University of Florida IAEA Nuclear Safeguard System Inspection Discussion 1 Describe the IAEA Safeguards System. What are its goals/purpose? What sort of a

University of Florida IAEA Nuclear Safeguard System Inspection Discussion 1 Describe the IAEA Safeguards System. What are its goals/purpose? What sort of activities or

functions are involved?

2. Briefly discuss and evaluate the different forms of inspections implemented by the IAEA within

the framework of the non-proliferation agreement with each state.

3. Describe the inspector activities before, during, and after the inspection Viewpoint
Nuclear
Safeguards
How far can Inspectors go?
by George Bunn
A look at experience in Iran and North Korea — and the
origins of the NPT and safeguards in the 1960s—offers
insights into the authority of IAEA nuclear inspectors.
The world’s Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
requires countries without nuclear weapons to accept
inspections by the IAEA. The purpose is to assure that
these NPT members — referred to in the Treaty as “nonnuclear-weapon States” — do not make nuclear weapons.
This raises an important question: Could such refusal of an
inspector’s request violate the NPT or the country’s inspection agreement with the IAEA?
During an NPT inspection, how widely within the
inspected country may inspectors look? May they search
only those areas that the NPT member has declared to have
nuclear activities? May they look for activities that do not
include nuclear material but may nevertheless relate to
nuclear weaponization?
The NPT & Nuclear Safeguards
Weaponization activities can vary. They might include
learning how to design or make nuclear weapons or their
components using calculations, computer simulations,
models, high-flux neutron generators, high-explosive
lenses, high-energy electrical components, hydro-dynamic
tests and many other activities that do not require the presence of nuclear material. Yet such activities may be useful
for making nuclear weapons.
1. Did the NPT negotiators intend to authorize
inspections at places where nuclear material
was not usually present?
In my view, it could.
Some insights are gained from looking back at the NPT and
the origins of nuclear safeguards. Four questions arise.
Can IAEA inspectors look for such activities at places other
than those where nuclear material is present? If they do,
may they ask responsible personnel about the purpose of
the activities?
The first sentence of the NPT inspection article (Article
III.1) describes the goal of inspections. It states that their
purpose is to verify compliance with the promise of a nonnuclear-weapon State not to acquire nuclear weapons. It
says that each non-nuclear-weapon State must accept IAEA
safeguards inspections “for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under
this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear
energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons.…”
The IAEA’s experience in Iran and the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (North Korea) shows the answer is not
clear cut. Some countries might say “no” to an IAEA inspector’s request to check activities that are not at the same site
as the nuclear facilities that the country has “declared” to
the IAEA to be open for inspection.
The use of the phrase “nuclear energy” rather than the more
specific “nuclear material” (which is used elsewhere in this
provision of the NPT) suggests that the NPT’s purpose may
well be to authorize IAEA inspections at locations related
to “nuclear energy” whether or not nuclear material is actually present there.
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March 2007 49
In sum, the IAEA’s INFCIRC/66 safeguards requirements
that I studied when I was involved in negotiating a first
US-Soviet joint draft of the NPT safeguards article did not
require that nuclear material always be present at the sites
to be inspected by IAEA inspectors. INFCIRC/66 was the
“model” for what IAEA safeguards inspections then were
— a model that the NPT negotiators and their governments
had available when they reviewed Treaty drafts of what
became the safeguards article of the NPT. The scope of
INFCIRC/66 is therefore relevant to the scope of the NPT
safeguards article.
IAEA inspectors conduct a random check of fuel
pellets at a fuel fabrication facility.
Photo: Calma/IAEA
Is this conclusion consistent with the history of the negotiation of the NPT and other NPT language dealing with
inspections?
When the NPT was negotiated in the late 1960s, I was one
of the US negotiators of this language in the NPT safeguards article. At that time, what I knew about IAEA
inspection requirements came in large part from reading
the IAEA safeguards rules dealing with them. The collective rules were called “The Agency’s Safeguards System,”
IAEA Information Circular 66/Revision 2 (issued in 1965
as IAEA document INFCIRC/66/Rev.2). This document
— the basis for 1960s safeguards inspection agreements
between the IAEA and the nation States having nuclear
facilities — contained the basic IAEA non-proliferation
safeguards inspection requirements. Its main focus was on
accounting for “nuclear material.”
