Homeland Defense and Security Strategies and Policies Case Study Paper Homeland Defense and Security Strategies and PoliciesAPA style and in length between

Homeland Defense and Security Strategies and Policies Case Study Paper Homeland Defense and Security Strategies and PoliciesAPA style and in length between, 3-5 pages Order Code RL32366
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Terrorist Identification, Screening, and Tracking
Under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6
April 21, 2004
William J. Krouse
Analyst in Social Legislation
Domestic Social Policy Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
Terrorist Identification, Screening, and Tracking Under
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6
Summary
In Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD-6), the Administration
announced plans to establish a Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), as a multi-agency
effort to be administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), where several
watch lists are being consolidated into a single terrorist screening database (TSDB).
The TSC is the latest of three multi-agency efforts undertaken by the Administration
to better identify, screen, and track known terrorists, suspected terrorists, and their
supporters. The other two are the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF)
and the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). According to the Administration,
the TSC complements the FBI-led FTTTF’s efforts to prevent terrorists from entering
the United States, and to track and remove them if they manage to enter the country.
The TTIC serves as a single locale where terrorism-threat data from all sources are
further analyzed to more critically focus on terrorism.
Certain terrorist identification and watch list functions previously performed by
the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) have been
transferred to the TTIC and TSC under HSPD-6. At the TTIC, intelligence analysts
are building a Terrorist Identities Database (TID) based on TIPOFF — the U.S.
government’s principal terrorist watch list database prior to HSPD-6. From TID
records, TSC analysts are building a consolidated TSDB. The Administration plans
to widen access to, and use of, lookout records by making them available in a
“sensitive but unclassified” format to authorized federal, state, local, territorial and
tribal authorities; to certain private sector entities; and to certain foreign
governments.
Merging watch lists will not likely require integrating entire systems, but there
are likely to be technological impediments to merging watch list records. From
system to system, and watch list to watch list, there remains no standardization of
data elements, such as, name, date of birth, place of birth, nationality, or biometric
identifiers. While elevating and expanding the terrorist identification and watch list
function is an important step in the wider war on terrorism, additional work will
remain to upgrade and integrate other consular and border management systems,
criminal history record systems, and biometric systems.
HSPD-6 presents significant opportunities to more effectively share data and
increase security, but there are risks as well, not the least of which is the potential
loss of privacy and the erosion of civil liberties. In recent hearings, Members of
Congress have raised several related issues. For example, is the TSDB fast, accurate,
comprehensive, and accessible? Have procedures been established to allow persons,
who may be misidentified as terrorists or terrorist supporters, some form of redress
and remedy if they are denied civil rights or unduly inconvenienced by a screening
agency? Does the establishment of the TSDB require new guidelines and oversight
mechanisms to protect privacy and other civil liberties? Or, are existing agency
policies under which such data is collected sufficient? Is the FBI the best agency to
administer the TSDB? Are the TSC and TSDB, and by extension the TTIC,
temporary or permanent solutions? This report will be updated as needed.
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
HSPD-6 and Terrorist Watch List Consolidation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Terrorist Watch-Listing Prior to HSPD-6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Watch Lists and Lookout Books . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Terrorism-Related Ground for Inadmissability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Diplomatic Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Failures to Identify, Watch-List, and Screen 9/11 Hijackers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Elevating and Expanding Terrorist Identification, Screening, and
Tracking under HSPD-6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
TTIC and IAIP Reporting Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Expanding Use of Terrorist Watch Lists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
TSC Level of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Legal Safeguards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
TSC Reporting Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Selected Watch List, Criminal, and Biometric Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
GAO Watch List Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
TIPOFF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
National Automated Immigration Lookout System II (NAILS II) . . . . 28
Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Computer Assisted Passenger Profiling System (CAPPS) . . . . . . . . . 29
National Crime Information Center (NCIC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Regional Information Sharing System/Law Enforcement Online . . . . 32
Biometric Systems for Identity Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Possible Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Appendix A. Frequently Used Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
List of Figures
Figure 1. TIPOFF and Immigration/Border Inspection Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Figure 2. Terrorist Identification, Watch-listing, and Watch List
Dissemination under HSPD-6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
List of Tables
Table 1. Selected Lookout, Border Security, Criminal History, and
Biometric Computer Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Terrorist Identification, Screening, and
Tracking Under Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 6
Introduction
This report analyzes Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD-6) and
issues relating to (1) the establishment of a Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), (2) the
transfer of certain terrorist identification and lookout record distribution functions
from the Department of State to the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) and
the TSC, and (3) the consolidation of terrorist watch lists into a single, stand-alone,
terrorist screening database (TSDB) under the direction of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) at the TSC. In recent hearings, Members of Congress have raised
several issues regarding the establishment of the TSDB. For example,
! Has the Administration committed enough resources to ensure the timely
establishment of an integrated terrorism watch list (the TSDB)?
