Stanford University Personal and Professional Cardinal Values Discussion Check the attachment to view all material and reading useful for th

Stanford University Personal and Professional Cardinal Values Discussion Check the attachment to view all material and reading useful for this week. I will attach any documents or links you will need from the course material. Make sure to cite some material from this week in the writings and you can always use material from previous weeks.

Here are two links shown in the and everything else is attached here.

Sam Harris, Science can answer moral questions (TED)

Codes of Ethics Compilation

Assignment:

YOUR SYSTEM: A BRIEF PROPOSAL

1. After reviewing our discussions on SMA, take a shot at developing steps in your own personal SMA system. List and briefly describe the rationale behind each of your steps.

I have also attached an “Example” for this assignment. Please look at it as it may help you. Do not copy it though and it’s attached as .

This can be 500 words.

PERSONAL & PROFESSIONAL VIRTUES & VICES

2. What are personal “cardinal” virtues. Choose up to 5 virtues that you value highest and describe them each using Aristotle’s notion of virtue as the “golden mean.”

This can be 600-700 words. The Ethics Toolkit
The Ethics Toolkit
A Compendium of Ethical Concepts
and Methods
Julian Baggini and Peter S. Fosl
To Joseph P. Fell and Lucy O’Brien
Contents
Acknowledgments xiii
Introduction xv
Part I The Grounds of Ethics 1
1.1 Aesthetics 1
1.2 Agency 3
1.3 Authority 6
1.4 Autonomy I0
1.5 Care 12
1.6 Character 15
1.7 Conscience 16
1.8 Evolution 19
1.9 Finitude 21
1.10 Flourishing 23
1.11 Harmony 26
1. 12 Interest 28
1.13 Intuition 31
1.14 Merit 33
1.15 Naturallaw 36
1.16 Need 39
1.17 fain and pleasure 41
1.18 Revelation 44
1.19 Rights 47
1.20 Sympathy 51
1.21 Tradition and history 53
Part II Frameworks for Ethics 56
2.1 Consequentialism 56
2.2 Contractarianism 60
2.3 Culture critique 62
2.4 Deontological ethics 64
2.5 Discourse ethics 66
2.6 Divine command 68
2.7 Egoism 71
2.8 Hedonism 74
2.9 Naturalism 76
2.10 Particularism 79
2.11 Perfectionism 81
2.12 Pragmatism 84
2.13 Rationalism 86
2.14 Relativism 88
2.15 Subjectivism 91
2.16 Virtue ethics 94
Part III Central Concepts in Ethics 98
3.1 Absolute/relative 98
3.2 Act/rule 101
3.3 Bad/evil 104
3.4 Beneficence/non-maleficence 106
3.5 Cause/reason 109
3.6 Cognitivism/non-cognitivism 111
3.7 Commission/omission 114
3.8 Consent 116
3.9 Facts/values 119
3.10 The golden mean 122
3.11 Honor/shame 124
3.12 Individual/collective 127
3.13 Injury 129
3.14 Intentions/consequences 132
3.15 Internalism/externalism 134
3.16 Intrinsic/instrumental value 137
3.17 Legal/moral 140
3.18 Liberation/oppression 142
3.19 Means/ends 144
3.20 Metaethics/normative ethics 147
3.21 Moral subjects/moral agents 149
3.22 Prudence 152
3.23 Public/private 154
3.24 Stoic cosmopolitanism 157
Part IV Assessment, Judgment, and Critique 160
4.1 Alienation 160
4.2 Authenticity 162
4.3 Consistency 164
4.4 Counterexamples 167
4.5 Fairness 169
4.6 Fallacies 172
4.7 Impartiality and objectivity 174
4.8 The “is/ought gap” 177
4.9 Justice and lawfulness 179
4.10 Just war theory 182
4.11 Paternalism 185
4.12 Proportionality 187
4.13 Reflective equilibrium 189
4.14 Restoration 192
4.15 Sex and gender 194
4.16 Speciesism 196
4.17 “Thought experiments 199
4.18 Universalizability 201
Part V The Limits of Ethics 205
5.1 Akrasia 205
5.2 Amoralism 207
5.3 Bad faith and self-deception 209
5.4 Casuistry and rationalization 211
5.5 Fallenness 214
5.6 False consciousness 216
5.7 Free will and determinism 218
5.8 Moral luck 222
5.9 Nihilism 224
5.10 Pluralism 227
5.11 Power 229
5.12 Radical particularity 231
5.13 The separateness of persons 233
5.14 Skepticism 235
5.15 Standpoint 237
5.16 Supererogation 239
5.17 Tragedy 242
Appendix: Ethics Resources 245
Index 247
Alphabetical List of Entries
Absolute/relative 98
Act/rule 101
Aesthetics 1
Agency 3
Akrasia 205
Alienation 160
Amoralism 207
Authenticity 162
Authority 6
Autonomy 10
Bad/evil 104
Bad faith and self-deception 209
Beneficence/non-maleficence 106
Care 12
Casuistry and rationalization 211
Cause/reason 109
Character 15
Cognitivism/non-cognitivism 111
Commission/omission 114
Conscience 16
Consent 1 16
Consequentialism 56
