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Bureaucracy and Democracy: A Theoretical Analysis
Ali Farazmand
Published online: 14 September 2010
# Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010
Abstract This article addresses the relationship between bureaucracy and democracy,
bureaucratic politics and democratic politics. Bureaucratic theories and politics
are discussed, democratic theories and politics are analyzed, and the argument in
favor of reconciling bureaucracy and democracy is analyzed with implications for
democratic theory and public administration. Persistence of bureaucracy is stressed,
deficiencies in democratic theory and practice are noted, and the importance of a
functionally balanced and professionally competent bureaucracy is reminded for
administration of sound governance in both developed and developing societies. It is
hypocrisy to speak of functioning democracy without a balanced professional
bureaucracy.
Keywords Bureaucracy . Democracy . Bureaucratic politics . Democratic politics .
Instrumentality . System-maintenance . Public administration . Governance .
Government . Representative bureaucracy . Globalization
Introduction
Bureaucracy is one of the oldest institutions of governance and administration in
history. It has survived millennia of political and social changes, from the dawn of
civilizations to the present. Political masters have come and gone, but none has been
able to do away with bureaucracy. The survival and persistence of bureaucracy has
been tested over time. As an institution of continuity amidst changes and upheavals,
of service delivery in the face of disaster and crisis, and of order and stability out of
chaos, instability, and disorder, bureaucracy has gained a historical reputation of
resilience, instrumentality, and positive as well as negative organization of public
governance and administration. Equally important, democracy has a had long history
Public Organiz Rev (2010) 10:245–258
DOI 10.1007/s11115-010-0137-0
A. Farazmand (*)
Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton, FL, USA
e-mail: afarazma@fau.edu
as well, perhaps not as long as bureaucracy, but it too has survived millennia of
changes and transformation in governance and administration, both in theory and
practice. What do bureaucracy and democracy really mean? How are these two
historical institutions related to each other? Are they compatible or contradictory?
Are they supportive or diametrically opposed to each other? What do bureaucratic
and democratic politics mean? And by the same notion, what does bureaucratization
and democratization mean? What perspectives explain these two institutional
phenomena, particularly in the age of globalization? This short analytical essay
addresses these important questions and sheds some lights on the intricate
relationship between these two very important institutions of modern governance
and public administration.
Perspectives on bureaucracy and bureaucratic theory
Bureaucracy has gained a pejorative reputation over time, and has often been
associated with red-tape, delay, corruption, and stifling processes in getting things
done. It has also gained a negative reputation for being a repressive instrument of
domination, control, and class rule in the hands of ruling elites. But bureaucracy and
bureaucratization have also been historically recognized for being processes through
which a policy of “leveling off,” at least to some extent, in socio-economic class
structures pursued by certain ruling elites or rulers to ensure broader political bases
of support (Antonio 1979), particularly in patrimonial and historical bureaucratic
societies (Eisenstadt 1963), or to curb local feudal powers by centralization of
authority through bureaucratization (Farazmand 2009b). The same may also apply to
enforcement of the “rule of law” through bureaucratization of society (Eisenstadt
1993; Etzioni-Halevey 1983).
Generally speaking, at least two perspectives explain the meanings of bureaucracy.
One is the Weberian ideal-type concept of bureaucracy as the most efficient type
of organization characterized by hierarchy and unity of command, division of labor
and task specialization, merit-based staffing and promotion, rules and regulations
universally applied to govern working systems, formal communication and
interaction systems, and records for reference and administrative decisions or
behaviors. To Max Weber, the ideal-type bureaucracy is superior to traditional and
charismatic types of authority structures, because the former is based on legal and
rational decisions, action, and leadership; it is based on rational knowledge
and expertise. The ideal-type bureaucracy is the most commonly used concept of
bureaucracy in academic textbooks and scholarly publications. In reality, however, it
is recognized that such an ideal type bureaucracy rarely exists or operates, as merit,
task specialization, universal application of rules and standards are rarely applied. In
reality, approximation or a combination of merit and patronage, near specialization,
and some degree of rules are applied in the real world of public administration and
governance worldwide. Exceptions aside, as some societies are better organized
along Weberian line, while others hardly resemble such a system.
The second meaning of bureaucracy refers to any large organization or institution
organized with structure, process, and normative values, rules, and regulations as
well as a mix of merit and patronage and record systems. Waldo (1948, 1992),
246 A. Farazmand
Eisenstadt (1963, 1993) and other scholars are known for espousing this view.
Expertise and specialized knowledge are obtained through performance, training,
and longevity; both are applied in large scale organizational systems that perform
either strictly political functions (e.g. organization of foreign affairs), or provide
services (e.g., social services, child protection, law enforcement) to citizens both
directly or indirectly through proxies such as contractors or outsourced agents. This
perspective of bureaucracy is most commonly applied and most realistic meaning of
bureaucracy as most bureaucracies of the world’s nation-state systems are organized
this way, not on the ideal-type line. This notion of bureaucracy is also most
commonly found in various societies, both historical bureaucratic empires and
contemporary societies.
However, few historical bureaucratic empires, such as ancient Persia, especially
the world-state Achaemenid Empire as well as the later Sassanid Empire, Imperial
Rome, plus the modern British Empire in India, the Prussian/German and French
empires both at home and in colonies, as well as the American bureaucracy resemble
a high degree of professionalization close to Weberian type bureaucratic model. The
rest of the world bureaucracies appear to be more patronage-based and less
meritoriously oriented with lower degrees of specialization and rule specialization.
The former Soviet Union bureaucracy—huge on a world scale—was claimed to be
meritorious and professionalized, but studies are needed to reveal details worthy of
scholarly research consideration. Such studies need to be conducted free from
ideological and political biases. The second perspective of bureaucracy also views it
as a powerful organization of governance and public administration, and as such it
has survived over 8,000 years of political and social changes and upheavals in the
Near/Middle East, particularly early Iran and Persia, Egypt, India, Assyria, and
Babylon (Frye 1975; Olmstead 1948).
There is a third possible meaning of bureaucracy, and one that is the meaning
associated with the “machinery of government,” a system or complex of organizations
and institutions—executive, judicial, and legislative—that makes the operations of
government and governance possible, get things done, and “run the government.” This
notion embodies both meanings of bureaucracy just explained above, and it is more
popular a term in political science than in public administration. However defined,
bureaucracy as a concept or organization is a powerful institution of governance,
administration, and means of modern business enterprise. It is an organizational system
no one can escape, whether in the private or public sectors (Marx 1967). Modern
societies are highly organized and bureaucratized with specialized knowledge and
expertise beyond the comprehension of average citizens (Weber 1947). Obviously, the
above meanings or perspective of bureaucracy overlap significantly, but what is
relevant is the understanding of bureaucracy—both military and civilian—as a
machinery or organization of government and public administration, and this has been
the case for the last 8,000 years.