! Is the TSDB fast, accurate, comprehensive, and accessible?
! Have procedures been established to allow persons, who may be misidentified
as terrorists or terrorist supporters, some form of redress and remedy if they
are denied civil rights or unduly inconvenienced by a screening agency?
! Does the establishment of the TSDB require new guidelines and oversight
mechanisms to protect privacy and other civil liberties? Or, are existing
agency policies under which such data is collected sufficient?
! Is the FBI the best agency to administer the TSDB?
! Are the TSC and TSDB, and by extension the TTIC, temporary or permanent
solutions?
While this report identifies some privacy issues associated with the
establishment of a consolidated terrorist screening database, it is not intended to
serve as an in-depth legal analysis of the issues related to national security, privacy,
and the government’s need for information to combat terrorism. Rather, it is a
systematic examination of the mission and functions of the TSC in relation to other
entities like the TTIC. It also identifies and describes key watch lists, residing in
CRS-2
several computerized systems and databases,1 that likely will be consolidated at the
TSC.
HSPD-6 and Terrorist Watch List Consolidation
In HSPD-62 and an accompanying memorandum of understanding (MOU),3 the
Administration announced plans to establish the TSC, as a multi-agency effort to be
administered by the FBI, where several watch lists will be consolidated into a single
terrorist screening database (TSDB).4 The MOU on the Integration and Use of
Screening Information to Protect Against Terrorism was signed by Secretary of State
Colin Powell, Attorney General John Ashcroft, Secretary of Homeland Security
Thomas Ridge, and Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet on
September 16, 2003. The measures outlined in HSPD-6 and the MOU can be viewed
as an outgrowth of the Administration’s National Strategy for Homeland Security,
which reported in July 2002 that the FBI would be establishing a consolidated
terrorism watch list that would be “fully accessible to all law enforcement officers
and the intelligence community.”5
According to the Administration’s timetable, the TSC was to be operational on
December 1, 2003.6 According to press accounts, however, the Administration
informed Representative Jim Turner, the ranking member of the Select Committee
on Homeland Security, that the TSC was not “fully” operational as of the end of
1
A computer system is composed of computer(s), peripheral equipment such as disks,
printers and terminals, and the software necessary to make them operate together (according
to the American National Standards Institute/Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers
(ANSI/IEEE) Standard 729-1983). A database is an organized body of machine readable
data that can be cross-referenced, updated, retrieved, and searched by computer.
2
The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-6, Subject: Integration
and Use of Screening Information (Washington, Sept. 16, 2003). Available at
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030916-5.html].
3
The Terrorist Screening Memorandum of Understanding accompanying HSPD-6 is
available at [http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2003/09/tscmou.pdf].
4
Presidents may exercise executive authority by issuing various kinds of directives. Among
the oldest of these are executive orders and proclamations, both of which today are usually
published in the Federal Register. For example, President George W. Bush established the
Office of Homeland Security and the initial Homeland Security Council with E.O. 13228
of Oct. 8, 2001. With the establishment of the National Security Council in 1947, there have
emerged a series of variously denominated national security directives, but these are not
published. Recently, President Bush inaugurated a similar series of Homeland Security
Presidential Directives, the first such being issued on Oct. 29, 2001. While these homeland
security directives are not published in the Federal Register, they are available from the
White House Website and appear in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents.
For further information see CRS Report 98-61, Presidential Directives: Background and
Overview, by Harold C. Relyea.
5
The White House, Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security
(July 2002), p. 57.
6
The White House, Fact Sheet: New Terrorist Screening Center Established (Washington,
Sept. 16, 2003), at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030916-8.html].
CRS-3
December 2003 and that the Nation’s multiple terrorist watch lists have yet to be
consolidated.7 On March 25, 2004, the TSC Director — Donna Bucella — testified
that the TSC had established an unclassified, but law enforcement sensitive TSDB.
In addition, the TSC was assisting federal screening agencies in identifying terrorists
and their supporters with greater certainty, and TSDB lookout records had been made
available to nearly 750,000 state and local law enforcement officers.8
The TSC is the latest of three multi-agency efforts undertaken by the
Administration to better identify, screen, and track known terrorists, suspected
terrorists, and their supporters. The other two are the FTTTF and the TTIC.
According to the Administration, the TSC complements the FBI-led FTTTF’s efforts
to prevent terrorists from entering the United States, and to track and remove them
if they manage to enter the country. Under the oversight of the DCI, the TTIC serves
as a single locale where terrorism-threat data from all sources, foreign and domestic,
are further analyzed to more critically focus on terrorism. As part of that function,
under HSPD-6, the TTIC will assume a greater role in identifying individuals who
are known, or suspected, to be terrorists, or their supporters.