Consistency 164
Contractarianism 60
Counterexamples 167
Culture critique 62
Deontological ethics 64
Discourse ethics 66
Divine command 68
Egoism 71
Evolution 19
Factsivalues 119
Fairness 169
Fallacies 172
Fallenness 214
False consciousness 216
Finitude 21
Flourishing 23
Free will and determinism 218
The golden mean 122
Harmony 26
Hedonism 74
Honor/shame 124
Impartiality and objectivity 174
Individual/collective 127
Injury 129
Intentions/consequences 132
Interest 28
Internalism/externalism 134
Intrinsic/instrumental value 137
Intuition 31
The “is/ought gap” 177
Justice and lawfulness 179
Just war theory 182
Legal/moral 140
Liberation/oppression 142
Means/ends 144
Merit 33
Metaethics/normative ethics 147
Moral luck 222
Moral subjects/moral agents 149
Natural law 36
Naturalism 76
Need 39
Nihilism 224
Pain and pleasure 41
Particularism 79
Paternalism 185
Perfectionism 81
Pluralism 227
Power 229
Pragmatism 84
Proportionality 187
Prudence 152
Public/private 154
Radical particularity 231
Rationalism 86
Reflective equilibrium 189
Relativism 88
Restoration 192
Revelation 44
Rights 47
The separateness of persons 233
Sex and gender 194
Skepticism 235
Speciesism 196
Standpoint 237
Stoic cosmopolitanism 157
Subjectivism 91
Supererogation 239
Sympathy 51
Thought experiments 199
Tradition and history 53
Tragedy 242
Universalizability 201
Virtue ethics 94
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Peter’s spouse, Catherine Fosl, and his children,
Elijah Fosl and Isaac Fosl van-Wyke, for their patience and support; Avery
Kolers for advice on the contents; Jack Furlong and Ellen Cox for their
insight; Maggie Barr for proofreading the text; and Transylvania
University’s Jones Grant program for underwriting Peter’s intercontinental
travel.
We would also like to thank Jeff Dean and Danielle Descoteaux at
Blackwell for their support and patience, as well as the anonymous referees
for their thoughtful, thorough, helpful comments, and for their encouragement.Thanks also to Charlotte Davies, Annie Jackson, and David Williams
at The Running Head for their remarkably thorough tidying up of the
manuscript. We are also deeply grateful to all those who have built and who
maintain the Internet. Without it, our work together and our friendship
would have never come to exist.
Julian Baggini
Peter S. Fosi
Introduction
How should you think about ethics? It’s a deceptively simple question.
Certainly, you should think well, think clearly, think accurately, and – if it’s
possible in ethics – think rightly. But how exactly can you set about doing
all this?
One way to approach the topic is to try to establish a general theory that
attempts to do things like determine the true nature of ethics, define the
meaning of ethical terms, formulate fundamental moral principles, and
place those principles in a hierarchy. This way of thinking about ethics, in
short, tries to produce a theory that pretty much answers all the theoretical
questions anyone might ask.
Having accomplished this, of course, you also have to explain why your
general theory is better than all the rest, and you have to repel the various
challenges that critics are certain to advance. After producing such a theory
and defending it, you next set about applying your theory to real-life moral
problems, demonstrating how it resolves disputes and answers questions
about what to do in various actual circumstances.
One problem with this kind of approach, however, is that more than two
millennia of moral philosophy have led to little consensus about the
fundamental nature of ethics, the hierarchy of moral principles, or the way
to apply them in the real world.Worse, some respectable thinkers have
rejected the idea that reaching consensus about such things is even possible.
Meanwhile, of course, the world goes on, tangled in the most profound
sorts of moral struggle. If anything, the demand for meaningful and
effective moral thinking has become greater than ever. Moral thinking and
reasoning, then, despite the limitations of moral philosophy, can neither be
put on hold until agreement is reached nor abandoned altogether. Even
amoralists need to get clear on what they’re rejecting.
The fact that theoretical consensus about moral issues hasn’t been