Bureaucratic politics and democratic theory
In another study, Farazmand (1989) has identified several types of politics: group
politics, partisan politics, program and policy politics, and bureaucratic politics.
Bureaucracy, Democracy, and Hypocricy: A Theoretical Analysis 247
While each of these political types serves particular interests or purposes,
bureaucratic politics serve as a “key instrument” in accomplishing or achieving the
goals of all other politics. It is the bureaucracy—both civilian and military—that is
the institutional arm or machinery of government, one that carries out policies and
programs and accomplishes political goals. This raises the central questions of who
the bureaucracy serves, who controls the bureaucracy, and how this works as a
process. This is a fundamental question that all social scientists, revolutionary
leaders, and administrators have tackled for millennia.
Can bureaucracy be neutral? Perspectives abound, but the majority agree that
whoever controls the institutions of government also controls and uses the
bureaucracy as an instrument of power and rule—including class rule. History has
shown this being the case, from the ancient time to the present (Antonio 1979;
Eisenstadt 1963; Farazmand 2009a, b, c). Even Max Weber recognized and
acknowledged this in his expose of modern ideal-type rational-legal bureaucracy
(1947, 1968).
Highly influenced by Karl Marx (1967), Max Weber (1947) agreed that ideal
bureaucracy rarely exists or operates and that bureaucracy is a “powerful instrument
of power of the first order” in the hands of those who control it—whether a
monarch, en elected president, or autocratic dictator (Weber 1947). He also agreed
that bureaucracy can be a repressive instrument of class rule and domination, as it
was in the imperial Rome or the last stage of the Persian Empire (Antonio 1979;
Eisenstadt 1963). Nevertheless, Weber considered it to be the most efficient form of
organization for its blind implementation of laws, public policies, and decisions, and
for its universal application of rules, standardization of operations, and task
specializations leading to expertise and knowledge unmatched by any other forms
of organization (Weber 1947, 1968). Weber’s ambivalent attitude toward bureaucracy
emanated from his understanding of the Prussian society and the role the
bureaucracy played in governing Germany, and elsewhere in the world, such as India
under British colonial rule. Unless controlled by democratic or other forms of
political rule, bureaucracy has a tendency to “over-tower” and dominate society,
stressed.
Aside from the centrality of bureaucracy as a most powerful instrument of
government and public administration, several perspectives may explain the question
of what bureaucratic politics means in a broader sense. Bureaucratic politics also
means internal organizational politics of bureaucracy by those in key positions
favoring particular policies, programs, and or ideas. Moreover, it means playing with
bureaucratic rules to slow down or expedite certain ideas and programs through
policy ‘implementation’. Studies of bureaucratic politics using this angle are
voluminous and easily found in the ‘politics of policy implementation’ literature.
Further, studies on the role of bureaucracy in society and class rule abound;
sociologists have contributed immensely to this body of literature. Finally, the
literature on the psychological impacts of bureaucracy on individual citizens and or
employees working in such organizations is also enormous, produced by
psychologists and anthropologists (See Merton 1957; Parsons 1951; Hummel 1976).
The role of bureaucracy in society, therefore, is manifest through policy
implementation, role clarification (defining citizen-government relations), class rule
(those who control and those being controlled), regulatory function, development
248 A. Farazmand
(economic, social, etc.), destruction (military and wars), and political systemmaintenance
or enhancement. Sociologists and political scientists have addressed the
latter role of bureaucracy, but this notion has not been studied in public
administration. Exceptions include Farazmand (1989). The politics of bureaucracy
in the policy process reflect a huge literature with implications for democratic theory,
and that is the extensive role it plays in not only implementing but making or at least
influencing the policy making process—the decision process politicians and critics
often argue should be exclusively in the realm of politically elected officials, not
appointed bureaucrats. This view is highly shared and promoted by the neoconservative
circles of politicians, citizens, scholars, and academics (see for
example, Mosher 1968; and those in the “public choice” theory circles—i.e., Downs
1967; Niskanen 1971; Q. Wilson 1989). To these critics, bureaucracy and
bureaucrats stifle democracy and their role must be curtailed and government’s size
reduced to a minimum to protect capitalism and marketplace activities. They
prescribe ‘privatization and corporatization’ to maximize citizens’ self-interest
individualism.
The political economy perspectives of ‘bureaucratic politics’ also offers at least
two broad understandings of the role of bureaucracy. One is bureaucracy (both
civilian and military) as a machinery of government. More developed and
industrialized societies tend to have stronger bureaucracies—both military and
civilian—which carry out the will of powerful elites (business and corporate elites,
political power elites, military elites, and other administrative/bureaucratic elites). In
less developed and developing societies, the bureaucracy tends to have the
advantage of being more organized and regimented (military and civilian) and
exploits opportunities to influence or even dominate the and political and policy
processes. These variations are even accentuated by more diversity found in both
presidential and parliamentary systems of government, as well as in various regions
and countries of the world governed under either form of the political systems
(Riggs 2009).
The second perspective of the ‘political economy’ school explains the role of
public bureaucracy (both civilian and military), and private-corporate bureaucracy,
in maintaining and enhancing the politico-economic systems they serve
and benefit from. Here, bureaucracy is a powerful instrument of system
maintenance—and without exception, all bureaucracies perform this function.
By extension, bureaucracy also becomes a powerful ‘instrument of class rule’
by those who rule society, whether a capitalist ruling class (ala Karl Marx 1967;
and Lenin 1971; Mosca 1939), a few rich oligarchs and “ruling power elite’
(Parenti 1988, 2010), or any person—whether a dictator, a monarch, an elected
president, or a council (Weber 1947, 1968). A variant of this ‘political economy’
perspective is explained by the politics of bureaucracy in developing or less
developed nations. Most of these countries, often known as the South nations, are
former colonies of the Western powers, rich and industrialized, also known as the
North nations. The only exceptions are Iran and Turkey, which were empires
themselves right into the 20th century—Iran was the Persian Empire for several
thousands of years, while Turkey was Ottoman empire for seven centuries. In
Southeast Asia, Thailand also escaped direct colonization but was eclipsed by
indirect colonial and imperialist practices of the West.
