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Please read outline carefully Must choose 1 of the topics. Please provide 1500 words, I will give some extra money as it does not allow me to pick 1500 words. Use the readings I provide you any questions let me knowModule 9: Biodeterminism
A number of texts in the preceding modules have suggested in subtle and not-so-subtle ways
that important aspects of human gender – perhaps human genders themselves – are socially
constructed. In this unit, we look at two expressions of the opposite view, namely, that gender is
actually biologically determined. This view is an example of a more general position known as
“biodeterminism.”
The idea of biodeterminism is most pithily captured by the familiar saying, “biology is destiny.”
Biodeterminists think that human behaviour is best understood as the result of human beings’
innate biological tendencies. Biodeterminism of one stripe or another is very often deployed to
explain differences between masculine and feminine gender roles. If someone says, that
women tend to pursue caring professions because they are naturally more nurturing than men,
they are invoking biodeterminism. If someone says that women ought to pursue caring
professions because they are naturally more nurturing than men, they are also invoking
biodeterminism.
Notice the difference between these two claims, though. The first claim is descriptive and seeks
merely to explain some aspect of human behaviour. The latter claim, however, is normative, and
seeks to affect human conduct. The second reading of this module, by Clark, starts
descriptively, but ends normatively.
Before we get to Clark, however, we will take a look at a passage from Charles Darwin’s
Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex.
Darwin: The Evolution of Sex
Darwin’s most famous and important contribution to evolutionary theory was, of course, his
Origin of Species.
In that earlier work, he described what he termed “natural selection” in the following way. When
organisms reproduce, there are occasional chance variations that result in differences between
the parent(s) and offspring. When this happens, there are three possible consequences. If the
new trait makes the offspring less fit for the econiche it occupies than its parents, it will, on
average, have a shorter lifespan than them, and will consequently have a lower chance of itself
reproducing and passing on its mutation to offspring. Thus, such traits have a reduced chance
of taking hold in a population. If the new trait neither advantages nor disadvantages the
offspring relative to its parents, then on average the offspring will live about as long as them and
reproduce about as successfully as them. So, the mutation may occur in its offspring, and
perhaps in their offspring, etc. Such a neither-harmful-nor-helpful mutation will, then,
occasionally recur in the broader population, but is not likely to become a common trait in the
species. Finally, a chance variation that better fits an individual to its environment than its
parents will on average extend the life of the offspring, and allow it to reproduce with greater
success than its parents and other members of the population. This reproductive success will
lead to more members of the species acquiring the new trait, such that it becomes common
within the species. Over time, enough adaptations of this type leads to the emergence of whole
new species.
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Darwin’s Finches:
A good part of the evidence for Darwin’s theory of natural selection came from the
numerous finch species he discovered on his expedition to the Galapagos Islands,
species which are found nowhere else in the world. He argued that these were best
explained as descending from a common ancestor on the South American mainland,
with the diversification of species arising from the differential selective pressures of local
environments within the Gallapagos.
While natural selection offers an elegant explanation of species change, Darwin was for many
years at a loss to explain the emergence of sex differences.
It was not until his later Descent of Man that he offered an account of why males and females
differ from each other. The new mechanism he describes there as a supplement to natural
selection is “sexual selection.”
Why sex?
Why do species reproduce sexually at all? The ability to reproduce sexually, it turns out,
is itself a naturally selected trait. Populations that reproduce sexually have a survival
advantage over other populations because the way they recombine genetic material
makes them more robust. Let’s imagine that human beings reproduced
parthenogentically – that is, using the genetic material of only one parent. If your (one!)
parent had a genetic predisposition to some disease, then so would you. However, since
human beings reproduce sexually, if one of your parents has such a genetic
predisposition, there is no guarantee you will acquire it since your DNA contains genetic
material from both parents. Sexual reproduction results in more varied, and hence more
adaptable, populations. Notice, however, that where the choice of sexual partners is
extremely limited for a number of generations, such robustness can suffer. That is why
some geographically isolated populations often have very high rates of genetic
conditions that occur at a lower frequency in the rest of the human population.
Darwin arrived at the question of sex differences indirectly. Before it occurred to him to ask why
males and females are different – indeed, why there are males and females at all – he was first
at pains to explain why some traits that make their possessors more vulnerable to predators are
nonetheless selected within a population. The bright red feathers of a cardinal, for instance, or
the tail of a peacock, make the bearer more visible to potential enemies. And, in the case of the
peacock, the tail inhibits escape. On the face of it such traits should fall into the
disadvantageous category and thus disappear from populations in comparatively short order.
