Ancient Greek Citizenship Law Assignment | Essay Help Services

This paper should be focused on the “Against Timarchus” case that helps to understand citizenship in ancient Greece

introduction
Context
In 346 an Athenian delegation, led by Philocrates and including
Aeschines and Demosthenes, negotiated a peace treaty with Philip of
Macedon. Although there was majority support for the peace, there
remained elements in the city implacably and explicitly opposed either
to the idea of peace with Macedonia or to the terms of the Peace of
Philocrates. Th ere were others, like Demosthenes, who saw the peace
as a necessary but temporary arrangement. Th e opponents of the peace
began working against it from the moment it was concluded. Aeschines
was an early target. All Athenian offi cials had to submit to an audit on
the expiry of their term of offi ce. When Aeschines submitted to this
process after the second embassy to Macedonia of 346, he was accused
of misconduct by Timarchus, a minor politician of whose background
we know no more than Aeschines tells us and on whose precise political
affi liations we are badly informed, and by Demosthenes.
On the useful principle that attack is the best form of defense,
Aeschines responded by launching a prosecution. He chose Timarchus,
the weaker target. Demosthenes was both wealthy and, though not yet
forty, a formidable political operator and public speaker. Neither his
private life nor (at this stage) his political activity off ered a secure base
for prosecution. It is clear, however, from the present speech (and from
Demosthenes’ grudging admission at 19.284) that Timarchus had had
a scandalous youth. Th e speech can be dated to 346/5, though it is
diffi cult to fi x the date more precisely.
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184 aeschines 1
Despite the factual (though not rhetorical) weakness of the speech,
which is ultimately no more than a sustained attempt to throw sand
in the eyes of the jurors, Aeschines won the case and Timarchus was
disfranchised (Dem. 19.257, 284). Th ough Demosthenes was later to
treat Timarchus as an object of pity, the reader should bear in mind
that it was Timarchus who picked the fi ght. His mistake was to underestimate
his intended victim. By demonstrating his ferocity and skill
as a political fi ghter and his credibility with a judicial panel of ordinary
Athenians, Aeschines eff ectively checked his enemies’ attempts to
bring him to trial, and it was three years before Demosthenes felt able
to return to the attack. Th e defeat stung Demosthenes, who revisits
the subject of Timarchus repeatedly in his speech On the Embassy
(Dem. 19), written for the prosecution of Aeschines in 343; he also in
that speech takes a certain grim pleasure in using against Aeschines
arguments used by Aeschines against Timarchus.
Th e Charge
Th e legal action used by Aeschines against Timarchus was dokimasia
tōn rhētorōn, literally “scrutiny of public speakers.” Th e term
“public speaker” (rhētōr) was applied to individuals who regularly
addressed the Assembly. Such people were professional politicians
in the double sense that they devoted much of their time to politics
and they could hope to earn substantial sums from individuals
and groups keen to gain access to their political infl uence, though,
unlike modern democratic politicians, they received no income from
the state. Th e purpose of the dokimasia tōn rhētorōn was to test the
credentials of those who sought to direct public policy in the Assembly
and to remove from infl uence those deemed unworthy. It was
open to any Athenian citizen to initiate it by publicly declaring his
intention to subject a speaker to the process, which took the form
of a trial before a jury. It is a strangely hybrid action. Th e process of
 Th e date of the creation of this process is uncertain; it clearly refl ects the
distinction, observable in the fi fth but increased in the fourth century, between
the regular speaker (rhētōr) in the Assembly and formally appointed state offi –
cials (especially the generals) and probably belongs to the period of the restoration
of the democracy in 403.
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against timarchus 185
initiation locates it within the public actions open to any volunteer
prosecutor (ho boulomenos) against alleged infractions of the laws. But
its title fi xes it within the various processes of formal scrutiny (dokimasia)
automatically imposed on the commencement of certain rights
or responsibilities (Introduction, IVA). Accordingly, as Todd (1993)
has emphasized, the penalty is merely the confi rmation of the formal
restrictions automatically attaching (in most cases) to the activities it
addresses.
Although Aeschines focuses specifi cally on one aspect of the dokimasia,
it is clear from his account of the law in 28–32 that there was a
list of acts that rendered a man ineligible to address the Assembly. Th e
list, which may not be exhaustive, included violence toward or failure
to support parents, military derelictions, prostitution, and squandering
an inheritance. With the exception of the last item, these were all
acts for which atimia, loss of citizen rights, was the prescribed penalty,
and the penalty for an individual convicted on the dokimasia tōn
rhētorōn was likewise atimia. Aeschines charges Timarchus specifi cally
with having prostituted himself as a young man but also throws in for
good measure the allegation that he squandered his inheritance (42,
94–101). Aeschines cannot formally accuse Timarchus of mistreating
his father, who appears to have died when Timarchus was young, but
he does draw on associated values by accusing him of mistreating an
aged uncle (104).