Bureaucracy, Democracy, and Hypocricy: A Theoretical Analysis 249
Despite official independence—whether by revolutionary wars, or gradual peaceful
means of the United Nations in the post-World War II era—the public bureaucracies
(both civilian and military) of these nations have been modeled on and dependent on the
Western powers of the North. Their character, behavior, culture, structure, and values
reflectWestern influence. Their military leaders and officers as well as their bureaucratic
elites have been carefully trained to serve political and economic interests closely tied to
theWestern economic, political, and military power structures. These bureaucracies and
bureaucratic elites are the actual ‘agents of the neo-colonial rule’ by remote control; in
the critical literature, they constitute the “comprador bourgeoisie,” or agents of foreign
imperialism (see Kelly 2007; Farazmand 1989). Escaping the Empire’s neocolonial
hold requires fundamental changes and transformation of public bureaucracy—both
military and civilian—away from Western influence, and this is not an easy task. Most
of these developing nations are in need of foreign aid often coming from the Western
nations of the North, but the latter do not give aid without conditions that benefit them
—no condition, no aid (Amsden 2007); and such conditionality only cements the
dependency grip over the countries of the South (Kelly 2007).
Few countries have been able to break this vicious circle, mostly by revolutions
and at a heavy cost, and this is the only way to make independent policy decisions
toward national “development” (Amsden 2007). Yet, pressures of economic,
military, and political, as well as a technological nature mount as a developing
country tries to break away from the yoke of neocolonialism or imperialism; their
bureaucracy therefore becomes a battleground for this long process of national
struggle toward development. The political economy of bureaucracy as an
instrument of power in governance and administration is further accentuated in the
age of rapid globalization of corporate capitalism, as its bureaucratic elites in key
positions of contacts with global corporations become potential targets for corruption
opportunities offered by global capitalism (see Farazmand 1999). With sweeping
privatization policies, such corruption opportunities only increase and accentuate the
public sector accountability problem in the age of globalization. The only way to
escape the vicious circle of global neo-colonialism is “building administrative
capacity” to govern the economy and society with indigenous resources and
leadership determination in developing nations. It requires courage, determination,
resolute and resilient leadership, strong popular consensus, and sound governance
and administration (see Farazmand 2004, 2009a). A few nations have recognized
this reality and are building such administrative and governance capacities toward
national development—they are facing formidable challenges and threats (both
internationally and domestically), but persistence will pay off, and this can be done.
The third perspective on bureaucratic politics is explained by “bureaucratism,” a
process and phenomenon that involves use and abuse of power and authority by
bureaucrats in positions of power for personal and other purposes. Bureaucratism is
a powerful instrument and can be used effectively, especially when bureaucracy is
determined to resist changes affecting its viability, or when key figures of the
bureaucratic machinery decide to oppose certain socio-political agendas or processes
that may undermine bureaucratic elites’ positions. Bureaucratism manifests itself in
many ways, and often includes tactics used by rank and file bureaucrats as well. The
dynamics of bureaucratism, however, take ‘political’ shape for political purpose, but
it can also be purely for personal gain (se Farazmand 1989 for more details on this).
250 A. Farazmand
The fourth explanation of bureaucratic politics is summed up in the “bureaucratization”
process and phenomenon, an issue beyond the scope of this short essay.
Suffice it to say here that bureaucratization is both political to curtail decentralization
and autonomous power centers or structures—such as feudal lords—in favor of more
concentrated power structures by kings, elected presidents, or other officials. It is
also used as a process through which political control is more easily exercised by
those in control of the bureaucracy. There is also a “social or class leveling” practice
often associated with the “bureaucratization” process, in order to break the class
hierarchy system and spread access to government and its privileges of society
among ‘common citizens.’ Historical evidence shows this to be the case in many
bureaucratic empires from ancient time to the present, at least in the initial stages of
bureaucratization. Ancient Persia and Rome are two examples of this process, and
modern/contemporary American bureaucratization is another example.
Finally, the relationship between bureaucracy and change or revolution is another
huge topic that requires separate treatment (see, for example, Farazmand 2009c,
especially chapters 32–35). In short, at least three theoretical perspectives explain
this relationship, with implications for democratic theory. One is the ‘neutrality’ of
bureaucracy in governance and administration, regardless of who rules the society.
The bureaucracy is viewed as a neutrally competent organization in service of the
entire society and must stay as such, and by such virtue, it should not be involved in
political regime or system changes—its neutrality is its best safeguard. This is a
Woodrow Wilson’s view, or at least attributed to him, of the bureaucracy as a neutral
competence (Wilson 1887). The second perspective argues against the first and sees
the bureaucracy politically involved at all levels and with all social and normative
values. There is no such thing as neutral competence, and bureaucrats or public
administrators are involved in all types of policy, programmatic, personal, partisan,
economic, and class politics—no matter what social or political change, administrators
and members of the bureaucracy play a role and make a difference. Dwight
Waldo and Robert Dahl made this point as early as 1940s.
There is also the third view on the role of bureaucracy with reference to change
and revolution, as a powerful view espoused by Marx, Lenin, and revolutionary
leaders. The bureaucracy is seen a dangerously powerful obstacle to revolutionary
change, it is pro-status quo, and resists changes that threaten its existence, privileges,
and power. Therefore, it must be changed or replaced once the revolutionary changes
in political systems or regimes succeed. Two different viewpoints have emerged
within this revolutionary perspective: One arguing the bureaucracy of the old regime
must be totally abolished, while the other argues that bureaucracy can’t be abolished
overnight and should not be so, because the new regime needs the ‘neutral elements
of the bureaucracy’ who may not be loyal to the new system but they are not pro-old
system either and pose no direct threat to the new regime. As long as they remain
neutral and pose no threat to the system, they can continue to function under the new
administrative elite’s control until a new cadre of administrative personnel is
prepared. Thus, the leadership of the bureaucracy is totally replaced by new
administrative elites who then determine who among the old ones must stay or go.
Lenin (1971) was among the strongest supporters of this view who prevailed in the
great debate that ensued right after the Bolshevik Socialist Revolution of Russia in
1917 (Lenin 1971). Similar patterns developed after the Iranian Revolution of 1978–
Bureaucracy, Democracy, and Hypocricy: A Theoretical Analysis 251
1979; the leadership cadre of the bureaucracy of the old Shah’s regime was totally
replaced while retaining most career personnel until a new generation of new
bureaucrats emerged (Farazmand 1989).