reached doesn’t mean it can’t be reached. But perhaps there’s another
method, another way to think about ethical matters, a way that can bring
real intellectual force to bear upon the moral controversies that populate the
world but doesn’t require a univocal, general moral theory.
Rather than trying to determine a single, complete ethical theory that
answers all the relevant moral questions that may arise, and defeats all its
competitors, perhaps one might instead (or also) try to gain a kind of
mastery or at least facility with some of the many different theories,
concepts, principles, and critiques concerned with ethics that moral
philosophers have produced over the ages. The Ethics Toolkit aspires to
help those engaged in moral inquiry and reflection to do just that. By
placing a selection of insights from different moral theorists and theories
side by side, we hope to show readers something about ethics that may go
missing in the contests among ethical theories.
We hope to show how many of the concepts and ideas collected under the
umbrella of ethical theory have a wider and more complex range of
application than can sometimes appear. There are many voices composing
the moral discourses of our age, and these different voices address many
different problems in different ways. Many tools are necessary to hear them
and to respond properly to them, not a single voice or a single tool.
Indeed, anyone who wants to deliberate and converse with others about
the major moral concerns that occupy people today must be able to draw
upon not just a single well-crafted theory but more broadly upon the rich
and diverse work of the past 2,500 years of moral philosophy. Competent
thinkers simply must have in their possession a well-stocked “toolkit”
containing a host of intellectual instruments for careful, precise, and
sophisticated moral thinking.
By producing a compendium like this we also hope to provide readers
with a deeper and subtler sense of how different ideas and methods may be
enlisted so that people might not only think but also act with regard to
moral matters in more effective and satisfying ways. Many of the problems
that human beings have to deal with are in part conceptual and
philosophical. Coming to terms with these problems will require better
thinking. Medicines and machines will be needed to help make the world a
better place. But, contrary to the charges that are often brought against
philosophy, so will the capacity for clear thinking and sound moral
deliberation. In this way, we believe that there is a connection between what
the ancient Greeks called “knowing that” (theoretical knowledge) and
“knowing how” (practical knowledge).
The vision of ethics underwriting The Ethics Toolkit is pluralistic, and
unabashedly so, in the sense that it holds that the insights of, say,
utilitarianism are of interest and value not only to utilitarians but also to
anyone who wishes to engage in moral reflection. This vision of ethics does
not, however, imply that the tools described here can simply be picked up
and applied blindly to suit whatever need arises. Various tools are more
appropriate to certain needs than others. That is not to say that the tools we
collect here can or should only be used in a single way. Some may
effectively use a screwdriver to take on the same job others would tackle
with a hammer. More advanced thinkers may be able to use some of the
tools in ways that beginners cannot. Moral thinkers of all abilities will use
some tools more than others, using some only rarely.
There are, similarly, different ways to use this text. The Ethics Toolkit
can be read cover-to-cover as a course in ethical reasoning. We begin in fart
I with the question of the grounds on which ethics stands. We then consider
in Part II the most important frameworks that have been constructed to
enable us to reason about ethics. Part III describes a number of central
concepts in ethical discourse. In Part IV, we look at the ways in which
ethical theories and judgments may be critiqued. Finally, we look at the
limits of moral reasoning in Part V.
But this sort of linear approach isn’t the only way to use Ac Ethics
7iholkit. It can also be used as a reference text upon which people can draw,
using either the table of contents or the extensive index, to help understand