The Administration has transferred certain terrorist identification and watch list
functions previously performed by the Department of State’s (DOS’s) INR to the
TTIC and TSC. Through a system known as TIPOFF, the DOS’s INR identified
known and suspected terrorists, produced lookout records, and distributed those
records for inclusion in consular and border inspection systems. Prior to HSPD-6,
TIPOFF was the Nation’s principal terrorist watch list.9 Based in part on TIPOFF,
the member agencies of TTIC have built a TID into which all international terroristrelated data available to the U.S. government will be stored in a single repository.10
With TID records, the TSC is building a consolidated international terrorist watch
list, which will be merged with domestic terrorist watch list records, in the TSDB.
Under HSPD-6 the Administration plans to widen access to, and use of, watch
list records by making them available in a “sensitive but unclassified”11 format to
7
Chris Strohm, “Congressman Blasts Bush on Terrorist Screening Efforts,” Government
Executive Magazine, Jan. 13, 2004, at
[http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0104/011304c1.htm].
8
This testimony was given by TSC Director Donna Bucella on Mar. 25, 2004, before a joint
hearing held by the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland
Security and the Select Homeland Security Subcommittee on Intelligence and
Counterterrorism.
9
Watch lists are just that, lists of persons who are of interest to visa issuance and border
inspection agencies or law enforcement. Persons may be on watch lists to prevent them
from acquiring a visa or to prevent them from entering the country, or both. Persons can be
excludable from entry for reasons ranging from public health concerns to tax-motivated
citizen renunciates, in addition to being known and suspected terrorists, or their supporters.
They may also be wanted by law enforcement agencies for questioning or arrest.
10
The TID is nearly identical to the system that section 343 of the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (P.L. 107-306, 116 Stat. 2399) required the DCI to establish.
11
There is no governmentwide definition of “sensitive but unclassified (SBU).” Within
(continued…)
CRS-4
authorized federal, state, local, territorial and tribal authorities; to certain private
sector entities; and to certain foreign governments.
Hence, HSPD-6 has elevated and expanded the terrorist identification and
watch-list functions, which were previously performed by the DOS’s INR for
immigration-screening purposes. Moreover, under HSPD-6, the use of watch lists
will be expanded to include data taken from on-going criminal and national security
investigations that are related to terrorism. The purpose of these measures is to better
identify, watch-list, and screen known and suspected terrorists at U.S. consulates
abroad and international ports of entry. Such measures could also better enable the
U.S. government to track terrorists within the United States if they manage to enter
the country. Yet, at the same time, there are significant risks as well, not the least of
which is the potential loss of individual privacy and an erosion of civil liberties. In
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004,12 Congress has required the
President to report back to Congress on the operations of both the TTIC and TSC.
Terrorist Watch-Listing Prior to HSPD-6
A primary goal of lookout systems and watch lists has been to prevent terrorist
attacks, by excluding known or suspected terrorists and their supporters from entry
into the United States. Under HSPD-6, the use of watch lists would be expanded to
better screen such persons at consular offices and international ports of entry, and to
better track them both abroad and, if they manage to enter the United States, at home.
Watch Lists and Lookout Books. The DOS’s Bureau of Consular Affairs
(CA) and the federal border inspection services, until recently the U.S. Customs
Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), have long maintained
watch lists (or lookout books) for the purpose of excluding “undesirable” persons
from the United States. Customs and immigration inspection activities are now
carried out by the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) at the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS).13 While these watch lists/lookout books were just that
11
(…continued)
certain limits set out in statutes and presidential directives, agencies have discretion to
define SBU in ways that serve their needs to safeguard information that is unclassified but
should be withheld from the public for a variety of reasons. The reasons for safeguarding
such information, are likely to include maintaining the privacy rights of individuals and the
integrity of ongoing inquiries and investigations. A provision in the Homeland Security Act
of 2002 (§892 of P.L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2253) requires the President to implement
procedures to safeguard SBU information that is homeland security-related. For further
information, see CRS Report RL31845, “Sensitive But Unclassified” and Other Federal
Security Controls on Scientific and Technical Information: History and Current
Controversy, by Genevieve J. Kneso.
12
P.L. 108-177, Stat. 2622-2625.
13
Until the establishment of DHS, federal border inspection services included the
Department of the Treasury’s Customs Service, the Department of Justice’s INS, the
Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), and the
Department of Health and Human Service’s Public Health Service. The Homeland Security
(continued…)
CRS-5
— bound paper volumes — the development of computers, computer software, and
computer connectivity/networking, allowed these agencies to develop and more
efficiently search watch list records during the 1970s and 1980s.
Beginning in 1987, the DOS began keeping watch list (lookout) records on
known and suspected terrorists through a system known as TIPOFF. While the DOS
had maintained computerized visa records since 1965, including watch lists, the
events surrounding the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993 prompte…
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