Democracy and democratic politics
From the dawn of human civilizations, rulers, philosophers, and thinkers have tried
to create ideal societies. Ancient Greek philosopher Plato conceived an ideal state in
his Republic, Farabi the Persian philosopher of the 10th century, also known as the
Second Teacher in history after Aristotle, developed the “ideal city state,” in his
book, Madineh Fazele, Western philosophers like Locke, Hobbs, Rousseau,
Montesquieu, Bentham, Mills, and the American Founding Fathers also proposed
forms or models of government. The latter tried to prescribe institutions and systems
of government to promote equality, rule of law, liberty, collective mechanism,
separation of powers, constitutional rule, and other forms of citizen participation in
government and administration. So did the revolutionary leaders of the Russian
Bolshevik Revolution by visioning a classless society based on socialism and
communism. Similarly, the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran that replaced
the longest historical monarchy system on earth through a major revolution, tries to
create an “ideal society” based on social and economic justice, and democracy
through separation of powers, a mix of presidential and parliamentary systems of
government, and direct popular election. All strove to help develop and promote the
concept of “democracy.” Yet, neither ideal society, nor true democracy has emerged
as a political system in the world yet.
Democracy is a term in need of extensive definitions, explanations, and
interpretations, a task beyond the space limitation of this short essay. This brief
discussion touches upon some of the key points of the subject. First, all democratic
theories imply explicitly or implicitly, a number of characteristics common to all
democratic systems of societies—such as the role of the constitution, rule of law,
respect for minority rights, elections and other forms of representation, citizen
participation in political activities, accountability, and responsiveness; most of these
characteristics rarely exist in any democracy, but a degree of their presence or
practice may be found in various societies or political systems. Second, variations
among democracies abound, as political culture and traditions play key intervening
variables. Third, pure or ideal democracy does not exist, or is at best rare. Fourth, the
larger the society and more complex its socio-cultural and political orientations, the
more complex and less democratic that democracy tends to become. Fifth, the more
technological advances, the less democratic and more bureaucratic the society tends
to become, as specialized knowledge and technical expertise are not comprehensible
to average citizens. Sixth, democratic systems based on election are more often
unstable and inconsistent in policy directions, practices, and outcomes that affect
citizens and other nations in international relations. Finally, there are officially
known democracies that have no constitutions, practice undemocratic activities, and
their people are treated as “subjects” of monarchs or queens, not “citizens,” hence a
contradiction in democratic theory in practice because subjects can determine their
destiny; the sovereign monarch does. As an extension, there are also ‘exclusionary’,
252 A. Farazmand
racially or religious based political systems that are officially known as democracies,
but practice exclusion of people based on religion, race and ethnicity, culture, or
color.
Using a continuum, one can easily identify a number of theories representing at
least four broad spectrums of theories on democracy and democratic politics. On the
far right, various political parties and the governments they form hold ultraconservative
or radical political and socioeconomic ideologies with values that
appear under different names or titles, all called ‘democratic’ in the United States,
Europe, and elsewhere. In the middle we find various political ideologies often with
the titles of ‘liberal’, ‘democratic’, ‘social democratic’, ‘Christian democratic’, and
other forms of political orientations with values in Western political culture
composed of individualism, property, liberty, and equality, with the exclusion in
practice of certain people of color, gender, and race, etc., as history has shown in
Europe, United States, and Australia, some as late as the 1960s. Examples of the
excluded groups include the Native Aboriginals in Australia, Native Americans and
Blacks as well as Women in the United States—the latter gained voting rights early
in the 20th century.
On the near-left side of the continuum, there are also many Western democratic
systems with various ideological values purported to be ‘socialist,’ combining a
good degree of individualism and collectivism that tend to promote social equality,
more equitable distribution of wealth, and expanded opportunities for common
citizens. These democratic systems tend to be found more in the Scandinavian
countries of Europe. Although called socialist in name, these systems as well as all
others noted above are also capitalist with strong religious values and norms rooted
in Christianity. Capitalism, individualism, and Christian values constitute the core of
the Western democracies, with variations of course.
On the far left of the continuum, we also find political systems of “socialism”
with various degrees of democratic orientations, in both theory and practice. This
category of systems called democracy appears to be a bi-product or outcome of long
struggle against inequality, poverty, repression and exploitation, and injustice so
prevalent in most capitalist systems, including in some democracies. They are
generally created as a result of “social revolutions” replacing capitalist economic
systems and their political orders, hence a reversal of the old order of rule by
minority over majority through a new system based on “socialism” with the rule of
the “majority over minority.” Such a system is called democratic by the left because
the “majority of formerly dispossessed now rules over former few super rich.”
Socialized or public ownership of wealth and national resources are the basis of
socialist democratic system of rule—hence socialist democracy, according to Karl
Marx (1967), Lenin (1971), and others (Schumpeter 1950). Indeed, Marx identifies
several forms of ‘democracy” that include “feudal democracy,” in which a few
feudal lords share power and rule society; capitalist or “bourgeoisie democracy” in
which the small ruling capitalist class rule over the vast majority of the working
class in constant struggle for better life but dispossessed, property-less, and
powerless in the face of the over-towering bureaucratic machine controlled by the
capitalist rulers (Marx 1967; Lenin 1971). Even Weber recognizes this fact and
shows his ambivalence toward bureaucracy and bureaucratic administration as a
powerful instrument of class rule (Weber 1947, 1968). Thus, we see a spectrum of
Bureaucracy, Democracy, and Hypocricy: A Theoretical Analysis 253
various ideological perspectives on democracy and democratic systems around the
world.
The dynamics of democracy is further explained by the variations in forms of
political systems and degrees of citizen participation in the political process.
Generally speaking, there are three types of democratic political systems which use
election as a rule: the parliamentary system, in which the winning political party
forms the government and controls the legislative parliament (e.g., Germany); the
presidential system, in which presidents are elected directly by popular votes of
people but must deal with a supportive or opposing legislature (e.g., U.S. system);
the mixed parliamentary and strong presidential system, in which both features add
to the dynamics of the political system (e.g., France). Socialist systems may also
have elections, both directly and indirectly through representation. Direct democracy
is rare and possible only in small population based towns or villages, hence the case
for “representative democracies,” in which citizens have to rely on elected
representatives who tend to ‘log-role’ through-give and-take strategies with opposing
colleagues in order to get things done; and this adds more complexity to the politics
of democracy.
