Alcoff’s “The Problem With Speaking For Others Assignment | Essay Help Services

Hello. Write with plain, simple language, there is no need to sound fancy. No need to quote. Don’t raise more objections than you need to. Can use personal pronouns. No general introduction. Explain technical terms. Thank you. The “Radford” attachment is a paper I submitted earlier if you can try your best to imitate it. Also, I wanted to do question 6 but if you want to write about another, be my guest

Consider the following true stories: 1. Anne Cameron, a very gifted white Canadian author, writes several semi-fictional accounts of the lives of Native Cana- dian women. She writes them in first person and assumes a Native identity. At the 1988 International Feminist Book Fair in Montreal a group of Native Canadian writers decided to ask Cameron to, in their words, “move over” on the grounds that her writings are disempowering for Native authors. She agrees.’ 2. After the 1989 elections in Panama are overturned by Manuel Noriega, President Bush of the United States declares in a public address that Noriega’s actions constitute an “outrageous fraud” and that “the voice of the Panamanian people has spoken.” “The Panamanian people,” he tells us, “want democracy and not tyranny, and want Noriega out.” He proceeds to plan the invasion of Panama. 3. At a recent symposium at my university, a prestigious theorist was invited to give a lecture on the political problems postmodernism. Those of us in the audience, including many white women and people of oppressed nationalities and races, ? 1991 by Cultural Critique. 0882-4371 (Winter 1991-92). All rights reserved. 5This content downloaded from 146.96.128.36 on Sun, 19 Apr 2020 14:42:01 UTCAll use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
6 Linda Alcoff waited in eager anticipation for what he has to contribute to this important discussion. To our disappointment, he introduced his lecture by explaining that he could not cover the assigned topic, because as a white male he did not feel that he could speak for the feminist and postcolonial perspectives that have launched the crit- ical interrogation of postmodernism’s politics. He went on to give us a lecture on architecture. These examples demonstrate some of the current practices and discussions around speaking for others in our society. As type of discursive practice, speaking for others has come under increasing criticism, and in some communities it is being rejected. There is a strong, albeit contested, current within feminism which holds that speaking for others is arrogant, vain, unethical, and politically illegitimate. In feminist magazines such as Sojourner it is common to find articles and letters in which the author states that she can only speak for herself. In her important paper, “Dyke Methods,” Joyce Trebilcot offers a philosophical articulation of this view. She renounces for herself the practice of speaking for others within a lesbian feminist community and argues further that she “will not try to get other wimmin to accept my beliefs in place of their own” on the grounds that to do so would be to practice a kind of discursive coercion and even a violence (1).2 In anthropology there is also much discussion going on about wheth- er it is possible to adequately or justifiably speak for others. Trinh T. Minh-ha explains the grounds for skepticism when she says that anthropology is “mainly a conversation of ‘us’ with ‘us’ about ‘them,’ of the white man with the white man about the primitive- nature man … in which ‘them’ is silenced. ‘Them’ always stands on the other side of the hill, naked and speechless . . ‘them’ is only admitted among ‘us,’ the discussing subjects, when accom- panied or introduced by an ‘us’ . ..” (65, 67).3 Given this analy- sis, even ethnographies written by progressive anthropologists are a priori regressive because of the structural features of anthropo- logical discursive practice. The recognition that there is a problem in speaking for oth- ers has arisen from two sources. First, there is a growing recogni- tion that where one speaks from affects the meaning and truth of what one says, and thus that one cannot assume an ability toThis content downloaded from 146.96.128.36 on Sun, 19 Apr 2020 14:42:01 UTCAll use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
The Problem of Speaking for Others 7 transcend one’s location. In other words, a speaker’s location (which I take here to refer to their social location, or social identi- ty) has an epistemically significant impact on that speaker’s claims and can serve either to authorize or disauthorize one’s speech. The creation of women’s studies and African-American studies departments was founded on this very belief: that both the study of and the advocacy for the oppressed must come to be done principally by the oppressed themselves, and that we must finally acknowledge that systematic divergences in social location tween speakers and those spoken for will have a significant effect on the content of what is said. The unspoken premise here simply that a speaker’s location is epistemically salient. I shall plore this issue further in the next section. The second source involves a recognition that, not only location epistemically salient, but certain privileged locations discursively dangerous.4 In particular, the practice of privileged persons speaking for or on behalf of less privileged persons actually resulted (in many cases) in increasing or reinforcing oppression of the group spoken for. This was part of the argu- ment made against Anne Cameron’s speaking for Native Cana- dian women: Cameron’s intentions were never in question, but effects of her writing were argued to be counterproductive regard to the needs of Native women. Thus, the work of ileged authors who speak on behalf of the oppressed is coming more and more under criticism from members of those oppressed groups themselves.5 As philosophers and social theorists we are authorized virtue of our academic positions to develop theories that express and encompass the ideas, needs, and goals of others. However, must begin to ask ourselves whether this is a legitimate authority. Is the discursive practice of speaking for others ever a valid tice, and, if so, what are the criteria for validity? In particular, ever valid to speak for others who are unlike me or who are privileged than me? We might try to delimit this problem as only arising when more privileged person speaks for a less privileged one. In case, we might say that I should only speak for groups of which am a member. But this does not tell us how groups themselves should be delimited. For example, can a white woman speakThis content downloaded from 146.96.128.36 on Sun, 19 Apr 2020 14:42:01 UTCAll use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
8 Linda Alcoff for all women simply by virtue of being a woman? If not, how narrowly should we draw the categories? I am a Panamanian- American, and a person of mixed ethnicity and race: half white/ Angla and half Panamanian mestiza. The criterion of group iden- tity leaves many unanswered questions for a person such as my- self, since I have membership in many conflicting groups but my membership in all of them is problematic. On what basis can we justify a decision to demarcate groups and define membership in one way rather than another? No easy solution to this problem can be found by simply restricting the practice of speaking for others to speaking for groups of which one is a member. Moreover, adopting the position that one should only speak for oneself raises similarly problematic questions. For example, we might ask, if I don’t speak for those less privileged than myself, am I abandoning my political responsibility to speak out against oppression, a responsibility incurred by the very fact of my priv- ilege? If I should not speak for others, should I restrict myself to following their lead uncritically? Is my greatest contribution to move over and get out of the way? And if so, what is the best way to do this-to keep silent or to deconstruct my discourse? The answers to these questions will certainly differ signifi- cantly depending on who is asking them. While some of us may want to continue to undermine, for example, the U.S. govern- ment’s practice of speaking for the “free world”-an ideo- logical construction that represents a great number of Third World nations-we may not want to undermine someone such as Rigoberta Menchu’s ability to speak for Guatemalan Indians.6 So the question arises as to whether all instances of speaking for others should be condemned and, if not, where the line of demar- cation should be drawn. In order to answer these questions we need to become clearer on the epistemological and metaphysical issues that are involved in the articulation of the problem of speaking for others, issues that most often remain implicit. I will attempt to make these clear, and then I will turn to discuss some of the possible sponses to the problem before advancing a provisional, proce- dural one of my own. But first I need to explain further framing of the problem. In the examples used above, there may appear to be a confla-This content