The existence of such traits seems to fly in the face of natural selection.
Of course, as Darwin soon realized, it is not all cardinals who are red or all peacocks who sport
large, brightly coloured tails. Both of these traits are limited to the males of the species. It was
this realization that led to Darwin’s formulation of sexual selection.
Recall that the core mechanism within the process of natural selection is the ability to produce
offspring. An animal that has a shorter lifespan than other members of its species is on the
whole less likely to produce offspring – and hence pass on its genetic material – than other
members of its species. Thus, all other things being equal, if red feathers make cardinals more
vulnerable to predators, we should expect to see fewer cardinals with red feathers. That is,
unless the red feathers make it easier for the cardinal to achieve sexual success in the time
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available to it within its lifespan. This was the solution to Darwin’s problem. If you want to
increase your odds of winning a lottery, you can buy one ticket at a time for many, many years.
Or you can buy a large quantity of tickets all at once. Whereas natural selection is concerned
with the purchase of tickets in the reproductive lottery over time, sexual selection emphasizes
the purchase of such tickets at a time. But what sorts of mechanisms allow organisms to make
bulk purchases of reproductive lottery tickets? Or, dropping the lottery analogy, what sort of
mechanisms serve to increase an individual’s chances of reproductive success at a given time?
Notice that antlers pose less of an explanatory challenge for Darwin than do red feathers
since antlers may be used to fight off not only rival males of one’s own species, but also
predators from different species. Unsurprisingly, many biologists think that some traits,
like antlers, may be both sexually and naturally selected. But, if antlers help to fight off
predators, does it even make sense to think of them as sexually selected?
Indeed it does. After all, natural selection alone cannot account for the fact that in most
species of ungulates the males alone have antlers. If the antlers evolved merely as a
means of self-defence against predators, then we would expect to see females with
antlers too. This is why sexual selection is an explanation not only for traits that imperil
their bearers but also for sexual dimorphism.
The emphasis on warding off other males helps us to think of the difference between natural
and sexual selection in a different way than above. Whereas naturally selected traits allow all
members of a population to better compete with members of other populations within a
particular econiche, sexually selected traits allow individual males within a particular population
to better compete with other males in the group. In Darwin’s words,
Sexual selection depends on the success of certain individuals over others of the same
sex in relation to the propagation of the species; whilst natural selection depends on the
success of both sexes, at all ages, in relation to the general conditions of life. (398 in the
original)
Having posited sexual selection, Darwin now derives some generalizations about it. First, he
observes that sexual dimorphism is more prevalent in the “higher species” than in the lower
ones.
Moreover, he maintains, among almost all sexually dimorphic species, the dimorphism follows
similar patterns:
…with mammals, birds, reptiles, fishes, insects, and even crustaceans, the differences
between the sexes follow almost exactly the same rules. The males are almost always
the wooers; and they alone are armed with special weapons for fighting with their rivals.
They are generally stronger and larger than the females, and are endowed with the
requisite qualities of courage and pugnacity. They are provided, either exclusively or in a
much higher degree than the females, with organs for producing vocal or instrumental
music, and with odoriferous glands… (397 in the original)
On Darwin’s account, both males and females of even highly dimorphic species typically
resemble the adult female during their juvenile period. It is only as they approach mating age
that the males of these species begin to manifest their distinctive sexually selected traits. Thus,
for instance, juvenile male deer have no antlers and juvenile male lions have no manes.
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Questions for reflection:
Turn to the passage on p. 397 where Darwin lists all of the typical male traits. Note all of
the traits that he lists and try to think of examples of each of them from sexually
dimorphic species. Are the traits he lists equally characteristic of males in all species, or
are some more common than others? What about human males? Do they too possess
all or most of these sexually selected traits? Is sexual dimorphism as consistent across
species as Darwin suggests? Is it true of humans, as Darwin claims of other species,
that juveniles of both sexes resemble the adult female? Why or why not? Try to be as
detailed as you can
Although Darwin sought to provide a neutral, solely biological account of evolution, for some
decades critics have charged that his science bears the traces of the social mores of nineteenth
century England. Feminist scholars such as Ruth Hubbard argue that Darwin’s description of
typical male and female traits reflects Victorian English mores more than it does real facts of
nature. He characterizes males as the more important sex in sexual selection because men
were then regarded as the more important sex in human society. Likewise, argue the critics,
Darwin represents males as active, aggressive and sexually appetitive, and females as passive
and distinguished only by their aesthetic judgment because this was the attitude towards men
and women when Darwin was writing.