Homosexuality and Male Prostitution
Greek homoeroticism is a complex subject that has attracted scholarly
interest in recent years. Th e following summary of the subject is
off ered merely as a rough guide. Th ough on occasion we fi nd dissenting
and condemnatory voices, many Greek sources from the archaic
period onward take it for granted that grown men fi nd males around
the age of puberty sexually attractive. Although it was possible to be
exclusively homosexual (as with Misgolas in this speech), there is no
automatic assumption that homosexual tastes preclude heterosexual.
Structurally, the practice of homosexuality diff ered from modern
experience in that there is normally an age diff erence between the
partners. As with sex in most societies, there appear to be elaborate
proprieties. Th e roles of the partners are perceived as distinct, with the
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186 aeschines 1
older man as pursuer, the younger as pursued, the older as achieving
physical gratifi cation, the younger as providing it.
Participation in such relationships was not in itself illegal, and
prostitution, homosexual or heterosexual, was a legitimate profession
for many noncitizens. But the sale of sexual favors was felt to be
incompatible with citizen status and brought an automatic penalty of
disfranchisement. No further penalties were imposed unless an individual
so barred sought to exercise citizen rights. In addition to the
dokimasia tōn rhētorōn, available against public speakers believed to
have prostituted themselves, there was also a public action (the graphē
hetairēseōs) that could be brought against any Athenian male who
infringed the automatic bar consequent upon male prostitution, the
penalty on conviction being death. Th ough this may look like a
straightforward issue, in fact it was riddled with complications. Quite
apart from the obvious diffi culty of obtaining evidence about an activity
carried out by two people in private, the common practice of giving
gifts to a lover meant that the question of payment was necessarily
a grey area.
Th e Speech
After an opening that stresses the orator’s own moderation, an
introductory section (4–6) stresses the importance of the laws.
Aeschines then moves into an account of the laws dealing with decent
conduct (6–36), arranged chronologically in order of the age of the
individuals covered and culminating in those dealing with the morality
of politicians and the conduct of the political process. Much of this
section is at best only tangentially relevant to the main issue, though
it does create a high moral tone and underline the importance of
adherence to high standards of decency in public and private life.
After a transitional section (37–38) reasserting the moderate and
decent character projected by the speaker, Aeschines proceeds to a
narrative of Timarchus’ sexual career (39–70) with testimony.
At this point Aeschines interrupts his narrative and turns to anticipation
of the defense arguments, boldly tackling head-on the lack of
any shred of solid evidence against Timarchus (71–94). Th e essence of
his answer, reiterated in a variety of ways, is that the members of the
audience all know the truth and therefore have no need of further
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against timarchus 187
evidence. Th e last section of this refutation (94) acts as a springboard
for the next section of narrative, which deals with the rest of Timarchus’
career, his squandering of his inheritance (95–105), and his corruption
and criminality in public offi ce (106–116).
Aeschines now reverts to anticipation of defense arguments. First,
he deals with arguments anticipated from Demosthenes, who (he
claims) will stress the absence of evidence from the offi cials who collect
the prostitution tax and the unfairness of conviction on the basis
of rumor (117–131). Th e fi rst objection is met partly by righteous indignation,
partly by insisting that the fact that Timarchus has not worked
in a known brothel says nothing about the nature of his activities. Th e
second is met by a magisterial appeal to the divine authority of Report,
Phēmē, a mystical force that promulgates the truth.
Th e next section of refutation (132–159) responds to an anticipated
appeal to the traditions of Greek homosexuality. Aeschines will be
presented by his opponents as inconsistent, as a pursuer of young men
who attacks a young man who has had pursuers. It will also be claimed
that homosexual relationships have long been sanctioned by tradition
and have been the inspiration for noble deeds. Aeschines’ response is
to distinguish (without ever making explicit the basis for the distinction)
between chaste homosexual love and the indecent conduct of
people like Timarchus.
In 160–165 he returns to the problem of lack of evidence, to demolish
the defense’s demand that he produce a sexual contract between
Timarchus and a client. In 166–169 he dismisses Demosthenes’ anticipated
attempts to use Macedonia as a means of exciting prejudice
against Aeschines. After insisting that the jurors must not accept irrelevant
pleas from the defense, he turns to an irrelevant character assassination
of Demosthenes (170–176), fi nishing with a demand that the
jurors keep Demosthenes to the point. In 177–187 he returns to the
earlier theme of maintaining the laws, using both Sparta and the Athenian
ancestors as examples.
