CJ360 University of Chicago Network Strategy Paper I need help with a two question paper…… in APA format. I have attached how I want the paper layout a

CJ360 University of Chicago Network Strategy Paper I need help with a two question paper…… in APA format. I have attached how I want the paper layout and course material to help. Please be clear and concise and follow all instruction provide. Each questions is least them a 1000 words.

Question 1

Read the excerpts from Chapter 3 of Lessig’s text “Code 2.0” (I have attached chp 3 here) concerning how Harvard University and the University of Chicago adopted internet capabilities on their campus.

Are both approaches acceptable?

Justify and explain your answer in no more than 750 words. Be specific. Think through these approaches as different philosophical outlooks and how they impact the operations and missions of the entities employing them. Alos, recall tha this book was published in 2006 and technologies have changed dramatically- as you are seeing in this class. Does that impact your view? Explain.

Question 2

Lessig describes 4 “puzzles” of cyberspace in the assigned reading from Week 1 (chp 2). He uses those puzzles, or “stories” as also calls them, to illustrate various themes which he identifies at the end of chapter 2. His point is that each of the puzzles incorporates different aspects of the identified themes.

For this assignment you are to imagine that you are the chief executive of a major corporation or government entity. And, if it is not obvious, it should be a real corporation or government entity- not one you make-up… and address the following:

Choose one any ONE of the four themes from the end of the chapter and identify which, you can argue, presents the greatest risk or challenge for your entity.
In the case of the corporate entity it should be in the context to both individual corporation and the industry.
For the government agency it should be for their operations and mission. –
You will also choose any ONE of the four themes and identify which creates creates the greatest opportunity for your entity
NOTE: For both, risk and opportunity, the theme you use can be the same but, either way, you need to identify and argue persuasively in no more than 900 words.