In several instances, however, INFCIRC/66 authorized
inspections even though no such material was likely to
be present at the time and place of inspection. For example, it said that “routine inspections” could include “audit
of records and reports” without requiring that the records
and reports be located where the nuclear material was
located. “Initial inspections” of principal nuclear facilities
were to take place before the facilities had started to operate, and this could mean before nuclear material had been
installed.
There was thus no requirement, in the case of initial inspections, that nuclear material be present. In addition, “special inspections,” though used infrequently in practice,
were permissible when “[a]ny unforeseen circumstance
requires immediate action.” Thus, INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 did
not require that nuclear material be present at the site or
sites to be inspected in a special inspection.
50 IAEA BULLETIN 48/2
A major issue in drafting the NPT safeguards article was
whether and how it would apply in Western European countries that did not have nuclear weapons but did have nuclear
reactors (Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, West Germany).
These countries’ nuclear facilities were inspected periodically by the West European atomic energy agency, Euratom,
which had begun operations before the IAEA did. Some
Euratom governments saw no reason why their nuclear
facilities should have to be inspected by IAEA inspectors as
well as by Euratom inspectors acting pursuant to Euratom
inspection standards.
At the same time, the Cold War was still going on and the
Soviet Union was not about to agree in the NPT to accept the
reports of Euratom safeguards inspectors on nuclear facilities in West Germany and other NATO members’ countries
(some of these Euratom/NATO members had US nuclear
weapons deployed on their territories).
Euratom members did not, of course, include the Soviet
Union or any of its allies in Eastern Europe. On the other
hand, IAEA members included the Soviet Union and some
of its allies as well as the United States and some of its
allies. The Soviet Union favored the IAEA and distrusted
Euratom. It insisted that the NPT require IAEA inspections
for Euratom countries that joined the NPT as non-nuclearweapon State participants.
This resulted in a major controversy among Western countries. On one side, Britain and the United States strongly
supported NPT safeguards provisions providing for IAEA
safeguards. On the other side were some Euratom members, particularly West Germany and Italy, who were nonnuclear-weapon countries interested in the NPT negotiations but already having Euratom, their own multilateral
nuclear inspection agency. They were unwilling to accept
both IAEA inspections and Euratom inspections at their
nuclear facilities. They preferred Euratom inspectors from
their own Euratom-member countries to IAEA inspectors
mostly from other countries including the Soviet Union. The
dispute produced a joint refusal by the Euratom countries
to join the NPT until new NPT IAEA safeguards standards
— and a new agreement between the IAEA and Euratom
describing future safeguards in Euratom countries — were
both negotiated.
March 2007
Most of Euratom’s non-nuclear-weapon countries signed
the NPT (without ratifying it) so they could participate with
other NPT signatories in negotiations with the IAEA on
NPT inspections standards. But they refused to ratify the
NPT until they were able to negotiate both a satisfactory
new IAEA safeguards system for the NPT, and an agreement with the IAEA on how Euratom and IAEA inspectors
would cooperate at Euratom facilities.
Euratom country representatives participated actively in
the negotiations that produced the IAEA safeguards standards for the NPT (INFCIRC/153). They then negotiated
a separate deal with the IAEA on what IAEA inspectors
would be permitted to do in Euratom countries. As a result,
IAEA safeguards in Euratom countries were carried out
largely through IAEA observation of Euratom inspections,
or through operation of “joint” inspections. This did not, of
course, reduce the scope of what the NPT inspection provision had authorized.
for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is
not diverted to nuclear weapons…”
For this purpose to be achieved, the IAEA needs to ensure
not only that declared nuclear material is not being made
into weapons but that no undeclared nuclear material exists
within the inspected State. This means that IAEA inspectors must not only verify the presence of nuclear materials that have been declared by the inspected State, but they
must verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials as
well.
Thus, inspections beyond the facilities or locations where
declared nuclear facilities exist may sometimes be essential
to achieve the basic purpose for safeguards.