Final Paper Instructions

Pick one of the following questions and answer in 2000 words. Submit via Blackboard by Midnight, May 23. Make sure to answer every part of the question. You can think of the different parts of the question as corresponding to different parts (i.e. paragraphs) of your paper. Make sure you cite, whenever necessary. I don’t care what citation style you use, so long as it is used correctly and consistently.

Question One: (Reading: Diamond’s “Anything But Argument”)

Cora Diamond rejects Onora O’Neil’s suggestion that if one wants to convince someone to adopt some moral perspective, then one must proceed by offering that person arguments. Explain why Diamond rejects this view and also why, according to Diamond, many philosophers have found O’Neil’s claim attractive. Next, raise one objection to (or worry about) Diamond’s argument. Finally, consider how Diamond might respond to your objection, and give an overall assessment (supported by reasons!) of her argument.

Question Two: (Reading: Gaita’s “Stories, Philosophy, Science”)

Rai Gaita argues that stories can teach us about the scope and nature of moral concepts. Explain what Gaita means by this, and how this function of stories is very different from the function of “anecdotes” which Gaita sees as providing mere empirical evidence. Next, raise one objection to (or worry about) Gaita’s argument. Finally, consider how Gaita might respond to your objection, and give an overall assessment (supported by reasons!) of his claim.

Question Three: (Reading: Eaton’s “Robust Immoralism”)

Anne Eaton argues for Immoralism. Explain how Eaton thinks that artworks which feature Rough Heroes provide evidence of Immoralism. Make sure you define Immoralism and Rough Heroes. Next, raise one objection to Eaton’s argument. Finally, consider how Eaton might respond to your objection, and give an overall assessment (supported by reasons!) of her claim.

Question Four (Reading: Gendler’s “The Problem of Imaginative Resistance”)

In her article, Tamar Gendler lists some of the explanations that philosophers have given of the causes of imaginative resistance (i.e. the varieties of Wontianism, Cantianism etc.). Pick the explanation you think is the most plausible and sketch how it explains the causes and nature of imaginative resistance. Next, raise one objection to (or worry about) this explanation. Finally, consider how a defender of that explanation might respond to your objection, and give an overall assessment (supported by reasons!) of the explanation’s merits.

Question Five (Reading: Cunliffe’s “Narrative Fiction and Epistemic Injustice”)

Zoe Cunliffe argues that narrative fiction can help to promote epistemic justice. Sketch either Cunliffe’s argument that narrative fiction can help promote testimonial justice or her argument that narrative fiction can promote hermeneutic justice. (Make sure you define “testimonial/hermeneutic justice”). Next, raise one objection to (or worry about) Cunliffe’s argument. Finally, consider how Cunliffe might respond to your objection and give an overall assessment (supported by reasons!) of her argument.

Question Six: (Readings to consult: Alcoff’s “The Problem With Speaking For Others” and the collection of articles assigned for this week)

Some people claim it is problematic to write fiction that is about, or from the perspective of, people who are members of a social group that is not your own. First, explain how someone who thinks this could mount an argument for the claim that authors ought not “speak for others.” Next, raise an objection to that view. Finally, consider the strength of that objection and give an overall assessment (supported by reasons!) of the claim that authors ought not speak for others.

Question Seven: (Reading: Noel Carroll, “Interpretation and Intention”)

Noel Carroll argues that Modest Actual Intentionalism provides the best account of fictional meaning and interpretation. What does Modest Actual Intentionalism involve, and what is one of its greatest strengths, when compared to other theories of meaning and interpretation? Next, raise an objection to Modest Actual Intentionalism. Finally, consider the strength of that objection and give an overall assessment (supported by reasons!) of Modest Actual Intentionalism.