Combs chapter 4 analysis: Domestic and Foreign instigated terrorism the writing will be about Read Combs Ch 4 . Only referanss is the chapter. I suggest u

Combs chapter 4 analysis: Domestic and Foreign instigated terrorism the writing will be about Read Combs Ch 4 . Only referanss is the chapter.

I suggest using a three-ring binder to store your journal entries after they have been read and graded. Each journal entry should contain several paragraphs, written in your own words, and should conform with the following format:

Journal Format

Author ______________________ Reading Title ________________________

Your Name ___________________ Date ______________________________

Summary
Write from memory, noting what you recall as the main ideas of the reading.
Integration
In your own words, how does this reading “connect” (amplify, contradict, substantiate, etc.) to other information about this topic? The other information may be in the form of other readings, news stories, or images of the police portrayed in popular culture.
What do you see as the implications of the ideas covered in the reading?
Application
How can you use the information in this reading?
Does the reading change your view of some aspect of policing? Explain.
If you think there is no application for the material, say so. However, provide a rationale for your position.
Evaluation
Describe your reaction to the reading (like, dislike, etc.). Why?
Who is the appropriate audience for this reading? Why?
What would make the reading more useful?

5. Essay question

Create an essay question based on the reading that requires critical thinking (comparing, analyzing, evaluating, critiquing, justifying, etc.). The question should be capable of being answered by someone who has read this and earlier readings in our class.