Darwin and Aristotle
There are some obvious similarities between Darwin’s and Aristotle’s views on sex. Both
men rank sexually dimorphic species as the “highest”. And, both of them seem to regard
adult females as undeveloped in some respects. For Aristotle, the female is
undeveloped in the sense that, due to her father’s failure to “prevail” in mating (See
Module 3 for a reminder of what this means.), she fails to fully resemble him. She does
not quite attain to the paternal form that is the standard for all offspring. For Darwin, the
adult female is undeveloped in the sense that juveniles of both sexes resemble her, but
they do not resemble the adult male who came to acquire distinctive traits in adulthood.
Questions for reflection:
Can you discern other similarities between Darwin and Aristotle? Any differences? What
are they?
Culture is destiny?
Although we have in this module focused on Darwin’s biodeterminism, Darwin himself was also
well aware of the ways in which culture could affect biology. Many of the populations he
discusses in Descent of Man are domesticated species, whose desired traits breeders had by
then long known how to cultivate through selective pairing. Darwin writes, “…it seems to me
almost certain that if the individuals of one sex were during a long series of generations to prefer
pairing with certain individuals of the other sex, characterised in some peculiar manner, the
offspring would slowly but surely become modified in this same manner” (399-400 in the
original). It is easy to see how this applies to human populations. If many generations of human
beings sought partners with certain culturally endorsed traits, those traits would begin to
proliferate within the population. By the same token, suppression of the reproductive
opportunities of those lacking the endorsed traits would further lend to the traits’ proliferation.
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This, of course, is the basis of the notorious practice of eugenics. It is also at the heart of
Darwin’s discouragingly racist and classist remarks at the end of the reading.
Clark: An Anthropological Case for Traditional Gender Roles
Unlike Darwin, whose samples are often drawn from non-human animal species, Stephen Clark
considers evidence from anthropology to support his biodeterminism with respect to gender
roles. He begins by citing examples of wide variations between human cultures. However, he
argues, despite the “stunning diversity of human life” (36 in the original) gender roles seem to be
universal.
He does not mean that gender roles are the very same from one culture to the next. Rather, he
maintains that, even though gender roles vary widely between human cultures, all societies past
and present share four fundamental features, all of them closely linked to gender roles:
1. There is a gendered division of labour in all societies. In some societies, men hunt while
women gather. In others, men mow the lawn while women wash the dishes.
2. In all societies, men and women serve complementary roles, with men dominating the
communal sphere and women dominating the domestic sphere. Put differently, men
dominate politics and work outside of the home, while women have a larger role within
the home.
3. Every society features some form of subordination by females to males. This runs the
gamut from wives or daughters who are subordinate to husbands or fathers to subjects
who are subordinate to political leaders.
4. In every society, males and females have different forms of cultural expression. Such
forms of cultural expression can include grooming and attire, but also things like dance
and athletics. Again, they may vary from culture to culture, but Clark maintains that,
within cultures, males and females consistently express their cultures in different ways.
On Clark’s account, these universal commonalities despite the wide range of variations between
societies are only explicable by underlying biological differences between males and females.
Human beings are wildly versatile, he argues. When, despite our endless inventiveness, we see
universal patterns, the best explanation for such patterns is biological.
You might wish to rebut Clark by pointing to the matriarchal societies that have existed over
time. However, Clark rejects the view (common among Marxist feminist anthropologists in the
1980s) that there ever have been such societies. He attributes the (on his view, mistaken) view
to a confusion about the difference between matriarchal, matrilineal and matrifocal societies.
While he agrees that there have been (and continue to be) matrilineal societies (those in which
names are traced via the mother rather than the father) and matrifocal societies (those in which
mothers are the heads of family units), he denies that there have ever been any truly
matriarchal societies (that is, societies in which primarily women control the political sphere and
property).
As further evidence that human beings are naturally inclined to traditional gender roles, Clark
discusses Israeli kibbutzim founded on egalitarian principles. Even though kibbutz life was
meant to defy traditional gender roles – with women working alongside men and children raised
communally – Clark reports that over time, traditional gender roles began to re-emerge with
female kibbutzniks in general preferring to raise their own children rather than work in the
communal sphere. He sketches similar examples from the People’s Republic of China.