In summary, the 1960s IAEA inspection standards
(INFCIRC/ 66/Rev.2) were what the NPT negotiators
had before them to describe IAEA inspections when they
drafted the Treaty’s safeguards provisions. These standards did not require that nuclear material always be present
before an inspector could carry out an inspection. The
NPT negotiators of the safeguards provision clearly did
not intend to require that nuclear material be present at
every site inspected by the IAEA inspectors pursuant to
the NPT.
2. Does the IAEA safeguards system pursuant
to the NPT authorize inspections at sites where
“nuclear material” is not present?
After the NPT had been signed, lengthy negotiations that
included both experts familiar with Euratom inspections,
and experts familiar with IAEA inspections, produced the
new IAEA safeguards standards for the NPT. They were
published in 1972 as IAEA Information Circular 153,
(INFCIRC/153 (Corr.)).
As previously noted, Euratom subsequently negotiated
with the IAEA to produce an agreement on sharing inspection authority between the two organizations that provided
for international inspections of Euratom members’ nuclear
facilities. Though there were some early disagreements on
inspection practices between Euratom and the IAEA, today
there is a “partnership approach” between the two for sharing inspection responsibility at Euratom facilities.
INFCIRC/153’s statement of purpose for safeguards says
that the IAEA has the “right and obligation to ensure that
safeguards will be applied, in accordance with the terms of
the [safeguards] agreement, on all [nuclear] material in all
peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the State…
IAEA BULLETIN 48/2
IAEA inspectors are trained to detect, at an early stage, possible
diversion of nuclear material—rather than just detecting its loss
after it’s gone. Photo: Calma/IAEA
INFCIRC/153 says that the “objective” of NPT safeguards
is the “timely detection of the diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities
to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear
explosive devices or for purposes unknown….” The other
element of that objective is the “deterrence of such diversion
by the risk of early detection.” Thus, if weapons-related
nuclear activities not yet involving nuclear material are suspected, they may be subject to inspection on the ground
that they may imply a future diversion of nuclear material
to nuclear explosives, an activity that should be deterred—
and detected if it is not deterred. If one of the basic NPT
duties of the IAEA in implementing safeguards is to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials, information from many sources and the possibility of inspections
at undeclared sites are essential.
The inspection provision in the NPT requires that safeguards obligations for non-nuclear-weapon States be “negotiated and concluded with the [IAEA] in accordance with
March 2007 51
the Statute of the [IAEA] and the Agency’s safeguards system.” As we have seen, the “Agency’s safeguards system”
does authorize inspection of various activities, some of
which may not involve nuclear material, which could contribute to the making of nuclear weapons. The IAEA’s ability to detect, at an early stage, possible diversion of nuclear
material is necessary to deter such diversion from happening rather than simply detecting its loss after it is gone.
The use of the phrase “nuclear
energy” rather than the more
specific “nuclear material”
suggests that the NPT’s
purpose may well be to
authorize IAEA inspections at
locations related to “nuclear
energy” whether or not nuclear
material is actually present
there.
Thus, the NPT authorizes broader IAEA inspections whenever there is the possibility that nuclear material may be
being used for weapons-related purposes. Examples of
these inspections are cited in a study for VERTIC, a nongovernmental organization that has done useful research
on arms control verification.
Like INFCIRC/66, INFCIRC/153 focuses mainly on locations where nuclear material is known to be present or is
likely to be present. However, it also identifies, as subject to
IAEA inspection, facilities meant to contain nuclear material even though they do not contain nuclear material at the
time of inspection.
Moreover, the INFCIRC/153 provision authorizing “special inspections,” to gain “access to information or locations in addition to the access specified” by the safeguards
agreements, shows that nuclear material does not always
have to be present at the inspected site if there is other information that suggests that the site may be related to nuclear
activities.
52 IAEA BULLETIN 48/2
There is in that provision no limitation of access to places
where nuclear material is already present. This was confirmed by the Board of Governors’ concurrence in the
Secretariat’s request to the DPRK for access under that provision for reasons unrelated to any suspicion about presence
of undeclared nuclear material at those locations. However,
the IAEA has not requested to conduct special inspections
in any but a very few cases (such as North Korea) because
of resistance by many IAEA Member States to the notion
of “unlimited” inspections. In fact, on one occasion, the
Board expressed its “anticipation” that such inspections
were likely to occur “only on rare occasions”.