STRET WORD , DIRECTE STYLE , YOUR ONLY REFERENSS IS THE CHAPTER5 . Chapter 4 Terror From Above Terrorism by the State
Opening Viewpoint: State Terrorism as Domestic and Foreign Policy
State Terrorism as Domestic Policy in Central America
Honduras during the early 1980s was a staging area for American-supported Nicaraguan counterrevolutionary
guerrillas known as the Contras. During this period, the Honduran government vigorously suppressed domestic
dissent. The military established torture centers and created a clandestine death squad called Battalion 3-16.
Battalion 3-16 was allegedly responsible for the disappearances of hundreds of students, unionists, and politicians.
In El Salvador during the 1980s, a Marxist revolutionary movement fought to overthrow the U.S.-backed
government. To counter this threat, right-wing death squads worked in conjunction with Salvadoran security
services to eliminate government opponents, leftist rebels, and their supporters. ORDEN was a paramilitary and
intelligence service that used terror against rural civilians. Another death squad, the White Hand, committed
numerous atrocities against civilians.
In Guatemala, a brutal civil war and related political violence cost about 200,000 lives, including tens of thousands
of “disappeared” people. It was, in part, a racial war waged against Guatemala’s Indians, descendants of the ancient
Mayas, who made up half the population. The government responded to an insurgency in the Indian-populated
countryside with widespread torture, killings, and massacres against Indian villagers. Death squad activity was also
widespread. One government campaign, called Plan Victoria 82, massacred civilians, destroyed villages, and
resettled survivors in zones called “strategic hamlets.” Plan Victoria 82 was responsible for thousands of deaths by
mid-1982.
State Terrorism as Foreign Policy in North Africa and the Middle East
Libya was implicated in a number of terrorist incidents during the 1980s, including attacks at the Rome and Vienna
airports in 1985, the bombing of the La Belle Discotheque in Berlin in 1986, and the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103
in 1988. Libya was also implicated in providing support for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–
General Command and the Abu Nidal Organization. During this period, Libya sponsored training camps for many
terrorist organizations such as Germany’s Red Army Faction and the Provisional Irish Republican Army.
Sudan supported regional terrorist groups, rebel organizations, and dissident movements throughout North Africa
and the Middle East. It provided safe haven for Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qa’ida network, the Abu Nidal Organization,
Palestine Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and Hezbollah. It also provided support for rebels and opposition groups in Tunisia,
Ethiopia, Uganda, and Eritrea.
Syria provided safe haven and support for Hezbollah, Palestine Islamic Jihad, Hamas, the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine–General Command, and the Abu Nidal Organization. Its decades-long occupation of the
Beka’a Valley, which ended in 2005, provided open safe haven for many extremist groups, including Iranian
Revolutionary Guards.
This chapter explores the characteristics of terrorism from above—state terrorism—committed
by governments and quasi-governmental agencies and personnel against perceived enemies.
State terrorism can be directed externally against adversaries in the international domain or
internally against domestic enemies. Readers will explore the various types of state terrorism and
will acquire an appreciation for the qualities that characterize each state terrorist environment. A
state terrorist paradigm will be discussed, and interesting cases will be examined to understand
what is meant by terrorism as foreign policy and terrorism as domestic policy.
Political violence by the state is the most organized and potentially the most far-reaching
application of terrorist violence. Because of the many resources available to the state, its ability
to commit acts of violence far exceeds in scale the kind of violence perpetrated by antistate
dissident terrorists. Only communal dissident terrorism (group-against-group violence)
potentially approximates the scale of state-sponsored terror.1
Why do governments use terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy? What is the benefit of
applying terrorism domestically? How do states justify their involvement in either international
or domestic terrorism? The answers to these questions incorporate the following considerations:
•
•
Internationally, the state defines its interests in a number of ways, usually within the
context of political, economic, or ideological considerations. When promoting or
defending these interests, governments can choose to behave unilaterally or
cooperatively, and cautiously or aggressively.
Domestically, the state’s interests involve the need to maintain internal security and
order. When threatened domestically, some regimes react with great vigor and violence.
In both the international and domestic domains, states will choose from a range of overt and
covert options.
Terrorism by states is characterized by official government support for policies of violence,
repression, and intimidation. This violence and coercion is directed against perceived enemies
that the state has determined threaten its interests or security.
Although the perpetrators of state terrorist campaigns are frequently government personnel
acting in obedience to directives originating from government officials, those who carry out the
violence are also quite often unofficial agents who are used and encouraged by the government.
An example illustrating this concept is the violent suppression campaign against the proindependence movement in the former Indonesian province of East Timor. East Timor comprises
the eastern half of the island of Timor, which is located at the southeastern corner of the
Indonesian archipelago northwest of Australia. East Timor is unique in the region because it was
ruled for centuries as a Portuguese colony and its population is predominantly Roman Catholic.
Portugal announced in 1975 that it would withdraw in 1978 after occupying the territory for
more than 450 years. The Indonesian army invaded East Timor in December 1975 and annexed
the territory in 1976. During the turmoil that followed, more than 200,000 Timorese were killed
in the fighting or were starved during a famine. At the same time that the Indonesian army
