Philosophy Assignment | Custom Assignment Help

you will need to post a substantive response to any one (or more) of the open-answer questions provided below. (remember I want a substantive, specific answer!!!) Questions For This Discussion Forum: Why does Marx hold that there is nothing natural about our fundamental moral convictions, and that in fact they are the product of forces of which we are entirely unaware? What forces does he have in mind? Why would a Marxist be suspicious of the contemporary moral/political focus on rights and liberties? How would they critically interpret such a moral/political focus? What does Marx mean when he claims that morality is inherently bourgeoisand a product of false consciousness? Is he right to do so? Is Marx critical of all morality, or only a bourgeois morality? Could there be a Marxist account of a ‘morality of the future’ once we overcome the inherent class conflicts within capitalist society? Would there be any need for morality in such a future society, if Marx is right? Why does Nietzsche hold that morality is a means by which the ordinary impose their will over the exceptional, and thereby enforce mediocrity? What does Nietzsche mean when he argues that morality arises out of ressentiment? Does it? What are the two main elements of the ‘morality of the weak’, according to Nietzsche? How are they meant to undermine and frustrate the will of those who are exceptional? Why does Nietzsche argue that the ‘death of God’ leads to both a crisis and an opportunity? What are the main points on which Marx and Nietzsche are in agreement in their respective critiques of morality? (Try to list at least three points of agreement). Have capitalist societies made moral progress since (say) the second world war? How might this issue be relevant to evaluating Marx and Nietzsche’s critiques of morality? To what extent could it be argued that Marx and Nietzsche’s critiques of morality effectively presuppose a Kantian or utilitarian conception of morality? How might one appeal to virtue ethics to respond to these critiques? What does Hume mean when he argues that morality is something that we projectonto objective reality, rather than being part of reality itself? What is moral expressivism, and what does it say about the nature of moral claims? In what sense is Hume’s moral expressivism more radical in its treatment of moral claims than the critiques of morality offered by Marx and Nietzsche? What ismoral relativism, and how does it offer one (radical) solution to the problem of moral disagreement? What ismoral scepticism, and how is it different from moral relativism? What is the distinction between moral knowledge scepticismand moral truth scepticism? How do these two forms of scepticism respond to the problem of moral disagreement? How are these approaches different from the response to the problem of moral disagreement offered by moral relativism? Why is moral expressivism committed to moral truth scepticism? Why is moral relativism not a way of respecting the moral claims of those who you disagree with? Is moral disagreement a good motivation for moral relativism? If so, then does the existence of moral agreement offer a motivation againstmoral relativism? Can there be moral progress, and if so, does that mean that moral relativism must be false? What is Mackie’s argument from queernessagainst moral objectivity? Is it compelling, do you think? What is Mackie’s argument from relativityagainst moral objectivity? Mackie argues that there are only two credible explanations for the diversity found in our moral judgements, and that neither of them are plausible. What are these explanations, and is Mackie right to dismiss their plausibility? What is the distinction between moral realism and moral anti-realism? How might a moral anti-realist nonetheless claim that there is such a thing as an objective morality? What is a moral error-theory, of the kind defended by Mackie? Why is it a form of moral anti-realism? How does it differ from moral expressivism? What is it about a Kantian ethics that ensures that morality is objective? Why is a Kantian ethics nonetheless a form of moral anti-realism? Why is such a proposal known as constructivism? How does an Aristotelian virtue ethics, like a Kantian ethics, claim that there is an objective morality even while endorsing moral anti-realism? How might the analogy with colour be useful in this regard? What is moral epistemology? What is the distinction between moral cognitivism and moral non-cognitivism? Why is the moral expressivist and the moral knowledge skeptic committed to moral non-cognitivism? What is the crucial difference between the kinds of moral non-cognitivism endorsed by these two proposals? How does the very idea of moral experts suggest that moral cognitivism must be true? If there are moral experts, then does it follow that there is nothing wrong in entirely forming our moral opinions by deferring to their judgements (as we often do with regard to experts in other realms, like scien