a specific issue. Or alternatively, readers can simply wander about through
the hook, following their own muses in a nearly countless variety of ways.
The cross-referencing we’ve appended to each entry directs readers to other
entries that will complement or elaborate upon the material at hand, helping
readers to make connections and articulate contrasts, sometimes in
surprising ways.
Each entry is also followed by two or three suggestions for further
reading. Usually these recommendations will tell you more about the
subject of the entry, but sometimes we have also included details of works
referred to in the entries that concern the specific examples used. Readings
particularly suitable for beginners are marked with asterisks. In addition, we
have tried to include concrete examples that illustrate many of the more
abstract ideas of the text and also show readers how the material of the text
applies to actual ethical controversies. The index includes the topic areas
these examples cover. A list of societies, institutions, websites, and other
resources related to the study and practice of ethics has been appended to
the end of the text.
No matter how it’s used, though, we hope Pie Ethics Tholkit will be a
book that readers will return to again and again, whether they are students,
teachers, scholars, professionals, or just people concerned with how to think
better about morality.
Part I
The Grounds of Ethics
1.1 Aesthetics
“Beauty is truth, truth beauty” wrote the poet John Keats (1795 1821) in
“Ode on a Grecian Urn.” Was he the victim of a romantic delusion or is
there really a relationship between the true, the beautiful, and even the
good? Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) seemed to think there was a
connection between at least the last two when he claimed that, “Ethics and
aesthetics are one” (I ractatus 6.421). Taking at face-value a statement from
any thinker as cryptic as Wittgenstein is a potentially misleading affair. But
nevertheless, many have argued for links between aesthetics and ethics.
Beauty can be seen as capable of representing goodness, revealing the
nature of goodness, or instructing us in goodness.
Representations of good
Various ethical notions have been personified in statues and images. At the
Library of Celsus in Ephesus,Turkey, you’ll hump into statues of beautiful
women said to be wisdom (sophia) and virtue (arenc), while justice is
commonly depicted as a blindfolded woman holding a pair of scales.
Besides personifying ethical concepts, the aesthetic can have ethical
import in much more abstract ways. When one looks at, for example, the
Parthenon in Athens, one sees a structure that exhibits exquisite balance and
harmony. The pediment and supports are carefully proportioned according
to what mathematicians call the “golden section,” conveying intelligence,
control, and moderation. The pillars are shaped with a slight swelling
(entasis) to give them a feeling of strength as well as rectitude. The site of
the structure in an elevated, central, and historic location communicates a
connection with the divine and with the past; it is the centering pole of the
polls.
What is it, though, that such “moral” art is representing? In his Critique
of Judgment (1790), Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) argued that art cannot
directly depict moral principles, but it can offer symbols of morality. By this
Kant meant that the way we reflect on objects of our aesthetic experience is
somehow analogous to the way we reflect on the purely abstract concepts of
morality. “The morally good,” Kant writes, “is the intelligible that taste has
in view” (Critique, 353-4). That’s why beauty seems bound up with so many
notions connected to morality. For example, says Kant, our experience of
beauty is disinterested; we find beauty in things from which we have
absolutely nothing to gain (e.g. someone else’s art). Beauty can also seem
universal in the sense that we think everyone ought to be able to see it that
way – ought to in a way analogous to the way people ought to be moral. In
short, aesthetic thought makes universal claims independent of self-interest
analogous to the claims of ethical thought.
Revealing the good