committed numerous atrocities—including killing scores of protesters by firing on a prodemocracy protest in November 1991—the government encouraged the operations of proIndonesian paramilitaries. The paramilitaries were armed by the government and permitted to
wage an extended campaign of terror for nearly two decades against East Timor’s proindependence movement. This violence became particularly brutal in 1999 as the territory moved
toward a vote for independence. For example, in April 1999, a paramilitary group murdered
about 25 people in a churchyard. The long period of violence ended in September 1999, when
Indonesia gave control of East Timor to United Nations (UN) peacekeepers. Under UN
supervision, East Timor’s first presidential elections were held in April 2002, and former
resistance leader Xanana Gusmao won in a landslide victory.
Photo 4.1 Libyan leader Muammar el-Qaddafi. El-Qaddafi’s regime provided assistance and
safe haven to a number of terrorist groups for two decades before renouncing such support in the
early 2000s. He later ordered Libyan security forces and mercenaries to crush opposition during
the 2011 Arab Spring uprising in Libya and was himself killed during the unrest.
Alain DENIZE/Gamma-Rapho/Getty Images
The East Timor case illustrates the common strategy of using violent state-sponsored proxies
(paramilitaries in this example) as an instrument of official state repression. The rationale behind
supporting these paramilitaries is that they can be deployed to violently enforce state authority,
while at the same time permit the state to deny responsibility for their behavior. Such deniability
can be useful for propaganda purposes because the government can officially argue that its
paramilitaries represent a spontaneous grassroots reaction against their opponents.
The discussion in this chapter will review the following:
•
•
•
•
The State as Terrorist: A State Terrorism Paradigm
Violence Abroad: Terrorism as Foreign Policy
Violence at Home: Terrorism as Domestic Policy
The Problem of Accountability: Monitoring State Terrorism
The State as Terrorist: A State Terrorism Paradigm
A paradigm is “a pattern, example, or model”2 that is logically developed to represent a concept.
Paradigms represent theoretical concepts that are accepted among experts, and they can be useful
for practitioners to design policy agendas. When paradigms change—commonly called
a paradigm shift—it is often because new environmental factors persuade experts to thoroughly
reassess existing theories and assumptions. A dissident terrorism paradigm will be presented
in Chapter 5.
Experts and scholars have designed a number of models to describe state terrorism. These
constructs have been developed to identify distinctive patterns of state-sponsored terrorist
behavior. Experts agree that several models of state involvement in terrorism can be
differentiated. For example, one model3 describes state-level participants in a security
environment as including the following:
•
•
•
sponsors of terrorism, meaning those states that actively promote terrorism and that have
been formally designated as “rogue states,” or state sponsors, under U.S. law4
enablers of terrorism, or those states that operate in an environment wherein “being part
of the problem means not just failing to cooperate fully in countering terrorism but also
doing some things that help enable it to occur”5
cooperators in counterterrorism efforts, including unique security environments wherein
“cooperation on counterterrorism is often feasible despite significant disagreements on
other subjects”6
State terrorism incorporates many types and degrees of violence. The intensity of this violence
may range in scale from single acts of coercion to extended campaigns of terrorist violence.
Another model describes the scale of violence as including the following:
•
•
•
•
In warfare, the conventional military forces of a state are marshaled against an enemy.
The enemy is either a conventional or guerrilla combatant and may be an internal or
external adversary. This is a highly organized and complicated application of state
violence.
In genocide, the state applies its resources toward the elimination of a scapegoat group.
The basic characteristic of state-sponsored genocidal violence is that it does not
differentiate between enemy combatants and enemy civilians; all members of the
scapegoat group are considered to be enemies. Like warfare, this is often a highly
organized and complicated application of state violence.
Assassinations are selective applications of homicidal state violence, whereby a single
person or a specified group of people is designated for elimination. This is a lower-scale
application of state violence.
Torture is used by some states as an instrument of intimidation, interrogation, and
humiliation. Like assassinations, it is a selective application of state violence directed
against a single person or a specified group of people. Although it is often a lower-scale
application of state violence, many regimes make widespread use of torture during states
of emergency.7
A number of experts consider the quality of violence to be central to the analysis of state
terrorism and have drawn distinctions between different types of state coercion. Thus, “some
analysts distinguish between oppression and repression. Oppression is essentially a condition of
exploitation and deprivation . . . , and repression is action against those who are seen to be threats
to the established order.”8
Understanding State-Sponsored Terrorism: State Patronage
and Assistance
Linkages between regimes and terrorism can range from very clear lines of sponsorship to very
murky and indefinable associations. States that are inclined to use terrorism as an instrument of
statecraft are often able to control the parameters for their involvement so that governments can
sometimes manage how precisely a movement or an incident can be traced back to its personnel.
For example, the Soviet Union established the Patrice Lumumba Peoples’ Friendship
University in Moscow. Named for the martyred Congolese prime minister Patrice Lumumba,
the university recruited students from throughout the developing world. Much of its curriculum
was composed of standard higher education courses. However, students also received instruction
in Marxist theory, observed firearms demonstrations, and were networked with pro-Soviet
“liberation” movements. Patrice Lumumba University was also used by the KGB, the Soviet
intelligence service, to recruit students for more intensive training in the intricacies of national
liberation and revolution. Many graduates went on to become leaders in a number of extremist
movements. Many Palestinian nationalists attended the university, as did the Venezuelan terrorist
