Explain the difference between meta-ethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics

Meta-ethics and Relativism

We’ll follow our usual pattern for 10 point board here. Offer a substantive initial post by the end of Wednesday and two replies by the end of the day Friday for full credit. Of course more engagement in discussion is welcome, and watch for my occasional contributions aimed at clarifying the material in the chapter. Again, 200-300 words is a good length for a post, but I’m more interested in informed engagement with the material. Here are a few review questions from the reading to get us started.

1. Explain the difference between meta-ethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics. Try to identify some issues and questions belonging to each.

2. What does it mean to say that ethics is normative?

3. What could it mean to say that there are ethical truths?

4. Explain the difference between ethical realism, relativism, and subjectivism.

5. Explain DCT and the problem arbitrariness presents for it. What better alternative meta-ethical view is open to religious believers?

6. Explain what Moral Relativism says.

7. How does arbitrariness present a problem for Moral Relativism?

8. Why does Moral Relativism fail to support the idea of tolerance and respect for diverse people and opinions?

9. Explain the problem of moral change or progress for Moral Relativism.

10. Explain the moral reformers’ dilemma as an argument against Moral Relativism.

11. What difficulty does subjectivism face in explaining apparent moral reasoning?

12. Explain the argument for ethical realism offered by this chapter as a whole.

For further thought:

Lots of people think that morality is subjective, a mere matter of opinion or relative to your own point of view or that of your culture. People often seem to take views like these simply on the grounds that some of our moral opinions differ. But people’s opinions also differ about whether dinosaurs existed, whether humans are causing climate change and whether the earth is flat. Certainly there are facts of the matter about these things. Even if we aren’t quite sure what the facts are or just how to justify our own opinion, nobody would say that whether or not the earth is flat is merely a matter of opinion or relative to your belief. So why the special carve out for moral opinions? Why are so many so reluctant to allow for the possibility that some moral opinions might be more reasonable than others and that some of us hold opinions that aren’t very reasonable? Well, that’s a question to ponder. The substance of our chapter this week focuses on a few meta-ethical opinions, that morality is somehow relative features centrally among them. Philosophers since Socrates have been practically unanimous in arguing that moral relativism is a pretty awful view about the nature of morality.

The central concern about moral relativism is that it allows for anything at all to be morally right. According to moral relativism, if Nazi Germany deems it right to commit genocide against Jewish people, then that is what is right relative to Nazi Germany and there is nothing more to say about the morality of genocide that what is right relative to various groups. Once this consequence is pointed out it looks to be a pretty clear reductio ad adsurdum of moral relativism. My suspicion is that most fans of moral relativism simply haven’t carefully considered the logical consequences of this view.