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On Clark’s account, if gender roles re-emerge even where they have been suppressed, this is
good evidence that they are natural.
Questions for reflection:
Given how deeply gender roles are embedded in our cultures, do you think one
generation of life without an imposition of gender roles is sufficient to determine whether
those roles are natural or not? What, if anything, do you think the kibbutz/China
examples reveal?
Clark considers two different denials of biodeterminism often deployed by feminists. The “strong
version” denies that there are real or significant differences between men and women. Clark
finds the evidence against that view overwhelming.
He also considers a “modified version” that emphasizes human adaptability. This modified
version holds that some natural differences exist between males and females, but that we can
and should recondition people so that they don’t express these differences except as necessary
in reproduction. Clark regards this view as more plausible given human malleability. However,
he cautions that we ought not to be too quick to try to reprogram people in this way. Such a
feminist manipulation of the usual order, he argues, entails a range of serious risks, including
the following outcomes, which he regards as already evident as a result of feminism:
• Family life is weakened
• Sexual relationships become troubled
• Women lose a sense of value
• Womanly roles are neglected
• Manly roles are neglected
• Men and women develop psychological instabilities
Thus, for Clark, biology is not necessarily destiny, but it ought to be.
Firestone on Biodeterminism and Technology: A Radical Proposal
At the opposite end of the political spectrum from Clark is Shulamith Firestone (1945-
2012), a radical Marxist-feminist scholar who nonetheless agrees with Clark that
biological imperatives are at the heart of human gender roles. Indeed, in her Dialectic of
Sex, Firestone argues that sexual dimorphism, and the biological necessity of distinct
human gender roles, is at the heart of all other human class and caste systems.
According to Firestone, the sorting that we do based on sex is the paradigm for all of the
ways in which we sort and rank human beings. For Firestone, not only gender roles but
all class-based oppression and injustice are explicable in terms of our biological
character. However, for Firestone, this is no reason to accept sexism or other forms of
injustice. While our ancestors needed to confine women’s lives in a number of ways in
order to ensure the continued existence of the species, Firestone advocates the use of
new reproductive technologies to remove the responsibility of child-bearing from women.
Once women are no longer required to bear children, argues Firestone, they can freely
develop their capacities to the same degree as men. This will ultimately lead to the end
of gender roles and, indeed, the end of class and inequality.
Questions for reflection:
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PHIL 202/GSJ 222 Online, Gender Issues— Essay Assignment 2
General Instructions
Write a brief essay on one of the topics given below. Your essay should be 5 double-spaced
pages in length (1500-1600 words by computer word count). The assignment is due on
Wednesday, July 29, at 11:55 pm ET.
Submission:
You must submit your work online through the Essay Assignment 2 folder in the LEARN
Dropbox. Please note carefully that only ONE file will be accepted to the Dropbox. Therefore,
you must not use the Dropbox to store drafts or otherwise incomplete versions of your work.
Use only supported browsers to submit your work. See below for detailed instructions on
preparing online submissions and using the LEARN Dropbox.
The following pieces of information MUST be on the front page of your assignment:
• Student ID Number
• Course Name and Number
• Assignment Number
• Date
Your name should NOT appear anywhere on the assignment: Refrain from including your
name on the front page, in the headers or footers, in the file name, or anywhere else on/in the
assignment. This helps to ensure that your work is graded fairly.
Late policy:
Late essays will be penalized at the rate of 10% per day late. No exceptions will be made
without a documented excuse of sufficient weight (e.g., a medical emergency).
Note on plagiarism:
Passing off the work of others as your own constitutes plagiarism and is a serious offence. All
suspected cases of plagiarism are referred to the Associate Dean’s office. See the Faculty of
Arts webpage on Ethical Behaviour for important information on plagiarism and other academic
offences. See below for instructions on appropriate methods of citation for your essay.
Topics:
Choose only one of the following as the topic for your essay:
Topic 1:
Clark presents a case for the universality of differing gender roles for men and women. Do you
think the differences that Clark points to amount to a good reason to believe in biodeterminism?
Alternatively, might there be other ways to explain existing patterns of differences in the gender
roles of men and women? Finally, consider what your answers to these questions imply with
respect to the possibility for changes in gender roles. (For example, would a biodeterminist
basis for existing gender role distinctions entail that we should simply accept gender roles as
they are? Would a non-biodeterminist explanation suggest that such differences are superficial
and easily overcome?)