Ilich Ramírez Sánchez, known as Carlos the Jackal.
Thus, state sponsorship of terrorism is not always a straightforward process. In fact, it is usually
a covert, secret policy that allows states to claim deniability when accused of sponsoring
terrorism. Because of these veiled parameters, a distinction must be made between state
patronage for terrorism and state assistance for terrorism.
As discussed in the next section, the basic characteristic of state patronage is that the state is
overtly and directly linked to terrorist behavior. The basic characteristic of state assistance is that
the state is tacitly and indirectly linked to terrorist behavior. These are two subtly distinct
concepts that are summarized in Table 4.1.
State Sponsorship: The Patronage Model
State patronage for terrorism refers to active participation in, and encouragement of, terrorist
behavior. Its basic characteristic is that the state, through its agencies and personnel, actively
takes part in repression, violence, and terrorism. Thus, state patrons adopt policies
that initiate terrorism and other subversive activities, including directly arming, training, and
providing sanctuary for terrorists.
State Patronage in Foreign Policy
In the foreign policy domain, state patronage for terrorism occurs when a government champions
a politically violent movement or group—a proxy—that is operating beyond its borders. Under
this model, the state patron directly assists the proxy in its cause and continues its support even
when the movement or group has become known to commit acts of terrorism or other atrocities.
When these revelations occur, patrons typically reply to this information with rationalizations.
The patron
•
•
•
•
accepts the terrorism as a necessary tactic,
denies that what occurred should be labeled as terrorism,
denies that an incident occurred in the first place, or
issues a blanket and moralistic condemnation of all such violence as unfortunate.
The 1981–1988 U.S.-directed guerrilla war against the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua
incorporated elements of the state patronage model.9 Although it was not a terrorist war, per se,
the United States’ proxy did commit human rights violations. It is, therefore, a good case study
of state patronage for a proxy that was quite capable of engaging in terrorist behavior.
In 1979, the U.S.-supported regime of Anastasio Somoza Debayle was overthrown after a
revolution led by the Sandinistas, a Marxist insurgent group. Beginning in 1981, the Reagan
administration began a campaign of destabilization against the Sandinista regime. The most
important component of this campaign was U.S. support for anti-Sandinista Nicaraguan
counterrevolutionaries, known as the Contras. During this time,
the centerpiece of the Reagan administration’s low-intensity-warfare strategy was a program of
direct paramilitary attacks. Conducted by a proxy force of exiles supplemented by specially
trained U.S. operatives, these operations were, ironically, meant to be the covert side of Reagan’s
policy. Instead, the so-called contra war became the most notorious symbol of U.S. intervention
in Nicaragua.10
From December 1981 until July 1983, funding and equipment were secretly funneled by the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to build training facilities, sanctuaries, and supply bases for
the Contras along the Nicaraguan–Honduran border. Allied personnel from Honduras and
Argentina assisted in the effort. From this base camp region, the Contras were able to be trained,
supplied, and sent into Nicaragua to conduct guerrilla missions against the Sandinistas. The
Contras were sustained by U.S. arms and funding—without this patronage, they would not have
been able to operate against the Sandinistas. Unfortunately for the United States, evidence
surfaced that implicated the Contras in numerous human rights violations. These allegations
were officially dismissed or explained away by the Reagan administration.
State Patronage in Domestic Policy
In the domestic policy domain, state patronage of terrorism occurs when a regime engages in
direct, violent repression against a domestic enemy. Under this model, state patronage is
characterized by the use of state security personnel in an overt policy of state-sponsored political
violence. State patrons typically rationalize policies of repression by arguing that they are
necessary to
•
•
•
•
suppress a clear and present domestic threat to national security;
maintain law and order during times of national crisis;
protect fundamental cultural values that are threatened by subversives; or
restore stability to governmental institutions that have been shaken, usurped, or damaged
by a domestic enemy.
The Syrian government’s 1982 suppression of a rebellion by the Muslim Brotherhood is a case
study of the state patronage model as domestic policy. The Muslim Brotherhood is a
transnational Sunni Islamic fundamentalist movement that is very active in several North African
and Middle Eastern countries. Beginning in the early 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood initiated a
widespread terrorist campaign against the Syrian government. During its campaign, the
movement assassinated hundreds of government personnel, including civilian and security
officials. They also assassinated Soviet personnel who were based in Syria as advisers. This
phase in the Muslim Brotherhood’s history posed significant dissident defiance to secular
governments in Syria, Egypt, and elsewhere.
In 1980, a rebellion was launched (and suppressed) in the city of Aleppo. In 1981, the Syrian
army and other security units moved in to crush the Muslim Brotherhood in Aleppo and the city
of Hama, killing at least 200 people. Syrian president Hafez el-Assad increased security
restrictions and made membership in the organization a capital offense. In 1982, another Muslim
Brotherhood revolt broke out in Hama. The Syrian regime sent in troops and tanks, backed by
artillery, to put down the revolt; they killed approximately 25,000 civilians and destroyed large
sections of Hama. Since the suppression of the Hama revolt, the Muslim Brotherhood and other
religious fundamentalist groups posed little threat to the Syrian regime, which is a secular
government dominated by a faction of the nationalistic Ba’ath Party. Nevertheless, when the
Ba’athist regime was again challenged by mass protests during the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings,
it again deployed the army and other security forces to violently attack centers of protest
nationwide and again assaulted Hama.11 A civil war ensued, with antigovernment f…
Purchase answer to see full
attachment