The politics of democracy is explained by several perspectives. One perspective
on the right complains that democracy is endangered by bureaucracy, big
government, and bureaucratic involvement in democratic policy making. This is a
neo-conservative perspective noted earlier, represented by public choice theorists
who seek small government, privatization, market approaches to government
functions. Their suspicion, and criticism, of public bureaucracy is both real and
imaginary, as they also need the bureaucracy to protect market interests and promote
corporate goals. The second perspective on the politics of democracy concerns its
deficiency as a form of government. Plato considered democracy deficient and based
on the “rule of the mob,” with human sentiment playing a key role in determining
who should rule. Human sentiment and mob rule can be easily manipulated by the
rich, fear of retaliation, and other means. To Plato, democracy also means
“plutocracy,” in which the rich rule by means of money and manipulation power.
Contemporary critics of democracy also point out the power of money and wealth
in ruling society, not formal elections or official names; they consider “plutocracy”
as the norm of governance in bourgeoisie democracy, with a few rich who dominates
and the vast majority “who is powerless” (Parenti 1988, 2010). The third critical
perspective on democracy comes from the left, the socialists and revolutionary
progressives who see democracy in capitalism a rhetorical cover for class
exploitation and repression of the vast majority of people by the few super rich
capitalist class. Still other perspectives point out the changed and ineffective nature
of democracy eclipsed by secrecy, lack of accountability, lack of responsiveness, and
corruption. This perspective see real dangers in democracy both within and outside
its boundaries—within when fewer and fewer citizens bother taking part in the
political process and/or trust their governments. This group of critics also notes
contradictions between what the Western democracies claim through rhetorical
slogans, and what they actually practice in other nations around the world—ignoring
human rights and violating democratic values in favor of national economic or
business interests. This perspective criticizes industrial democracies for practicing
neo-colonial and imperialist ideas, invading rich developing nations for political and
254 A. Farazmand
economic reasons, and dominating the world by forming an oligarchic hegemony
over it (Kelly 2007; Parenti 1988, 2010; Agnew 2005).
Reconciling bureaucracy and democracy?
Can bureaucracy and democracy be reconciled? Are they mutually exclusive
institutions of modern governance? Bureaucracy stands for continuity, order,
efficiency, standardization and rationalization of government administration. It
stands for fairness through universal application of rules and regulation, and as such
bureaucracy is compatible with and serves the interests and goals of democracy.
Democracy stands for election, representation, responsiveness, expediency, accountability
and citizen participation in the democratic process of government. Yet
democracy has been less efficient, often eclipsed by corruption and other problems.
The world of the last quarter century has experienced massive reforms in
governments and administrative systems, all toward privatization and outsourcing
of government functions. The major trends have been ‘market reform,’ market-based
governance, market-based administration, strategic and systemic privatization, and
results oriented reorganization. The buzz word has been “new” to describe New
Governance, New Public Management, and all the rest. How new are these ‘new’
ideas?
Proponents of these new market-based reforms have argued that traditional
bureaucracy and governance systems have outlived their time and they are no longer
good enough, if they ever were; that they are inefficient and unresponsive to citizen
demands; and that there are no market signals, no competitions, and no incentives
for public bureaucrats to deliver services with high efficiency; and that large
government and bureaucracy are a threat to democracy (Mosher 1968; Niskanen
1971). Their anti-bureaucracy solution is in “reinventing government” to reform
public administration through privatization and outsourcing of public sector
functions (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). Opponents of the sweeping market-based
reforms, massive privatization, and outsourcing argue that bureaucracy is actually
better and more efficient when taken social and opportunity costs into account of the
calculus of efficiency (Goodsell 2004; Farazmand 2009b; Meier 1993); and that
accountability is lost with sweeping privatization, especially in the age of rapid
corporate globalization in search of absolute rate of profit, total control of societies
and their markets and governments. They maintain that privatization does not
necessarily produce higher efficiency; that such a policy of sweeping public–private/
corporate sector transformation only benefits corporate globalizers and threatens
‘democracy’ and democratic rights of citizens as well as undermines the sovereignty
of nation states (Farazmand 1999; Korten 2001; Waldo 1992; Woods 2006); and that
no alternative has ever replaced bureaucracy, and never will.
These critics further argue that it is a hypocrisy to speak of democracy without
bureaucracy.

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Bureaucracy and Democracy
B. Guy Peters
Published online: 5 August 2010
# Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2010
Abstract The public bureaucracy is becoming an increasingly important locus for
democratic activity. This shift of democratic activity is in part a function of the
declining relevance of traditional forms of democracy, and changes within the public
bureaucracy itself. In particular, the emphasis on performance and the links with
output legitimation have led to greater participation through the bureaucracy.
Keywords Bureaucracy . Democracy participation
Introduction
The terms bureaucracy and democracy are usually thought of, both in the academic
and the popular literature, as antithetical approaches to providing governance for a
society (see Etzioni-Halevey 1983). On the one hand public bureaucracies are
typically conceptualized as necessary for the effective administration of public
programs, but as being legalistic and largely indifferent to the wishes and demands
of individual citizens.1 Bureaucracies also tend to be associated with hierarchical and
even authoritarian forms of governing, even though at least part of the logic for
institutionalizing the bureaucratic form of governing was to ensure equal treatment
of citizens, and to provide clients with records and justifications for the decisions
being made about them within the public sector.2
On the other hand, democratic institutions are assumed to be responsive to the
wishes of the public, and to be attempting to map those public preferences into
positive outcomes for their citizens. Richard Rose (1974) and others have pointed
out that the linkage between voting and policy choices in conventional
representative democracy is not as clear as most democrats might like to believe.
Public Organiz Rev (2010) 10:209–222
DOI 10.1007/s11115-010-0133-4
1These views are, of course, stereotypes and do not reflect the real nature of many or even most public
bureaucracies (see Goodsell 2004; Du Gay 2000).
2Weber’s model of bureaucracy, for example, attempted to ensure equality of treatment as well as greater
transparency in the public sector.
B. G. Peters (*)
Political Science Department, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA
e-mail: bgpeters@pitt.edu
Further, the public may vote for inconsistent goals, or have unrealistic expectations
that will require leaders–elected and bureaucratic— to make policy decisions on
their own (Caplan 2007). Further, in coalition governments the linkage between
votes and final policy decisions is at best complex. Still, for some good reasons,
democratic governance is assumed to be able to adjust more effectively to the
needs and wants of the public than most other forms of governing.