The connection between aesthetics and ethics isn’t restricted to art
representing goodness. Nature’s aesthetic qualities have also been thought
to have moral significance. Ancient Pythagoreans believed that there are
harmonic or at least harmonious relationships (harmonia) among the
various structures of the natural world and that achieving a good life means
replicating them in one’s own soul (psyche), making as it were the
microcosm correspond to the macrocosm. In his own ways, Plato followed
them in this. Later, Romantic thinkers such as William Blake (1757-1827)
and William Wordsworth (1770-1850) would find in natural beauty a source
of moral restoration for those suffering from the depravity of urban,
industrial society, as well as an expression of a deeper spiritual or divine
goodness and beauty.
Art as instruction
Perhaps the most widespread view of art’s moral dimension is that it can
help develop our moral sense. For example, Aristotle’s Poetics remarks
upon the powerful and important effects of tragedy. When one walks around
the remains of ancient Greece one is struck by the important location of its
theaters. Directly above the great temple of Delphi is a theater. The theater
of Dionysus sits snuggly at the base of the Athenian acropolis. That’s
because, for the ancient Greeks and many others after them, art offers not
simply the exhibition of morality but instruction in it and a site for
deliberation about the features of moral life.
Part of that instruction involves the cultivation of our feelings,
sentiments, sympathies, and affections. Aesthetic experience can help
people sympathize with the victims of war, crime, abuse, and vice. It can
cultivate compassion, moral outrage, pity, pride, devotion, admiration, and
respect. It can edify and elevate. Consider, for example, Picasso’s painting
Guernica (1937), the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, Arnold
Schoenberg’s A Survivor fronmWarsaw (Opus 46), and the Arc de
Triomphe in Paris.
But not everyone agrees that art makes us better people. In his dialogue
Ion, Plato argued that art is more likely to corrupt. Even if aesthetic
experience can make a positive contribution to moral understanding, we
might still question whether it offers us moral insight, cognition,
deliberation, or instruction in a way nothing else can. Which raises the
question: when faced with an ethical problem, is it better to turn to a theory
or a poem?
See also
1.1 1 Harmony, 2.11 Perfectionism, 3.6 Cognitivism/non-cognitivism
Reading
Jerrold Levinson, ed., Aesthetics and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection, new
edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001)
*Jose Louis Bermudez and Sebastian Gardner, eds., Art and Morality (New
York: Routledge, 2003)
Noell Caroll, “Art and the Moral Realm,” in The Blackwell Guide
toAesthet- ics, edited by Peter Kivy (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004), 12651
1.2 Agency
If, as the result of an earthquake, a boulder were to break off from the face
of a cliff and kill an unfortunate mountaineer below, it wouldn’t make sense
to hold either the boulder or the Earth morally accountable for her death. If,
on the other hand, an angry acquaintance dislodged the rock, aiming to kill
the mountaineer for the sake of some personal grudge, things would be
different. Why?
One of the key differences between the two deaths is that the second,
unlike the first, involves “agency.”This difference is a crucial one, as
agency is often taken to be a necessary condition or requirement of moral
responsibility. Simply put, something can only be held morally responsible
for an event if that something is an agent. Angry colleagues are agents but
the Earth is not (assuming, of course, that the Earth isn’t some animate,
conscious being). This seems obvious enough, but what precisely is agency,
and why does it matter?
Agency for many involves the exercise of freedom. Freedom is usually
taken to require the ability to act otherwise or in ways contrary to the way
one is currently acting or has acted in the past. For many holding this point
of view, being responsible (and thence an agent) means possessing a “free
will” through which one can act independently o…
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