Properly justify, support with evidence, and explain your answer in no more than 900 words. Our Domestic Intelligence Crisis
By Richard A. Posner
Wednesday, December 21, 2005
We’ve learned that the Defense Department is deeply
involved in domestic intelligence (intelligence concerning
threats to national security that unfold on U.S. soil). The
department’s National Security Agency has been
conducting, outside the framework of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, electronic surveillance of
U.S. citizens within the United States. Other Pentagon
agencies, notably the one known as Counterintelligence
Field Activity (CIFA), have, as described in Walter Pincus’s
recent articles in The Post, been conducting domestic
intelligence on a large scale. Although the CIFA’s formal
mission is to prevent attacks on military installations in the United States, the scale of its activities suggests a
broader concern with domestic security. Other Pentagon agencies have gotten into the domestic intelligence
act, such as the Information Dominance Center, which developed the Able Danger data-mining program.
These programs are criticized as grave threats to civil liberties. They are not. Their significance is in flagging
the existence of gaps in our defenses against terrorism. The Defense Department is rushing to fill those gaps,
though there may be better ways.
The collection, mainly through electronic means, of vast amounts of personal data is said to invade privacy.
But machine collection and processing of data cannot, as such, invade privacy. Because of their volume, the
data are first sifted by computers, which search for names, addresses, phone numbers, etc., that may have
intelligence value. This initial sifting, far from invading privacy (a computer is not a sentient being), keeps
most private data from being read by any intelligence officer.
The data that make the cut are those that contain clues to possible threats to national security. The only valid
ground for forbidding human inspection of such data is fear that they might be used to blackmail or otherwise
intimidate the administration’s political enemies. That danger is more remote than at any previous period of
U.S. history. Because of increased political partisanship, advances in communications technology and more
numerous and competitive media, American government has become a sieve. No secrets concerning matters
that would interest the public can be kept for long. And the public would be far more interested to learn that
public officials were using private information about American citizens for base political ends than to learn
that we have been rough with terrorist suspects — a matter that was quickly exposed despite efforts at
concealment.
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act makes it difficult to conduct surveillance of U.S. citizens and
lawful permanent residents unless they are suspected of being involved in terrorist or other hostile activities.
That is too restrictive. Innocent people, such as unwitting neighbors of terrorists, may, without knowing it,
have valuable counterterrorist information. Collecting such information is of a piece with data-mining
projects such as Able Danger.
The goal of national security intelligence is to prevent a terrorist attack, not just punish the attacker after it
occurs, and the information that enables the detection of an impending attack may be scattered around the
world in tiny bits. A much wider, finer-meshed net must be cast than when investigating a specific crime.
Many of the relevant bits may be in the e-mails, phone conversations or banking records of U.S. citizens,
some innocent, some not so innocent. The government is entitled to those data, but just for the limited
purpose of protecting national security.
The Pentagon’s rush to fill gaps in domestic intelligence reflects the disarray in this vital yet neglected area of
national security. The principal domestic intelligence agency is the FBI, but it is primarily a criminal
investigation agency that has been struggling, so far with limited success, to transform itself. It is having
trouble keeping its eye on the ball; an FBI official is quoted as having told the Senate that environmental and
animal rights militants pose the biggest terrorist threats in the United States. If only that were so.
Most other nations, such as Britain, Canada, France, Germany and Israel, many with longer histories of
fighting terrorism than the United States, have a domestic intelligence agency that is separate from its
national police force, its counterpart to the FBI. We do not. We also have no official with sole and
comprehensive responsibility for domestic intelligence. It is no surprise that gaps in domestic intelligence are
being filled by ad hoc initiatives.
We must do better. The terrorist menace, far from receding, grows every day. This is not only because al
Qaeda likes to space its attacks, often by many years, but also because weapons of mass destruction are
becoming ever more accessible to terrorist groups and individuals.
The writer is a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit and a senior lecturer in law at the
University of Chicago. He will take questions at 2 p.m. today athttp://www.washingtonpost.com.
View all comments that have been posted about this article.
© 2005 The Washington Post Company
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P A R T
O N E
“ r e g u l a b i l i t y ”
It is said that cyberspace can’t be regulated. But what does it mean to say that
something could be regulated? What makes regulation possible? That’s the
question raised in this Part. If the Internet can’t be regulated, why? And whatever the reason, can it change? Might an unregulable space be tamed? Might
the Wild West be won, and how?
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TH RE E
i s-i sm:
is the way it is the way it must be?
The rise of an electronic medium that disregards geographical boundaries throws the law into disarray by creating entirely new phenomena
that need to become the subject of clear legal rules but that cannot be
governed, satisfactorily, by any current territorially based sovereign.
David Johnson and David Post1
Some things never change about governing the Web. Most prominent is
its innate ability to resist governance in almost any form.
Tom Steinert-Threlkeld2
IF THERE WAS A MEME THAT RULED TALK ABOUT CYBERSPACE, IT WAS THAT CYBERSPACE
was a place that could not be regulated. That it “cannot be governed”; that its