Obviously, there are a variety of different ways you might take a position on the questions
involved in this topic. No matter how you go about it, your primary aims should be to
1. frame a coherent position that is well informed by the readings from the course. (You’ll
need to concentrate on the Clark reading, but you are free to draw on any ONE
additional reading you think is relevant.)
2. support your position as well as you can with clear reasoning of your own.
Topic 2:
As part of his argument against the practice of sex reassignment surgery, Mastroeni criticizes “the dualistic understanding of the human person.” Explain how Mastroeni’s critique of this understanding of human personhood informs his objections to SRS. Then consider whether or not the dualist understanding fits with the experiences recounted in one of the trans memoirs recounted in the article by Califia (choose one of Jorgensen, Morris or Martino). Taking account of both Mastroeni’s reasoning and the details of the trans memoir you focus upon, do you think Mastroeni’s conclusions about sex reassignment are justified? For example, you may wish to consider how well or poorly Mastroeni’s views on the consequences of SRS match up with the experiential outcomes for the person whose biography you are considering. Or you might consider whether or not the experiences and outcomes for that person could be explained in ways that don’t require the dualist perspective the Mastroeni criticizes. While there are different ways to approach your evaluation, your primary aims should be to
1.frame a coherent position that is well informed by the readings from the course. (You’ll need to be selective and concise, but your essay should draw substantially from both the Matroeni and Califia readings.)
2.support your position as well as you can with clear reasoning of your own.
Further Instructions:
•Begin with a brief introductory paragraph that includes a clear thesis statement (i.e., a statement of the position you will be arguing for). Keep the introduction brief.
•Include only material that is relevant to the position you are arguing for.
•Be selective in what you choose to report from the readings referred to in the topic. Use your judgment on what material is most important for the purposes of your essay.
•Leave yourself enough space to mount a proper argument for the position you are defending. Your view will only be as effective as the argument you give in support of it.
•Direct quotations should be kept brief (one or two sentences) and used only for the purpose of illustrating points you have already encapsulated in your own words.
Citations
•Use in-text references of the (author, page #) format whenever you directly quote or paraphrase from the course readings.
•For references to lecture content, specify the module # and use the pagination of the interactive PDF file for that module–e.g., (Mod. 6, p. 3) for a reference to p. 3 of the discussion of the Inuit third gender.
•A separate Works Cited list is unnecessary if your only sources are readings and learning materials from the course. However, any use of outside sources must be properly documented and included in a Works Cited list at the end of the essay. Please note that consultation with outside sources is unnecessary, and may even prove to be a distraction.
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Assignment Return: Your graded assignment will be returned to you through the Dropbox. Review the graded file for feedback on your work.
Module 8: Trans Issues
In this module, we will examine trans issues, from the point of view of a trans-activist and
scholar sketching the some landmark twentieth-century trans history, and from the point of view
of a Catholic theologian who opposes sex reassignment surgery on religious and metaphysical
grounds. Before we get to those readings, it would be helpful to know some of the terminology.
Identity terms
As I briefly noted in Module 7, the queer spectrum has come to be associated with a number of
long acronyms intended to capture the various queer identities. One common version is
LGBTTQQIA, which stands for “lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, two-spirited, queer,
questioning, intersex and allies.” But, it turns out that each of these terms on its own includes a
range of different identities. And, arguably, none of them gets as confused by people outside of
the queer community as “transgender.”
Indeed, “transgender” itself has come to operate as a kind of umbrella term for a range of
different sexual identities that in one way or another resist the gender binary. In broadest terms,
to be transgender is for one’s gender identity to fail to “match” one’s gender assignment or
phenotypic sex, either because one identifies as the “opposite” sex, or because one’s gender
identity defies binaristic classification.
Questions for reflection:
Notice that, in the above passage and in the remainder of this module, I use “gender
assignment” and “phenotypic sex” more or less interchangeably. We learned about
these terms in Module 2 and Module 7, respectively. Take a moment to think about each
of those terms. How would you define them? Given what you’ve learned so far in the
course, do you think it is appropriate to use these terms as near-synonyms? Or, is there
a principled basis for disambiguating between them? Which of the terms is more
appropriate in this context? Why?