3. Does the IAEA “Additional Protocol” to NPT
safeguards agreements authorize inspection
at locations that do not contain nuclear
material?
In 1997, the IAEA issued INFCIRC/540 (Corr.), the IAEA
Model Additional Protocol. It contains the most recent
statement of safeguards standards for non-nuclear-weapon
States that are party to the NPT (and for the non-weapon
nuclear activities of the five NPT nuclear-weapon states,
China, France, Russia, the UK, and the US).
INFCIRC/540 was not intended to replace INFCIRC/153
but to supplement it. What is its basic purpose? To assure
that no nuclear material in an NPT non-nuclear-weapon
member’s territory remains outside the purview of IAEA
inspection authority. Given the IAEA’s basic NPT obligation to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear material,
and given the Board’s expressed expectation that special
inspections would be conducted “only on rare occasions”,
broader inspection authority seemed useful.
This broader access would also permit another mechanism
for looking into indications of undeclared weaponization
activities that do not involve nuclear material in the territory of an NPT non-nuclear-weapon state
Most NPT parties have accepted INFCIRC/ 540 access provisions, though many have not done so yet. These provisions
are intended, among other things, to broaden IAEA inspection authority beyond that provided by INFCIRC/153.
While the concept of verifying “completeness” as well as
“correctness” of inspections derives from paragraph 2 of
INFCIRC/153, the Model Additional Protocol provides the
IAEA with additional tools for providing such assurances.
It is clear from the face of INFCIRC/540 that access to locations not involving nuclear material at all is permitted.
That suggests that IAEA inspector searches outside places
where nuclear materials have been declared to be present
by the NPT party (those customarily inspected in the past)
may be required.
March 2007
INFCIRC/540 contains a number of provisions showing
that it is meant to include coverage of locations that are
“nuclear-related” in the sense that they include some nexus
to nuclear material, though they do not contain nuclear
material.
Thus, INFCIRC/540 Articles 2.a.(i) and 2.b.(i) ask those that
have accepted its terms, to provide information (a) on their
research and development activities relating to the nuclear
fuel cycle not involving nuclear material that are funded,
authorized or controlled by, or carried out on behalf of, a
State, and (b) information on nuclear-fuel-cycle-related
research and development activities not involving nuclear
material which are specifically related to enrichment and
reprocessing of nuclear fuel or the processing of intermediate or high-level waste that are not funded, authorized or
carried out by or for a State.
Given these provisions, hiding facilities for the development
of enrichment technology, even though they had no uranium in them, would be inconsistent with INFCIRC/540.
This new language calls for access to sites like this by the
IAEA. If that is not possible, the regulation says, the operator must make “every reasonable effort to satisfy the [IAEA]
requirements without delay, by other means.”
The IAEA inspection authority grew after the NPT went
into effect. It grew again when governments began to realize that governmental limitations upon IAEA inspection
authority had prevented Agency inspectors from finding
nuclear-weapon related activities in Iraq before the first
Gulf War.
In a major step to remedy this failure, INFCIRC/540 provides increased authority for the IAEA inspectors — beyond
that already provided by INFCIRC/153. INFCIRC/540, for
example, requires the submission of information related to
possible nuclear activities that do not include nuclear material, and information on operational activities of possible
safeguards relevance at locations outside the areas where
nuclear material is customarily used. It clearly calls for
more information than INFCIRC/153 did. This information, of course, can be the basis for additional requests for
access by the IAEA.
4. What conclusions can be drawn?
The IAEA has authority to inspect for hidden nuclearweapons-related activities by non-nuclear-weapon NPT
members even though the activities do not involve nuclear
material.
Consider, in addition to the examples previously described,
the IAEA’s environmental sampling techniques for monitoring buildings, equipment, tree leaves, grasses, etc. to
IAEA BULLETIN 48/2
look for radioactive samples suggesting past nuclear activities in the area. This is a major increase in the IAEA’s ability to detect hidden nuclear activities that may relate to
nuclear weapons.
For example, environmental samples taken by IAEA
inspectors from equipment at a location in Iran (not a facility declared by Iran for IAEA inspection) showed particles
of enriched uranium that seemed to have come from uranium enrichment or other nuclear activities tha…
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