“nature” is to resist regulation. Not that cyberspace cannot be broken, or that
government cannot shut it down. But if cyberspace exists, so first-generation
thinking goes, government’s power over behavior there is quite limited. In its
essence, cyberspace is a space of no control.
Nature. Essence. Innate. The way things are. This kind of rhetoric should
raise suspicions in any context. It should especially raise suspicion here. If
there is any place where nature has no rule, it is in cyberspace. If there is any
place that is constructed, cyberspace is it. Yet the rhetoric of “essence” hides
this constructedness. It misleads our intuitions in dangerous ways.
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This is the fallacy of “is-ism”—the mistake of confusing how something is with how it must be. There is certainly a way that cyberspace is. But
how cyberspace is is not how cyberspace has to be. There is no single way
that the Net has to be; no single architecture that defines the nature of the
Net. The possible architectures of something that we would call “the Net”
are many, and the character of life within those different architectures is
diverse.
That most of us commit this fallacy is not surprising. Most of us
haven’t a clue about how networks work. We therefore have no clue about
how they could be different. We assume that the way we find things is the
way things have to be. We are not trained to think about all the different
ways technology could achieve the same ends through different means.
That sort of training is what technologists get. Most of us are not technologists.
But underlying everything in this book is a single normative plea: that
all of us must learn at least enough to see that technology is plastic. It can
be remade to do things differently. And that if there is a mistake that we
who know too little about technology should make, it is the mistake of
imagining technology to be too plastic, rather than not plastic enough. We
should expect—and demand—that it can be made to reflect any set of values that we think important. The burden should be on the technologists to
show us why that demand can’t be met.
The particular is-ism that I begin with here is the claim that cyberspace
can’t be regulated. As this, and the following chapters argue, that view is
wrong. Whether cyberspace can be regulated depends upon its architecture.
The original architecture of the Internet made regulation extremely difficult. But that original architecture can change. And there is all the evidence
in the world that it is changing. Indeed, under the architecture that I
believe will emerge, cyberspace will be the most regulable space humans
have ever known. The “nature” of the Net might once have been its unregulability; that “nature” is about to flip.
To see the flip, you must first see a contrast between two different
cyber-places. These two cyber-places are ideal types, and, indeed, one of the
two ideals no longer exists anywhere on the Net. That fact is confirmation
of the point this section aims to make: that we’re moving from one Internet
to another, and the one we’re moving to will be significantly more regulable.
The following descriptions are not technical; I don’t offer them as complete definitions of types of networks or types of control. I offer them to
illustrate—to sketch enough to see a far more general point.
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33
CYBER-PLACES: HARVARD VERSUS CHICAGO
The Internet was born at universities in the United States. Its first subscribers
were researchers. But as a form of life, its birth was tied to university life. It
swept students online, pulling them away from life in real space. The Net was
one of many intoxicants on college campuses in the mid-1990s, and its significance only grew through time. As former New York Times columnist J. C.
Herz wrote in her first book about cyberspace:
When I look up, it’s four-thirty in the morning. “No way.” I look from the clock to my
watch. Way. I’ve been in front of this screen for six hours, and it seems like no time
at all. I’m not even remotely tired. Dazed and thirsty, but not tired. In fact, I’m
euphoric. I stuff a disheveled heap of textbooks, photocopied articles, hilighters and
notes into my backpack and run like a madwoman up the concrete steps, past the
security guard, and outside into the predawn mist. . . .
I stop where a wet walkway meets a dry one and stand for a sec. . . . [I] start
thinking about this thing that buzzes around the entire world, through the phone
lines, all day and all night long. It’s right under our noses and it’s invisible. It’s like
Narnia, or Magritte, or Star Trek, an entire goddamned world. Except it doesn’t physically exist. It’s just the collective consciousness of however many people are on it.
This really is outstandingly weird.3
Yet not all universities adopted the Net in the same way. Or put differently,
the access universities granted was not all the same. The rules were different.
The freedoms allowed were different. One example of this difference comes
from two places I knew quite well, though many other examples could make
the same point.
In the middle 1990s at the University of Chicago, if you wanted access to
the Internet, you simply connected your machine to Ethernet jacks located
throughout the university.4 Any machine with an Ethernet connection could
be plugged into these jacks. Once connected, your machine had full access to
the Internet—access, that is, that was complete, anonymous, and free.
The reason for this freedom was a decision by an administrator—the
then-Provost, Geoffrey Stone, a former dean of the law school and a prominent free speech scholar. When the university was designing its net, the technicians asked Stone whether anonymous communication should be
permitted. Stone, citing the principle that the rules regulating speech at the
university should be as protective of free speech as the First Amendment, said
yes: People should have the right to communicate at the university anonymously, because the First Amendment to the Constitution guarantees the
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same right vis-à-vis governments. From that policy decision flowed the architecture of the University of Chicago’s net.
At Harvard, the rules are different. If you plug your machine into an Ethernet jack at the Harvard Law School, you will not gain access to the Net. You
cannot connect your machine to the Net at Harvard unless the machine is