The relationship between bureaucracy and democracy is both paradoxical and
complementary. The linkage between those two elements of governing is
paradoxical primarily because an effective democracy may require an effective
and well-functioning bureaucracy.3 Indeed, the emphasis on efficiency and the use
of the market in public service delivery during the past several decades has
demonstrated the extent to which the values of formalized bureaucracy maybe
important for a democracy to function well. The stereotype of rigidity in the
negative descriptions of bureaucracy may, in fact, be the result of a wellfunctioning
bureaucracy emphasizing equality, and attempting to ensure that all
members of society receive the same treatment according to law, even if that style
of delivery appears to be inefficient. Likewise, the formalization of public
bureaucracies was adopted at least in part to provide citizens the capacity to keep
track of their case as it moved through the labyrinth, and to be able to discover the
reasons for a decision once made. In short, bureaucracy was put into place to
minimize the arbitrary and capricious actions in which governments might
otherwise be tempted to engage, and in which markets may find it very appropriate
to engage in order to maximize efficiency.
These two aspects of governing maybe appear to be antithetical but they are
both necessary for providing effective and responsive governing, and the two
provide complementary benefits for society. The responsiveness of democratic
governing must be balanced with the predictability and impartiality assumed to
reside within bureaucratic institutions. Likewise, the democratic process4 is
important to confer legitimacy on the governing process, although in some
instances political systems—notably the European Union (Scharpf 2006)— are
able to legitimate their existence through its ability to govern effectively, and to
produce the outputs desired by the public. Indeed, there is some evidence that
outputs are more important than inputs in legitimating a range of political systems
(Rothstein 2009). The complementary nature of democratic and bureaucratic forms
of governance might be extended, but the basic point is that in contemporary
political systems they are both essential for good governance.
Although they are complementary, the relationship between democracy as
usually conceptualized and the public bureaucracy has been changing, and in
particular the nature of democracy itself has been changing. This paper will
present a general argument that public administration is becoming an increasingly
important locus for democratic participation in the contemporary public sector.
This argument will comprise four elements. The first is that the quality and
3 Suleiman (2003, 32) quite rightly notes that a constitution democracy depends upon an effective public
bureaucracy.
4 Of course, in non-democratic political systems that legitimacy must be conferred by some other political
process such as charisma or the control of hegemonic political party/caste.
210 B.G. Peters
efficacy of representative democracy in most European and North American
political systems are increasingly questioned, and are increasingly weak.
Participation in elections, membership in political parties, as well as many other
conventional forms of democratic participation, continue to decline in almost all
countries, indicating that the public may feel that these structures and processes
are not able to meet their collective needs.
In addition, the delivery of public services has been becoming increasingly
complex, and traditional accountability regimens that depended upon parliamentary
institutions are incapable of monitoring those service delivery complexes
effectively. These weaknesses in accountability are evident for both the
marketized delivery of public services and for “governance” arrangements that
involve civil society actors through networks and other participatory structures
(see Peters 2008). Likewise, the increased use of autonomous and quasiautonomous
organizations to deliver public services has also weakened conventional,
hierarchical accountability. Citizens may also encounter some confusion
when confronting contemporary service delivery but being closer to those services
may invest more in monitoring.
As well as become more disaggregated the public sector has also developed a
set of instruments that can be used to substitute for some aspects of conventional
accountability. There has been, for example, an increased monitoring of the
performance of individual facilities–schools, hospitals, etc.–and with that increased
public mobilization around the performance of those facilities. More generally,
performance management has enabled the public to assess the performance of the
public sector and to place pressures on the poorly performing elements of the public
sector. The use of governance networks also provides mechanisms for public
involvement with government, and especially the public bureaucracy.
Therefore, democracy have shifted significantly toward the output side of the
public sector, and that change in turn implies that accountability has become an
even more central instrument for democracy. The bureaucracy has become an
important locus for public involvement and for democracy.5 Further, the nature of
democracy itself maybe shifting away from concern with making political inputs
into decision-making toward more direct control over outputs (see Rothstein 2008).
Many contemporary instruments of accountability allow citizens to better assess
what services the bureaucracy is providing and to then direct their attention to the
organizations that may or may not be performing adequately.
This form of democracy is significantly different from that which attempts to provide
the indirect controls in more conventional models of democracy but perhaps is a more
effective means of controlling public policy (seeWarren 2009). In particular the outputoriented
version of democracy is more individualistic, non-deliberative and nonmobilizational.
Thus, this style of democracy shifts way from aggregating interests
and collective decisionmaking toward merely responding to the demands of each
individual (very much like the general conceptions of New Public Management).
5 One indication of the changing nature of this relationship is the large number of articles found in major
public administration journals that are attempting to conceptualize the nature of contemporary democracy
in the complex of changing patterns of service delivery (see Fung 2006).
Bureaucracy and Democracy 211
The decline of representative democracy
The conventional working model of democracy has assumed that voters would
control policy choices through voting for candidates who would in turn follow
through by selecting policies that their voters preferred. The bureaucracy would
then be expected to directions coming from those elected officials and to
administer the law to the best of their ability. Thus, an important elements of the
conventional model of democracy was that the elected politicians are responsible
for making policy choice and the administrators are responsible for putting them
into effect. This familiar Wilsonian dichotomy has been most clearly articulated
in the Anglo-American democracies but some of the same logic is evident in all
administrative systems except those that are directly fused with political parties.
The central actor in this democratic drama is the average citizen who is assumed
to be interested in politics, or at least sufficiently interested to vote. The hero of this
drama for many analysts would be the citizen who not only votes but also is
sufficiently involved in politics to pay attention to media and other information and
who would then make informed choices of political parties and candidates. Even if
heroic characters of this sort are not encountered all that often then institutionalized
political parties provide cues for the average voter. If nothing else their past behavior
can be a good guide to their behavior in the future so that citizens can reduce their
costs of being engaged in politics.
The problem for contemporary democracy is that there appear to be fewer and
fewer citizens who are actively engaged in political life (Wattenberg and Dalton
2002). With some notable exceptions, such as the French Presidential election of
2007 and the 2008 primary season in the United States, electoral participation has
been declining in most democratic political systems. This drop in participation has
been true even in political systems such as the Nordic countries that have long
histories of active voting and other forms of political participation. I will not
speculate at any length on the reasons for the declining levels of participation, but
what is clear is that there are a number of “disaffected democrats” in the
industrialized democracies (Pharr and Putnam 2000).
The decline in citizen involvement in mass politics is evident in the declining
levels of voting, and it is perhaps even more apparent in the declining level of
involvement in established political parties. In the first place, membership in
political parties, and even identification with established parties, has been declining.