While several of the identities on the queer spectrum involve sexual orientation, this is not the
case with transgender. Just like cisgender people, transgender people can be straight, gay,
bisexual, pansexual or asexual. However, societal norms around sexual orientation – the view,
for instance, that real women are sexually attracted to men – have sometimes led to prejudice
against non-heterosexual transgender people, and to the accusation that they are not really
trans. This is just mistaken. Transgenderism is grounded in one’s gender identity, not one’s
sexual desires.
Cisgender
The prefix “cis” is of Latin origin and means “on this side of”. It contrasts with “trans”,
also Latin, meaning “across”. In recent years, trans scholars and activists and their
allies have begun using the term “cisgender” to describe people whose gender identity
accords with their gender assignment or phenotypic sex. This terminological innovation
owes a great deal to Beauvoir’s diagnosis of the problem of the Other. (See Module 4 for
a reminder of how this goes.) The use of the cis- prefix is meant to render symmetrical
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the One/Other relationship between cis and trans people. It is hoped that the use of the
term reminds cisgender people of their privilege, and avoids treating transgender people
as “special cases” or exceptions.
Question for reflection:
What do you think about the cis- prefix? Is it helpful? Harmful? Why?
For years, “transsexual”, as opposed to “transgender” was the usual term for someone who
identified as the gender opposite to their sex at birth and sought medical medical interventions
to transition to the gender corresponding to their identity. In this context, “MTF” is the short-form
for male-to-female transsexual, while “FTM” stands for female-to-male transsexual. However,
more recently, trans people have challenged the inappropriate emphasis that others often place
on their private medical histories, including details about whether or not they have undergone
sex reassignment surgery or “SRS”. (Notice that SRS is different from “gender reassignment” a
term associated with intersex infants, not transsexual adults. See Module 2 for a refresher on
the latter term.) Just as one need not be heterosexual to be trans, so one need not undergo
SRS or hormone therapy to count as really trans. Moreover, whether or not one has undergone
such treatments is a highly personal matter into which other people have no right to enquire. For
many, using the formerly more general term “transgender” is a way to resist communicating
whether they have undergone, or plan to undergo, SRS.
Questions for reflection:
Why do you think that some trans people are adjudged “not really trans” based on their
sexual orientation or their medical history? Why do some people consider it important to
distinguish between “really trans” and “not really trans” people? Do we make similar
judgments about other groups of people? Why or why not?
For others, however, identifying as “transgender” rather than “transsexual” is a way to further
resist a perceived binarism in some trans experiences. Many trans people thus identify as
“transgender” precisely because they straddle the gender binary – by wearing a beard while
identifying as “she”, by using gender-neutral pronouns like “ze” and “zir” instead of “s/he” and
“him/her”, and so on. “Transgender” in this sense of the term aligns closely with such gender
identities as “agender” and “genderqueer” (not to mention the more radical “genderfuck”.) Most
recently, some trans people and their allies have begun deploying the term “transgender*” in
place of “transgender” in order to signify inclusivity and a broad openness to the full range of
trans identities.
Some other people who are sometimes included under the “transgender” umbrella but whose
gender identity (typically) matches their phenotypic sex are transvestites and drag
queens/kings. This is partly owing to 19th and early 20th century conflations of various “nonstandard”
gender expressions by scholars like Ulrichs (See Module 5 for a reminder of Ulrichs’
views.) but also because of confused (or just plain transphobic) characterizations of trans
people as men in women’s clothing or vice versa. Typically, however, transvestites derive
pleasure from cross-dressing even though their gender identities align with their gender
assignments; likewise, most drag kings/queens are cisgender people who simply enjoy
participating in this distinctive genre of gender-bending performance.
Drag shows in large part treat gender as a fluid category with which we can play and be
creative. However, for many trans people, actually being able to live as the gender with which
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they identify is serious, consequential matter, and not the site of playfulness. Moreover, drag
performance often trade in over-the-top stereotypes about gender (and gender-bending),
stereotypes many trans people find harmful. For an example of this, think back to Module 5 and
the film Hedwig and the Angry Inch. In that film, Hedwig is represented as unstable, capricious,
and ultimately “really” male. While the film seems to concern a transgender character, it bears
mention that Hedwig originated as a drag show in New York’s gay community. While it
ultimately evolved into a film about a transgender protagonist, it retains some of the original
drag stereotypes.
Question for reflection:
What are some of the other drag stereotypes in Hedwig? In what ways, if any, do they
diverge from the trans lives documented in the reading from Califia in this module?