registered—licensed, approved, verified. Only members of the university
community can register their machines. Once registered, all interactions with
the network are monitored and identified to a particular machine. To join the
network, users have to “sign” a user agreement. The agreement acknowledges
this pervasive practice of monitoring. Anonymous speech on this network is
not permitted—it is against the rules. Access can be controlled based on who
you are, and interactions can be traced based on what you did.
This design also arose from the decision of an administrator, one less
focused on the protections of the First Amendment. Control was the ideal at
Harvard; access was the ideal at Chicago. Harvard chose technologies that
made control possible; Chicago chose technologies that made access easy.
These two networks differ in at least two important ways. First and most
obviously, they differ in the values they embrace.5 That difference is by design.
At the University of Chicago, First Amendment values determined network
design; different values determined Harvard’s design.
But they differ in a second way as well. Because access is controlled at Harvard and identity is known, actions can be traced back to their root in the network. Because access is not controlled at Chicago, and identity is not known,
actions cannot be traced back to their root in the network. Monitoring or
tracking behavior at Chicago is harder than it is at Harvard. Behavior in the
Harvard network is more controllable than in the University of Chicago network.
The networks thus differ in the extent to which they make behavior
within each network regulable. This difference is simply a matter of code—a
difference in the software and hardware that grants users access. Different
code makes differently regulable networks. Regulability is thus a function of
design.
These two networks are just two points on a spectrum of possible network designs. At one extreme we might place the Internet—a network defined
by a suite of protocols that are open and nonproprietary and that require no
personal identification to be accessed and used. At the other extreme are traditional closed, proprietary networks, which grant access only to those with
express authorization; control, therefore, is tight. In between are networks
that mix elements of both. These mixed networks add a layer of control to the
otherwise uncontrolled Internet. They layer elements of control on top.
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Thus the original—there have been some changes in the last years6—
University of Chicago network was close to the norm for Internet access in the
middle of the 1990s.7 Let’s call it Net95. At the other extreme are closed networks that both predate the Internet and still exist today—for example, the
ATM network, which makes it possible to get cash from your California bank
at 2:00 A.M. while in Tblisi. And in the middle are Harvard-type networks—
networks that add a layer of control on top of the suite of protocols that
define “the Internet.” These protocols are called “TCP/IP.” I describe them
more extensively in Chapter 4. But the essential feature of the Harvard network is that this suite was supplemented. You get access to the Internet only
after you’ve passed through this layer of control.
All three designs are communication networks that are “like” the Internet.
But their differences raise an obvious question: When people say that the
Internet is “unregulable,” which network are they describing? And if they’re
talking about an unregulable network, why is it unregulable? What features in
its design make it unregulable? And could those features be different?
Consider three aspects of Net95’s design that make it hard for a regulator
to control behavior there. From the perspective of an anonymity-loving user,
these are “features” of Net95—aspects that make that network more valuable.
But from the perspective of the regulator, these features are “bugs”—imperfections that limit the data that the Net collects, either about the user or about
the material he or she is using.
The first imperfection is information about users—who the someone is
who is using the Internet. In the words of the famous New Yorker cartoon of
two dogs sitting in front of a PC, “On the Internet, nobody knows you’re a
dog.”8 No one knows, because the Internet protocols don’t require that you
credential who you are before you use the Internet. Again, the Internet protocol doesn’t require that credential; your local access point, like the Harvard
network, might. But even then, the information that ties the individual to a
certain network transaction is held by the access provider. It is not a part of
your Internet transaction.
The second “imperfection” is information about geography—where the
someone is who is using the Internet. As I will describe more in Chapter 4,
although the Internet is constituted by addresses, those addresses were initially
simply logical addresses. They didn’t map to any particular location in the
physical world. Thus, when I receive a packet of data sent by you through the
Internet, it is certainly possible for me to know the Internet address from
which your packet comes, but I will not know the physical address.
And finally, the third “imperfection” is information about use—what is
the data being sent across this network; what is its use? The Internet does not
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require any particular labeling system for data being sent across the Internet.
Again, as we’ll see in more detail below, there are norms that say something,
but no rule to assure data gets distributed just according to the norms. Nothing puts the bits into a context of meaning, at least not in a way that a machine
can use. Net95 had no requirement that data be labeled. “Packets” of data are
labeled, in the sense of having an address. But beyond that, the packets could
contain anything at all.
These three “imperfections” tie together: Because there is no simple way
to know who someone is, where they come from, and what they’re doing,
there is no simple way to regulate how people behave on the Net. If you can’t
discover who did what and where, you can’t easily impose rules that say “don’t
do this, or at least, don’t do it there.” Put differently, what you can’t know
determines what you can control.
Consider an example to make the point clearer. Let’s say the …
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