In most surveys citizens show a declining interest in political parties and often do not
consider them relevant for effective governance, or relevant for the everyday lives of
those citizens. Further, many traditional political parties have lost ground to “flash
parties” that may reflect the appeal of an individual politician, e.g. Pym Fonteyn in
the Netherlands or Naser Khader of Ny Alliance in Denmark, or may reflect the
importance of a single issue such as immigration.
Some scholars have also argued that political parties themselves have changed,
reinforcing the lack of interest that the average citizen might have with them.6 In
particular, many political parties appear to be de-emphasizing their representational
6 I am indebted to Muiris MacCarthaigh for emphasizing this point to me.
212 B.G. Peters
role while emphasizing their role in governing. They have become, in Katz and
Mair’s (1995, 2008) term, “cartel parties”, and tend to try to maintain their place in
the cartel of governing structures more than relating directly to the public.7 If this
characterization is true, and there does appear to be substantial justification for the
argument, then it is not surprising that the public would withdraw their support and
involvement with the parties.
The decline in party membership and the increasingly floating nature of parties in
many democracies is important for understanding the input side of contemporary
politics. For our purposes, however, this change is more important because it reduces
one of the important channels of accountability in democratic politics. Parties and
party leaders that come and go will tend to be less effective, everything else being
equal, in enforcing accountability over public bureaucracies than will more
established parties that have an electoral incentive. The single issue parties maybe
interested in accountability in that single policy area, but generally not in broader
policy issues nor in the continuing effective operation of democratic accountability
considered very broadly.
In short, somewhat paradoxically, in an era in which participation, broadly
defined, has become an ever more important value for the public8 the level of
participation in many aspects of political life has been declining. The institutions and
opportunities that had motivated the bulk of political participation for decades appear
to have become less relevant, with some citizens simply dropping out of political
life. However, as we will be discussing below, alternative forms of participation are
being developed and expanded so that democratic life can be rejuvenated, albeit in a
very different form. I am less interested here in ideas such as direct democracy or
referenda but rather more in the means through which citizens can participate with
respect to programs that affect them directly.
The complexity of service delivery
In the traditional model of government and service delivery there is a more or less
linear relationship between a public organization and a service. As Walsh and
Stewart (1992) pointed out one of the characteristics of traditional public
management was that the State was self-sufficient and would deliver its own
services. Except in those countries, such as Sweden, that early adopted the agency
model for service delivery most of the action of providing public service was housed
in ministries directly linked with political authority. This linear relationships between
voters, ministers, their civil servants and the service delivered made enforcing
accountability over programs relatively easy (Day and Klein 1987).
Although the traditional service delivery model might be seen to be capable of
enforcing accountability rather well, it was also a hierarchical process, and appeared
7 The decline of this representational function for political parties accentuates the emphasis on output
democracy. If the political parties do less tot facilitate input democracy then citizens may as well use their
participation to get what they want from the bureaucracy.
8 To some extent the “post-material” politics of Inglehart have been achieved and participation in an
important value, in the abstract. In practice, however, many members of the public do not appear
interested in the participation opportunities conventionally available in the public sector.
Bureaucracy and Democracy 213
to exclude the public from any effective involvement. The public was involved at the
level of selecting (albeit indirectly) the minister through the electoral process, as
above, but even the clients would be excluded from any direct involvement in
designing the services.9 This model of governing assumed that the public had little
of importance to say about the policies being delivered to them, and that their
involvement actually might undermine both the technical quality and the legality of
the services being rendered.
The ministerial model of service delivery has now been transformed drastically.
One of the central ideas motivating the (in)famous New Public Management is that
government organizations should “steer and not row”, meaning that the public sector
was perceived to be better at making policy decisions than at implementing
decisions. The familiar arguments about the weaknesses and inefficiencies of
bureaucracy (Osborne and Gaebler 1992) have been taken to justify the use of
instruments such as contracting, partnerships and voluntary agreements to deliver
public services. Further, even if the service delivery function were retained in the
public sector the prevailing wisdom was that it should be delegated to autonomous
or quasi-autonomous organizations usually referred to as agencies (see Pollitt and
Talbot 2004), thereby enhancing the efficiency and transparency of the services.10
The move away from the direct ministerial provision of services has weakened
the traditional mechanisms of accountability, and forced the creation of alternative
formats for holding public organizations accountable (see Considine 2002). In
general, the shift has been away from hierarchical forms of accountability toward
competitive, and mutualistic forms for accountability (Hood et al. 2004). These less
conventional forms of accountability require the involvement of the clients of
programs, as well as the general public.11 Those citizens would need become
involved in identifying and evaluating the outputs of public programs, as well as in
mobilizing to complain about inadequate performance.
As well as a decline in the direct connections of services to ministries and the
problems of political accountability associated with that change, the movement
toward alternative forms of service delivery and the complexity of that provision has
tended to create confusion among the population. For many nominally public
services it is difficult to determine who really is responsible, and citizens may not
have a clear conception of what government does any more. Again somewhat
paradoxically the attempt to create more efficient services may have in the process
weakened the public’s idea of what those services are and actually reduced the
perception of an effective and benevolent public sector.12
In addition to the general loss of clarity for citizens, the various means that the
public sector and its partners have devised for delivering public services present a
9 Indeed the clients might be very explicitly excluded in the case of many social policies that might have
some control as well as beneficial functions. Of course, for policies such as taxation
10 One of the assumptions of the use of agencies with single functions is that monitoring their performance
and their use of funds is easier than with large multi-service ministries.
11 The hierarchical forms of accountability have been dominant, but the alternatives are hardly completely
new. Indeed, some of the oldest forms of accountability have depended upon mutualism, or two or more
actors or institutions watching each other.
12 For this reason the notion of services publiques in the French model has tended to create a clearer
picture of responsibility and to prevent some of the excesses associated with Anglo-Sxon reforms.
214 B.G. Peters
variety of accountability challenges, as well as challenges for democracy considered
more broadly. Although a common reaction to the perceived need for change,
marketized delivery of services maybe the most difficult format for which to enforce
public accountability. The dominant logic in moving services into contractual
relationships, or other market formats, is in fact to reduce control from political
forces and from the public (other than in their consumer role), and to permit other
types of criteria govern the organization and delivery of the service. Contracts for
public services are notoriously difficult to write in a way that can ensure the type of
performance envisioned by the public organization writing the contract, and the
associated lack of specificity makes attempting to control them all the more difficult.
On the other hand, however, the use of “agencies” and other devolved
organizations within the public sector may offer several avenues for accountability.
