
9 Analyses not presented here, but available from the author, show that all three mechanisms tested—
closeness, problem awareness, and fear of both candidates—remain statistically significant when
tested together.
558 Martin
Table 6. Closeness Counts for Closet Partisans’ Vote Turnout
Pure independents “Closet” partisans Weak partisans Strong partisans
Perceived closeness of the election 0.244 (.474) 0.467† (.290) 0.029 (.234) -0.323 (.354)
Party contact 0.491 (.530) 0.560 (.361) 1.20* (.324) 1.41* (.553)
Age 0.059* (.016) 0.036* (.010) 0.035* (.008) 0.021* (.011)
Education 0.266 (.170) 0.506* (.112) 0.590* (.103) 0.319* (.146)
Income 0.343 (.265) 0.489* (.140) 0.329* (.120) 0.761* (.191)
Female 0.920* (.454) 0.097 (.303) -0.307 (.244) 0.525 (.356)
White -1.08† (.622) -0.007 (.460) -0.057 (.423) 0.324 (.399)
Constant -4.27* (1.21) -4.41* (.843) -3.72* (.780) -2.50* (.908)
n 115 312 471 437
c2 28.57* 69.86* 98.32* 60.63*
Initial log likelihood -79.60 -187.44 -272.53 -144.90
Final log likelihood -65.32 -152.51 -223.37 -114.58
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates are logit coefficients. Dependent variable is coded 1 if the respondent voted, 0 if not. Source: NES 1996.
†p < .10, *p < .05 (two-tailed).
APPENDIX
All survey data come from the 1996 NES; all campaign data come from
WiscAds. The models presented in Tables 1 and 3 are ordered probit models, and
the models presented in Tables 2, 4, 5, and 6 are logit models (for excellent
descriptions of these models, see King, 1989; Long, 1997).
Dependent Variables
Tables 1 and 2: Problem awareness
“What do you think are the most important problems facing the nation
today?” Coded as a count of the number of problems mentioned, from 0 to 3.
Tables 3 and 4: Anxiety toward candidates
“Has (Bill Clinton/Bob Dole)—because of the kind of person he is, or
because of something he has done—ever made you feel (angry/afraid/hopeful/
proud)?” (If yes) “How often would you say you’ve felt (angry/afraid/hopeful/
proud)—very often, fairly often, occasionally, or rarely?” Coded 0 if the respondent
answers no to first question, 1 if rarely, 2 if occasionally, 3 if fairly often, 4
if very often.
Tables 5 and 6: Perceived closeness of the race
“Do you think the presidential race will be close or will one candidate win
by quite a bit?” Coded 0 if one candidate will win by quite a bit, and 1 if race
will be close.
Tables 2, 4, and 6: Vote turnout
Coded 1 if the respondent reported to have voted, and 0 otherwise.
Independent Variables
Television viewership when commercials are most likely run (Probability of
reception)
The measure is identical to that of Goldstein and Freedman (2002).
“Do you watch (Frasier, ER, Prime Time, Dr. Quinn) every week, most
weeks, only occasionally, or not at all?” Coding: 1 if every week, .66 if most
weeks, .33 if only occasionally, 0 if never.
“How many times a week do you watch (game shows like Jeopardy! and
Wheel of Fortune/sports) per week?” Coding: 1 if more than once a week, .5 if
once a week, 0 if never. Prime-time and sports items combined in one scale.
“How many days in the past week did you watch the national network news
on TV?” and “How many days in the past week did you watch the local TV news,
for example, Eyewitness News or Action News?” News items combined in a single
Why Negative Campaigns Mobilize 559
additive scale, recoded 0–1. Prime-time/sports, game shows, and news measures
combined in a single 0–1 scale.
Likelihood of exposure to negative commercials
Number of negative commercials broadcast in market weighted by probability
of reception.
Number of Clinton’s negative commercials broadcast in market weighted by
probability of reception.
Number of Dole’s negative commercials broadcast in market weighted by
probability of reception.
Control Variables
Age (actual age at time of survey); education (6-point scale); income (5-point
scale); white (coded 1 if white, and 0 otherwise); female (coded 1 if female, and
0 if male); strength of partisanship (coded 0 if pure independent, 1 if leaning partisan,
2 if weak partisan, and 3 if strong partisan); partisanship (7-point scale with
1 as strong Democrat and 7 as strong Republican); party contact (1 if contacted
by either party, and 0 otherwise).
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the second Minnesota
Symposium on Political Psychology: Campaigns and Elections, 7–9 November
2002. Correspondence concerning this article should be sent to Paul S. Martin,
Department of Political Science, University of Oklahoma, 455 W. Lindsey, Room
205, Norman, OK 73019. E-mail: psmartin@ou.edu
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PS 2503

Assignment #2

Due:  February 21, 2020

 

This assignment requires you to read two research articles I provide you and to read one research article you find on your own. That is a total of three (3) articles.

 

The two articles reveal issues of disputed causality, internal and external validity.  You will explain the components of the arguments, the research design (mechanism), and the authors’ conclusions.  Then, you will locate one additional article that cites either or both of the assigned articles published since 2010.  Compare this article with the two in the debate and give us a sense of whether the debate has been resolved one way or the other.  Finally, explain which of the three hypotheses is proven to your satisfaction.

 

Approximately 750-1000 words.  Full citation for the article YOU find required.

 

The components of the arguments:                             Dependent Variable (s)

Independent Variable (s)

Thesis and causal story

 

 

The research design (mechanism):                              How the research was conducted

Size of the sample

Description of the treatment

 

The authors’ conclusions:                                            Results of the study

Conclusions based on the results

Internal validity issues

External validity issues

 

 

Article 1:

 

Ansolabehere, Stephen,  Shanto Iyengar, Adam Simon and Nicholas Valentino. 1994.  “Does Attack Advertising Demobilize the Electorate?” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 88 (No. 4) pp. 829-838.

 

Article 2:

 

Wattenberg, Martin P.  and Craig Leonard Brians. 1999. “Negative Campaign Advertising: Demobilizer or Mobilizer?” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 93 (No. 4), pp. 891-899.

 

Article 3:

 

An article that cites one of the above using Google Scholar, Web of Science, JSTOR or Academic Search Premier.

 

 

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