At this point the speech accelerates, moving rapidly over an appeal
to religion (188), the notoriety of Timarchus’ life (189), and the wider
implications of such conduct (190–191), before turning to the implications
for Athens of the verdict in the present case (192–193) and a
warning about the supporters of Timarchus (192–195). Th ere is a brief
conclusion (195).
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188 aeschines 1
Although it is possible to distinguish diff erent sections within the
speech, the boundaries are made fl uid by a tendency on Aeschines’
part to make use of narrative even in sections devoted to argument.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the structure is the way narrative
and proof (mainly refutation) are each divided and then interleaved.
Part of the reason may be a desire for variety. But a more telling
reason is the absence of solid proof. To impose on the speech a neat
division of the sort recommended by rhetoricians, with separate long
sections devoted to narrative and proof, would call attention to the
factual weakness. As it is, the emotive power of the narrative is deployed
to distract attention from this problem.
Given the diffi culty of obtaining evidence, it strikes the modern
reader as surprising that the prosecution succeeded. Probably we
should conclude that Timarchus had a colorful past and was therefore
a person against whom allegations such as these could plausibly be
made. Moreover, we cannot tell how far the prosecution’s case was
helped by the political climate and Aeschines’ own enhanced credibility
as a result of his role in the negotiation of the peace. But we should
also give due credit to the skill with which Aeschines presents the case.
Th e prosecution is conducted throughout with dignity. Th e speaker
projects a personality that is decent, moderate, and restrained, a character
that invites trust. Th is mask enables him to turn the absence of
incriminating detail to his advantage by attributing it to the salacious
nature of the narrative and his consequent (laudable) reluctance to be
explicit. He also undermines the moral authority of his opponents by
tainting them, especially Demosthenes, with the crimes for which
Timarchus is on trial and ably forces them to the defensive by making
their prima facie powerful demand for evidence an evasion that is
tantamount to an admission of guilt.
aeschines 1. against timarchus
[1] Never before, men of Athens, have I brought an indictment
( graphē ) against any man or persecuted him at his fi nal audit;
 For the procedure of graphē, see the Introduction, VE.
 For the audit (euthynai ) required of all offi cials after a term in offi ce, see the
Introduction, IVA. Given the role of litigation in Athenian politics, Aeschines’
claim is surprising, but given his high profi le at the time (which would make it
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against timarchus 189
no, I have in my opinion shown restraint in all such matters. But
since I could see that the city was suff ering serious damage from this
man Timarchus, who addresses the Assembly illegally, and since I
am personally the victim of his malicious prosecution (just how, I
shall explain later in my speech), [2] I concluded that it would be
utterly disgraceful not to intervene in defense of the city as a whole,
the laws, you, and myself. And in the knowledge that he is guilty
of the charges that you heard the clerk read out just now, I declared
this formal scrutiny against him. It seems, men of Athens, that the
claims usually made in public cases are not untrue: private enmities
very often do put right public wrongs. [3] So you will see that
Timarchus can put the blame for this whole prosecution not on the
city or the laws or you or me but on himself. Th e laws warned him
not to address the Assembly because of the disreputable life he has
led; in my judgment, this was not a diffi cult command but a very easy
one. And in my case he was free not to persecute me, if he had any
sense. I hope, then, that my opening words on this matter have been
reasonable.
[4] I am well aware, men of Athens, that you will certainly have
heard already from others what I am going to say at the outset; but I
think it appropriate that I, too, should now make the same statement
to you. It is agreed that there are three kinds of constitution in the
whole world, dictatorship (tyrannis), oligarchy, and democracy, and
dictatorships and oligarchies are governed by the temperament of
those in power, but democratic cities are governed by the established
laws. [5] You are aware, men of Athens, that in a democracy the perdiffi
cult to lie about something so obvious), it may well be true. It could be (Harris
1995: 36) that he was constrained by his background, which left him without
the network of infl uential supporters on which a wealthy Athenian could draw.
Th e penalties for failure to obtain 20 of the votes cast included a fi ne of 1,000
drachmas, which might deter a man with limited resources. Th is does not mean
that Aeschines had not been involved in any political litigation, since he could
have acted as a supporting speaker.
 For “malicious prosecution” (sykophantein), see the Introduction, VE.
 Greek dokimasia; see the Speech Introduction.
 Th e (commonplace) tripartite division of constitutions is found as early as
Pindar in the 470s (Pythian 2.85–86); cf. e.g., Herodotus 3.80–82; Plato Republic
books 8–9.
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