For example, although the agency maybe to some extent hived-off from the ministry
and political control, that control cannot be eliminated entirely, and some levers for
control tend to be retained, whether personnel, legal authorization, or usually the
budget (Verhoest et al. 2004). Further, many agencies have at least a second
dimension of accountability, often more closely related to the public than the
traditional vertical form through parliament or through legal structures such as a
Conseil d’Etat. Boards composed of experts, officials and the affected interests
formed an alternative line of accountability for agencies in the original Swedish
model, and in other cases the boards may even be elected, whether at large or from
among clients.
In addition to the somewhat passive idea that the development of agencies and
other devolved formats for service delivery create new opportunities for accountability,
they may also create a more pressing need for public participation. That is, if
these organizations are hived off from ministerial lines of control then if the public is
to have much influence over them they may have to find avenues for more direct
involvement. This involvement will not, of course, be done by the average citizen
acting autonomously but rather will be done by organized groups, whether in
network structures or through a more pluralistic manner requiring some competition
for access (McFarland 2007).
Another important aspect of contemporary patterns of service delivery is that even
if they are complex they do tend to become institutionalized. Indeed, often because
they are complex they tend to be institutionalized if only by default and because the
transaction costs of negotiating new relationships between public and private sector
actors is high. Institutionalized patterns such as partnerships (see Pierre and Peters
2008) are the products of often extended bargaining among the actors and involve
developing “logics of appropriateness” within the structure that provide means of
guiding behavior. While that institutionalized logic may enable the members to
function more effectively, it may also exclude non-members from any real
involvement.
While the devolution and fragmentation of public service provision have created
substantial problems for conventional forms of accountability, they have also
engendered new attempts on the part of political parties and governments to exert
some control. The level of politicization of the public bureaucracy appears to have
been increasing in response to the decline in some other instrument of accountability
(Peters and Pierre 2004; Rouban 2004). The numerous appointive positions on
Bureaucracy and Democracy 215
boards and in executive positions are patronage opportunities that might well have
been seized upon even in the absence of a need to regain some political control, but
the need to exert that control and to restore some level of accountability made these
opportunities all the more welcome.
Creating democratic politics
Although they are readily important for delivering public services, public
bureaucracies have a second, often unrecognized, role in democratic governance.
These organizations function as the principal interface between State and society, so
that citizens are more likely to come into contact with a bureaucrat of some sort than
they are to come in contact with their democratically elected officials. These contacts
maybe important for determining how well the services are delivered, but they also
play a major role in defining how the public considers government and the
legitimacy of the public sector. Most citizens rarely meet their elected representatives
but they almost daily will encounter some member of the public bureaucracy, and
those encounters can help to legitimate, or delegitmate, the state to the public (see
Katz 1975; Yackee and Lowery 2005). There is increasing evidence that these
relationships are important securing public trust in the public sector (Christensen and
Laegreid 2005).13
In addition to the downward legitimation function performed by the public
bureaucracy those organizations also can be the means of processing inputs coming
from the public, notably their clients. Street level bureaucrats are in daily contact
with their clients and often attempt to feed the information they collect from those
interactions into the political process (Smith 2004). That representational role for
public servants can be seen as an inappropriate form of politics by many citizens but
it is an alternative route for influence which segments of a society who might not
otherwise be represented. Street level bureaucrats in social service agencies, and the
police in different ways, have much greater contact with the“least, the last, and the
lost” in society than do conventional political institutions and hence maybe able to
channel rather different types of information into the policy-making system.
Although market devices and some of the other products of the enthusiasm for
New Public Management may have been able to enhance the efficiency of public
services, other aspects of the transformation of the public sector have been able to
create alternative mechanisms for democracy. To some extent this shift in the locus
of democracy has involved the creation of opportunities for participation, while in
other cases that participation has virtually been mandated by the public sector. In
both types of changes, however, the conception of democracy shifts away from
representative, electoral versions of that value toward more indirect and particularistic
versions.
The nature of changes in accountability in themselves have had the effect of
shifting forms of democracy. For example, the increased emphasis on measuring
13 The good news is that most evidence shows that citizens tend to regard these contacts positively,
although unfortunately at the same time they may not generalize from those positive contacts to a
generally positive view of the public sector.
216 B.G. Peters
performance and “naming and shaming” organizations that have not been
performing well has embedded within it a strong assumption about participation.
That assumption is that when an organization providing public services does not
perform well, whether that organization itself is public or not, then the clients of that
organization will mobilize and place pressure on the organization to perform better.
For example, when schools do not perform well the assumption is that parents will
become active in attempting to improve the school.14
As well as providing rather stark stimuli for citizens to become mobilized,
changes in accountability regimens, and in norms of participation, have created other
incentives for democratic involvement. Simply by de-emphasizing the legalistic and
hierarchical elements of governing changes in the public sector have tended to create
opportunities for political involvement around the individual organizations. Those
opportunities are driven in part by the devolved structures themselves. The devolved
organizations and “implementation structures” (Hjern and Porter 1980) need the
political support from groups and citizens given that they are not tied directly to
conventional forms of political support.15 too well, their constituents. In some cases
the rights of clients, other affected citizens, and perhaps the public as a whole maybe
mandated but even when it is not the organizations may want to foster such
involvement.
While we can extol all these opportunities for democracy, the type of democracy
that has been created maybe rather suspect. The mobilization assumption that is
embedded in the competitive idea of accountability depends upon the political
competence of the clients involved, and any optimism that this maybe a general
phenomenon often is misplaced. For example, lower quality public services are often
found in the neighborhoods that are less affluent and also less capable of being
effective politically (Friedrichs et al. 2005). Thus, depending upon political
mobilization may simply perpetuate inequalities rather than create any viable means
of reducing those inequalities. Representative democracy has been criticized as
perpetuating the power of the more affluent because of the importance of money in
politics, but the consequences of changing the style of democracy may not
necessarily produce any real change in the distribution of power and influence.
The only significant difference maybe that the public servants who are involved with
providing services in the less affluent areas, or to less powerful citizens, may
themselves have internalized some of the norms of equity (Smith 2004)
In addition to some of the difficulties encountered with political mobilization of
many segments of the population, the mechanisms of “New Governance” may
privilege certain types of actors. This privilege is perhaps most apparent for an
instrument such as public-private partnerships that involves a private actor directly in
the delivery of the service. While the public sector is, of course, able to leverage
resources through such arrangements it also loses some of its autonomy. The suspect
14 No

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