Diagnostic terms
As will have become clear when you read this module’s chapter by Califia, psychiatrists and
psychologists play a major role in twentieth (and now, twenty-first) century trans history.
The American Psychiatric Association (APA) regards transgenderism, which it formerly termed
“gender dysphoria,” as one of a pair of mental illnesses, GID (Gender Identity Disorder) and
GIDC (Gender Identity Disorder – Child). The main difference between the two conditions is
whether “symptoms” present in childhood or adulthood. Diagnostic criteria for these conditions
are described in detail in the APA’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, the
current version of which is the is known as the DSM-IV-TR (“TR” stands for “Text Revision”).
According to the DSM-IV-TR, the four criteria for a diagnosis of GID are:
• Strong and persistent cross-gender identification […]
• Persistent discomfort about one’s assigned sex or a sense of inappropriateness in the
gender-role of that sex […]
• The diagnosis is not made if the individual has a concurrent physical intersex condition.
• Clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important
areas of functioning.
Understandably, many trans people resent the claim that transgenderism is a mental illness.
However, in many jurisdictions, they are forced to obtain a psychiatric diagnosis of GID in order
to obtain sex reassignment surgery. Indeed, many trans people who have successfully
navigated the mental health system in order to obtain surgery, provide detailed advice to pre-op
trans people on how to answer psychiatrists’ questions “correctly” in order to receive the desired
diagnosis.
Arguably, therefore, psychiatrists retain a very narrow, and potentially inaccurate, sense of the
ways in which transgenderism manifests since all or most of their patients follow the same
DSM-inspired script.
The DSM-V
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It is important to note that our conception of what counts as a mental illness is always
evolving, and very often (if not always) socially constructed. In the nineteenth century,
psychologists regarded African-American slaves’ desire to escape from servitude a form
of mental illness, which they termed “drapetomania”. For much of the twentieth century,
mainstream psychologists and psychiatrists regarded homosexuality as a form of mental
illness.
As this module was being written, members of the APA were at work on the next edition
of the DSM, the DSM-V. In preparation for this new edition, there was considerable
research and lobbying by various groups (both trans allies, and groups that are anything
but allies) about what diagnostic terms, if any, that edition should include for
transgenderism. By the time you are reading this, the new edition will either be out, or
will soon be on its way.
Questions for reflection:
• Take a few minutes now to go online, seek out the DSM-V and discover for
yourself how that chapter in trans history turned out. Do you think the DSM-V
improves on the DSM-IV? Why or why not?
• Are some mental illnesses natural, as opposed to socially constructed? How
might we discern “real” mental illnesses from ways of being that are wrongly
pathologized in order to reinforce social norms?
Califia and Trans Memoirs
Now, read Patrick Califia’s overview of the memoirs of three twentieth century trans pioneers.
What experiences are common to all Jorgensen, Martino and Morris? In what ways do their
experiences differ?
Arguably the deepest commonality between the three stories is that none of the figures Califia
describes made their decisions lightly. The process of identifying as trans, and ultimately of
obtaining sex reassignment, is neither easy nor quick. It is especially important to note this,
given the popular representation (for instance, in television programs such as South Park and
Family Guy) of sex reassignment as a decision taken capriciously, and a procedure performed
quickly.
Another common thread between Jorgensen, Martino and Morris is the central role of doctors in
their transitions. As Califia documents, doctors’ roles in these cases were not limited to
prescribing hormones and performing surgical procedures. They also served as gatekeepers,
whose pronouncement of a patient’s “true gender” was essential to that patient’s obtaining the
care s/he sought.
Questions for reflection:
Compare the roles of Krafft-Ebbing, Benjamin and Money in the three narratives. How
were they similar? How did they differ? What about Jorgensen’s, Martino’s and Morris’s
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attitudes to their doctors? How would you describe them?
One difference between the three stories is the protagonists’ respective gender role identities.
(Consult Module 2 if you’ve forgotten what this term means.) While Jorgensen is very
stereotypically feminine, and Martino is stereotypically masculine, Morris has a more fluid,
nuanced understanding of gender. Why do you think this is?
If you are interested in learning about more recent trans figures, and of contemporary
trans struggles, consider reading the remainder of Califia’s book, Sex Changes:
Transgender Politics. It is a smart, strident, highly engaging read.
Mastroeni and the Principle of Stewardship
Our final reading in this module comes from a Catholic theologian, who believes that SRS is
immoral. Interestingly, his argument is a reply to a second Catholic theologian, John Dedek,
who argues that SRS can be morally and theologically justified by what is termed the “principle
of totality.” According to the principle of totality, “the parts of the body are seen as existing for
the ‘total well-being of the individual,’ understood not only somatically, but also personally and
even perhaps socially” (31). Dedek argues that, in cases in which SRS would improve a
person’s overall well-being, the principle of totality justifies the procedure.
Mastroeni disagrees. While he agrees that the principle of totality is important, Mastroeni holds
that another principle, the “principle of stewardship” is just as important, and indeed must inform
our interpretation of the principle of totality. The principle of totality is an enabling principle, that
permits the sacrifice of a part for a whole. By contrast, the principle of stewardship is an
inhibiting principle that obliges us to protect our body, parts included, as well as we can. In a
sense, the principle of stewardship treats the body as on loan to us from God. Before making
any alterations to the body, we must first determine that such alterations will not make our body
worse when we are done with it than it was when God loaned it to us.
Think of this by analogy with an apartment. Imagine that you rent an apartment that comes with
(among other things) a stove. However, you only eat raw food and you reason that the
apartment will be improved by the removal of the stove since you are not using it, and it would
be preferable to use the space occupied by the stove in other ways. It may seem on the face of
it that the principle of totality justifies you getting rid of the stove.
However, the principle of stewardship does not allow you to remove from the apartment
equipment that the landlord has put there for a reason. Mastroeni argues that the same is true
of SRS. God have given us our sexual organs for a reason—reproduction—and we are poor
stewards if we surgically alter those organs.
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Questions for reflection:
• If Mastroeni is right that surgically altering one’s sexual organs violates the
principle of stewardship, how far ought the prohibition to extend? What sorts of
alterations to the body are permissible if we accept such a principle? What about
non-surgical lifestyle choices, such as smoking or eating lots of fried food, that
can lead to poorer functioning of the body? Does the principle of stewardship
make such behaviours morally illicit?
• What do you think of the analogy between a human body and an apartment? Is
your body the kind of think you can steward? Why or why not?
• Mastroeni’s argument derives from his particular religious commitments. What
force, if any, do you think his argument has for members of other religions? For
atheists and agnostics?
Mastroeni blames applications of the principle of totality like Dedek’s on a dualistic tendency in
modern thought, which he contrasts with integrism. On Dedek’s account, to be a dualist is to
regard the human being as composed of two distinct and radically heterogenous components –
the mind and the body. By contrast, to be an integrist is to regard the mind and body as two
inseparable aspects of the very same thing. Mastroeni argues that dualists regard the mind as
the self. Hence, any alteration to the body in service of the mind serves the self. In a sense, the
body is merely a vessel or tool at the service of the self. According to Mastroeni’s integrist
perspective, however, the body is an integral part of the self, not a mere tool of the self. Thus,
when we compromise the body, we compromise the self.
For Mastroeni, integrism, if accepted, entails two conclusions — a metaphysical one and an
ethical one:
Metaphysically, he argues, if the mind and the body are integrated rather than distinct, then
there is no sense in which someone can really be a woman trapped in a man’s body, or a man
trapped in a woman’s body (a description that is often deployed to explain what it is to be trans).
The body you have is part of the person you are, so there is no scope for any opposition
between oneself and one’s body.
Mastroeni’s ethical conclusion from integrism extends beyond SRS. He holds that the dualist
attitude that the body is a mere vessel or tool rather than an end in itself leads not only to SRS,
but also to such behaviours as surrogate pregnancy, masturbation, the use of contraception,
and bestiality. From Mastroeni’s integrist point of view, each of these practices represents an
abuse of the body, predicated on misunderstanding the body as a mere instrument for the true
self (mind or soul). But for Mastroeni, SRS is perhaps the most dramatic kind of abuse, since
“such a procedure represents a massive assault on the integrity of the body and betrays an
attitude of absolute dominion reserved only for the Creator.” (p. 35)
Mastroeni is no doubt correct to suggest that dualistic views of human nature have played a
prominent role in our philosophical traditions. (Consider his account of dualism in the philosophy
of Descartes, who is frequently characterized as “the father of modern philosophy” in the
western tradition.) However, dualistic views are far less common among philosophers nowadays
than they were in the time of Descartes (who wrote most of his work in the mid-17th century).
Moreover, it is very difficult to say exactly where present-day non-philosophers stand on the
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